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EXAS civil trial procedure is the product of the state's Spanish civil
law heritage' and a desire by early Texas lawmakers to avoid the
complexities of a common law system of jurisprudence.2 This pio-
neer spirit of independence led Texans to adopt the simpler Spanish forms
of initiating civil actions by petition and answer 3 and allowing liberal
amendments to pleadings.4 Texans also rejected the bifurcated system of
law and equity courts, a holdover legal structure from the medieval Eng-
lish court system.5 In 1840 Texas adopted only so much of the common
law of England as was "'not inconsistent with the Constitution or the Acts
of Congress now in force.' "6 Early Texas courts also held that common
law procedures were not obligatory if in conflict with Texas procedure. 7
The early Texans thus made a conscious choice of the Spanish civil law
system in a variety of procedural areas, preferring simplicity and expedi-
ency in civil practices. Those founding Texas fathers would be astonished
by the complexity of our modem Texas venue practice. The Texas system
for determining the proper location of a civil trial as it exists today has
produced endless pages of case law,8 excessive costs, and consistent delays
in reaching the trial on the merits of any particular case.
The venue issue is raised in Texas when the defendant files a plea of
privilege, asserting that the venue alleged by the plaintiff in the original
B.B.A., University of Texas at Austin; J.D., University of Texas School of Law;
Associate Professor, University of Houston Law Center. The author wishes to express his
appreciation to Charles Lancaster for his valuable research and assistance.
1. McKnight, The Spanish Influence on the Texas Law of Civil Procedure, 38 TEXAS L.
REv. 24 (1959).
2. McCormick, The Revival of the Pioneer Spirit in Texas Procedure, 18 TEXAS L. REv.
426 (1940).
3. Id at 427-28.
4. Id at 429.
5. Id at 428; Markham, TheReception of the Common Law of England in Texas and the
JudicialAttitude Toward that Reception, 29 TEXAS L. REV. 904, 909-10 (1951).
6. HaIL An Account of the Adoption of the Common Law by Texas, 28 TEXAS L. REV.
801, 808 (1950) (quoting 1840 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act to Adopt the Common Law of Eng-
land,-to repeal certain Mexican Laws, and to regulate the Marital Rights of the parties, .2
H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 177-78 (1898)).
7. Grassmeyer v. Beeson, 13 Tex. 524, 531 (1855); see also Texas v. Smith, Dallam 407
(lf4l); Fowler v. Poor, Dallam 401 (1841); Hall, supra note 6, at 812-13.
8. See 37A TEx. DIG. Venue (1952 & Supp. 1981) (containing over 400 pages of anno-
tations of cases dealing with venue matters).
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petition is improper.9 The plaintiff must then file a controverting affidavit
and secure a hearing on the venue issue. 10 The plaintiff has the burden of
proof at the venue hearing to demonstrate that the forum county is the
proper venue; otherwise the defendant's plea will be granted and the case
transferred to the county of the defendant's residence. 11 The venue deci-
sion is an appealable interlocutory order,' 2 and trial on the merits of the
case may be delayed pending appeal. 13
The Texas venue statute is organized in a seemingly simple manner; a
general rule is qualified by a series of specific exceptions.14 The general
rule in venue matters is that "[n]o person who is an inhabitant of this State
shall be sued out of the county in which he has his domicile except in the
following cases."'15 That general rule is then diluted by thirty-four specific
exceptions. 16 Because the general rule is designed to protect the defend-
ant, the numerous exceptions can be viewed as either providing some ben-
efit to the plaintiff' 7 or providing assistance in the administration of
justice.'8
This Article discusses the history and development of the Texas venue
system, criticizes the confused evolution of that system, and examines
more efficient and practical venue systems of other jurisdictions. In an
attempt to bring simplicity and fairness to Texas procedural law, this Arti-
cle proposes a series of modifications to the current venue system. This
Article concludes that the trial on the merits is of primary importance;
consequently, the question of venue should be simplified in order to rele-
gate it to its proper secondary position.
I. HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND CRITICISM OF THE
TEXAS VENUE SYSTEM
Article 1995 The General Rule
Texas's first venue statute, passed in 1836,19 was taken from the Spanish
9. TEx. R. Civ. P. 86.
10. Id 87. The plaintiff can, of course, concede the defendant is correct as to venue and
request the case be transferred to the county of the defendant's residence.
11. Id 86-89; see General Motors Corp., Pontiac Motor Div. v. Courtesy Pontiac, Inc.,
538 S.W.2d 3, 6 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ); Citizens Standard Life Ins. Co. v.
Gilley, 521 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ); Fleetwood Constr. Co.
v. Western Steel Co., 510 S.W.2d 161, 163 (rex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).
12. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2008 (Vernon 1964); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 385(e).
13. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2008 (Vernon 1964); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 385(e).
14. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982).
15. Id
16. There are 31 numbered exceptions to the general rule, but because of exception
subparts, there are a total of 34 actual exceptions. See, e.g., id art. 1995(5)(a)-(b), (9a), (29a)
(Vernon Supp. 1982) (multiple provisions under one numbered exception).
17. See, e.g., id art. 1995(9a) (plaintiff may bring suit in county where defendant's neg-
ligent act occurred).
18. See, e.g., id art. 1995(19) (Vernon 1964) (suits against counties must be heard in the
defendant county).
19. 1836 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act Establishing the jurisdiction and powers of the Dis-




medieval code Las Siete Paridas,20 the Spanish law first codified in the
year 1265.21 Seven of the exceptions in the Texas statute of 1836 can be
traced directly to the Partidas.22 Thus the basic outline and governing
principles of Texas venue law, a general rule and accompanying excep-
tions, were derived from a medieval Spanish code. Though many excep-
tions have been added to our derivation of the original Spanish venue law,
the basic structure remains intact. " IT]he dominant purpose of the venue
statutes is to give a person who has been sued the right to defend such suit
in the county of his domicile .... "23 The size of the State of Texas and
the difficulty of early day transportation engendered a concern that the
defendant might be coerced into an unjust settlement.24 Modern transpor-
tation and communication have lessened the urgency of this concern. 25
More importantly, the basic venue provision favoring the defendant ig-
nores important factors that should be given equal consideration, such as
the convenience of witnesses and the location of the subject of the action.26
Similar concerns have been the basis for enactment of many of the excep-
tions to the basic venue rule. 27 The basic rule favoring the defendant's
residence has, however, served to give the defendant a clear advantage at
the venue hearing.28
An examination of legislative history and case law interpreting the ex-
ceptions indicates two primary motives behind the enactment of the excep-
tions. First and foremost, many of the exceptions benefit certain classes of
injured plaintiffs by granting an alternative venue in specific circum-
stances. 29 Secondly, many of the exceptions were drafted for the adminis-
trative convenience of the courts or the government.30 These motives serve
laudable purposes, but problems lie in the unnecessary complexity pro-
duced by "piecemeal legislative tinkering" 31 during more than 140 years.
32
The current Texas venue statute, article 1995 of the Texas Revised Civil
20. 2 G. LoPEz ed., LAs SIETE PARTIDAS III.2.32 (Valencia 1767).
21. McKnight, supra note 1, at 28.
22. Id at 37-40. Professor McKnight notes the similarity in the language and the order
of the venue exceptions in the Partidas compared to the Texas statute. Id
23. City of Mineral Wells v. McDonald, 141 Tex. 113, 116, 170 S.W.2d 466, 468 (1943).
24. Harvill, Venue in Texas: .4 New Approach to Proof of Venue Facts, 30 TEx. B.J. 429,
429-30 (1967); Langley, A Suggested Revision of the Texas Venue Statute, 30 TEXAs L. REv.
547 (1952).
25. Langley, supra note 24, at 547.
26. Id at 548.
27. Harvill, supra note 24, at 430.
28. Langley, supra note 24, at 550.
29. See, e.g., TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5) (contracts), (9a) (negligence), (31)
(breach of warranty) (Vernon Supp. 1982); see also the general principle, expressed by the
court in Finch's Heirs v. Edmonson, 9 Tex. 504, 510 (1853): "[Elxceptions in the statute are
all intended for the benefit of the plaintiff ... "
30. See, e.g., TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(6) (suits against executors), (17)
(suits for injunctions) (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982).
31. Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MICH. L. Rv. 307, 307
(1951).
32. Compare TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982) (31
numbered exceptions) with 1836 Tex. Gen. Laws, supra note 19, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAs 1258, 1260 (1898) (original Texas venue statute containing 10 numbered exceptions).
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Statutes, establishes the rule that no person who is an inhabitant of Texas
will be sued outside the county of his domicile except under specific cir-
cumstances. 33 Because of this structure, based more upon the exception
than the rule, the Texas venue statute has been criticized for a variety of
reasons. Initially, the statute lacks certainty of interpretation and clarity of
application. 34 These problems are reflected in the number of appellate
cases dealing with venue matters, occupying more than six hundred pages
of annotations in the Texas statutes.35 Part of the reason for the number of
appellate cases is the statute's use of undefined terms. Terms are given
different interpretations for venue purposes than for purposes of a trial on
the merits or other proceedings. 36 An example of this variance is found in
the basic venue provision that uses the term "domicile" of the defendant.
The Texas Supreme Court has held that "domicile" as used by the venue
statute is synonymous. with "residence. ' 37 The court, in defining the usual
legal concept of "domicile," noted that "there [can] be but one domicile
and several residences," but for venue purposes Texas courts should con-
strue the two terms to be synonymous.38 Other examples of the differing
interpretations given to legal terms for venue purposes can be seen in the
venue exceptions dealing with contracts 39 and with corporations.4° Be-
cause of the statute's use of ordinary phraseology and the legal commu-
nity's refusal to define these venue terms consistently, constant venue
litigation has ensued. The result has been uncertainty in application of the
venue statute, a trap for the unwary attorney, and an increase in venue
appeals.
Another criticism of article 1995 involves the requirement in some of the
exceptions that the plaintiff prove that he has a valid cause of action
against the defendant.4 1 If the plaintiff fails to prove that a cause of action
exists in the plea of privilege hearing, then the plaintiff's allegation of
venue cannot be maintained under the exception. The plaintiff must prove
a cause of action as one of the required venue facts under any exception
that contains the words "cause of action."42 This requirement causes delay
of the trial on the merits while the parties expend their energies in prepara-
tion for the venue hearing and forces the plaintiff to put on full-scale proof
of the cause of action to maintain venue. The plaintiff may thus face two
trials before a decision can be reached on the merits of his claim. This
33. Tax. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982).
34. Langley, supra note 24, at 548.
35. Tax. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982).
36. B. MCELROY, TEXAS PRACTICE--CIVIL PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE, § 694, at 493
(1980).
37. Snyder v. Pitts, 150 Tex. 407, 412, 241 S.W.2d 136, 139 (1951).
38. Id at 411, 241 S.W.2d at 138 (citing Brown v. Boulden, 18 Tex. 431 (1857)).
39. Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5)(a), (5)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
40. Id art. 1995(23), (27) (Vernon 1964).
41. See, e.g., the recent plethora of cases annotated in id art. 1995 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
42. A.H. Belo Corp. v. Blanton, 133 Tex. 391, 129 S.W.2d 619 (1939). The requirement
that plaintiff must establish a cause of action prior to falling under a venue exception is also




troublesome requirement was the product of the 1917 legislature's concern
about the onerous burdens the plea of privilege practice placed on the de-
fendant at that time.43 In enacting reform legislation to lessen this bur-
den,44 the legislature required the plaintiff to file a controverting plea
"setting out specifically the fact or facts relied upon to confer venue...
on the court where the cause is pending. '45 This language, coupled with
prior judicial precedent,46 led a later court to authorize this Texas two-trial
system in civil procedure:
It is true that this construction of the statute [art. 2007] means that the
issue as to the commission of the crime or offense may be twice tried,
once in the hearing of the plea of privilege and once in the trial on the
merits, with added expense and delay and sometimes with inconsis-
tent results. . . .It is better to put the parties to the inconvenience of
two trials of the issue than to deprive the defendant of the valuable
privilege of making his defense on the merits in the county of his resi-
dence, when the facts to bring the case within the exception do not
actually exist.47
Conditions forty-five years ago may have allowed the luxury of spending a
court's time and a litigant's money in what could amount to a full-blown
trial to decide the most convenient place to hold the real trial on the mer-
its. But Texans in the 1980s cannot afford to retain this outdated, expen-
sive, and time-consuming system.
The requirement that the plaintiff prove a cause of action is determined
by the substantive law. This means that substantive law questions, some-
times novel ones, will be decided in venue appeals. Such questions should
instead be decided in the appeal on the merits where the record has been
more fully developed. Historically, substantive law decisions made in
venue appeals have been based upon incomplete records and briefs con-
taining only a superficial analysis of the questions involved.48 Decisions
based upon such tenuous lower court development cannot be a proper
foundation for the evolution of stable judicial precedent.
Chief Justice Greenhill of the Texas Supreme Court cited the problems
of delay to litigants and the congestion of the court dockets caused by the
venue statute in his State of the Judiciary Speech to the 66th Legislature in
1979.49 Calling the system a "gross extravagance" of time and resources,
Chief Justice Greenhill described the two-trial problem:
Where venue is contested, and it often is, the first trial is to
determine where the case is to be tried, i.e., whether the plaintiff can
43. See the discussion of the history and development of the Texas venue system, infra
notes 394-437 and accompanying text.
44. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 176, § 1, at 388. In 1925 this act was codified as Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. art. 2007 (1925).
45. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 176, § 1, at 388.
46. See Hilliard v. Wilson, 76 Tex. 180, 13 S.W. 25 (1890).
47. Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232, 240-41, 88 S.W.2d 91, 95 (1935).
48. See Guittard & Tyler, Revision oftthe Texas Venue Statute: A Reform Long Overdue,
32 BAYLOR L. Rv. 563, 568 (1980).
49. Greenhill, State of the Judiciary, 42 TEx. B.J. 379, 383 (1979).
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prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was at
fault in a particular county. The result of that trial is appealable.
After some two years, that matter. . . is finally settled. Then the par-
ties go back and try the case to a second court and jury and the appeal
starts over again.
The right of a person to be sued in his or her home county is an
important one. But like other matters, the proof, or establishment, of
that right, and related venue procedures, have gotten out of hand. We
need your help to remove this large volume of cases of venue from
our dockets and to speed to adjudication of cases.50
As the venue appeal is interlocutory, consideration of the case on the mer-
its halts until the venue appeal is decided. This system indicates the mis-
placed importance that Texas judges and legislators have placed upon
venue matters. One answer to this procedural logjam is for the Texas Leg-
islature to repeal the provision allowing interlocutory appeal of the venue
decision.5' The supreme court could then consider rules of civil procedure
which would eliminate this costly procedural step.
The present venue statute also encourages the fragmentation of a single
law suit into multiple law suits in several counties when one or more pleas
of privilege are sustained. 52 Under present law the only time that an entire
case involving defendants with different county domiciles can be trans-
ferred to a single county is when the cause of action is a joint action grow-
ing out of a joint liability. That is, only when the defendants are necessary
parties can an entire case with defendants of differing residences be consol-
idated into a single county.53 As necessary defendant parties are rare,
fragmentation is encouraged.5 4 Another way that fragmentation results is
through the application of article 1995(29a). Any time a plaintiff files suit
in a county in which no defendant resides, the plaintiff must use article
1995(29a) and the concept of necessary party to sustain venue against all
defendants in that county. Again, as necessary parties are rare, a plaintiff
has difficulty maintaining venue in such a situation. In Loop Cold Storage
Co. v. South Texas Packers, Inc. ,55 for example, the plaintiff attempted to
maintain a suit against two warehouses for damages to frozen beef. The
defendant warehouses each had a domicile in a different county. One of
the warehouses negligently allowed some meat to thaw, the thawed meat
becoming valueless. The plaintiff did not know which warehouse was neg-
ligent. Since the two warehouses were not necessary parties, the plaintiff
50. Id
51. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2008 (Vernon 1964). See the discussion of the his-
tory and development of the Texas venue system, infra notes 394-437 and accompanying
text.
52. Guittard & Tyler, supra note 48, at 578.
53. See Geophysical Data Processing Center, Inc. v. Cruz, 576 S.W.2d 666, 668-69 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
54. Consequently, in a case involving multiple defendants with differing county resi-
dences, venue can easily become a tool whereby the various defendants force the plaintiff to
try a lawsuit repeatedly. Moreover, this fragmentation poses difficult problems of res judi-
cata and collateral estoppel that might not exist if fragmentation were discouraged.
55. 491 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. 1973).
[Vol. 36
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ended up with two suits in two different counties. It would be nearly im-
possible for a plaintiff to prevail on the merits in such a situation. 56 An-
other criticism of the venue statute is that subdivisions 4 and 29a
sometimes require a plaintiff to sue someone who might not otherwise be
sued in order to hold venue against another defendant.57 For instance,
under subdivision 4 a plaintiff would have to sue a resident defendant in
order to maintain venue against a nonresident defendant.
The present venue statute can also be criticized because it does not fully
accomplish its primary purpose of protecting the defendant's venue rights.
While the purported goal of the venue statute is to prevent forcing a de-
fendant to travel great distances to be litigated against, the fact that the
defendant must travel to the place where the plaintiff initially files the
cause of action to contest venue negates achievement of this goal.58
Criticisms of doubtful validity have also been asserted against the pres-
ent venue statute. First, because so many venue appeals involve questions
of substantive law, the decision of the trial and appellate judges will "inev-
itably influence the course of the litigation on the merits and usually the
settlement negotiations of the parties as well."5 9 This argument lacks va-
lidity for two reasons. Initially, it seems advantageous that the parties be
faced with the applicable law as soon as possible. This would allow them
to settle their case knowledgeably in light of the trial judge's rulings on
substantive law. Moreover, the fact that a venue decision may influence
litigation strategy and settlement negotiations must be accepted as inherent
in any system that allows a defendant to contest a plaintiff's allegation of
proper venue.6°
The second argument criticizes the venue statute's use of terms such as
"fraud" or "negligence" because these are terms incapable of precise defi-
nition.6' This argument also raises other serious questions. If the argu-
ment has any validity, then these terms should be deleted from the
substantive law as well. Additionally, due to the very nature of language
itself, a statute could not be framed without the use of some "broad terms
incapable of precise determination. ' 62 The problem here is not whether
broad terms should be used, but whether a venue distinction based upon
varying causes of action is needed. In other words, does venue really need
to be different in a negligence case than it is in a fraud case? If not, the
problem can be corrected by abolishing whatever venue distinctions may
56. Fragmentation can also occur in third-party actions. See Guittard & Tyler, supra
note 48, at 578-79.
57. Id at 580-81.
58. Id at 567.
59. Id at 568; see Loop Cold Storage Co. v. South Tex. Packers, Inc., 491 S.W.2d 106,
109 (Tex. 1973).
60. While the author disagrees with the argument that because venue appeals may af-
fect the negotiation, settlement, or trial of a lawsuit they should not be permitted, the author
nevertheless agrees that venue appeals should be abolished because substantive law ques-
tions should not be adjudicated in venue appeals.
61. Guittard & Tyler, supra note 48, at 568-69.
62. Id at 571.
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be made based upon these various bases of liability, rather than by delet-
ing the broad terms themselves.
Article 1995(1): Married Woman 63
Article 1995(1) originally provided an exception to the general venue
rule by stating that a married woman could be sued in the county of her
husband's domicile rather than in the county of her own domicile. This
subdivision's origins are found in the Spanish law.64 Despite the medieval
character inherent in its discrimination against married women, this excep-
tion remained a part of the statute until 1967, when it was repealed by the
legislature. 65
Article 1995(2). Transient Persons66
Subdivision 2 allows a suit to be maintained against a transient person
in any county where that person may be found. Subdivision 2 was also
adopted from Spanish law. 67 Its original purpose was to favor Texas
plaintiffs by allowing a suit to be maintained wherever the transient could
be located. Early judicial comments on this exception indicate that it is
inherently a jurisdictional provision, since its goal is to provide a forum for
trial in any location where the transient can be served with process.68
For this exception to apply, the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that
the defendant is a transient person and to serve the defendant in the
county in which venue is alleged. A transient person is defined as "one
who is found in the state but has no fixed place of residence therein." 69
The transient exception confers no actual benefit on the plaintiff if the de-
fendant is truly transient. The plaintiff would be better served by an ex-
ception allowing suit to be filed and maintained in any proper venue
63. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 419, § 1, at 951; see 1 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL
PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND COUNTY COURTS § 407 (rev. ed. 1965 & Supp. 1980); B.
MCELROY, supra note 36, § 670; Keith, Venue in Civil Cases, 1 STATE BAR OF TEXAS
ADVANCED CIVIL TRIAL COURSE HANDBOOK J-16 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
64. 1836 Tex. Gen. Laws, supra note 19, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAws OF TEXAS 1258, 1260
(1898).
65. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 419, § 1, at 951.
66. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(2) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD, supra
note 63, § 4.08; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 671; Keith, supra note 63, at J-16.
67. 1836 Tex. Gen. Laws, supra note 19, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1258, 1260
(1898).
68. See McMullen v. Guest, 6 Tex. 275, 279 (1851). In McMullen the court stated:
The plaintiff is a resident of the State, and is entitled to the process of the court
to protect and enforce his legal rights against a non-resident whose person or
property he may find subject to that process. He may sue the non-resident as a
"transient person".. . if found temporarily sojourning here ....
Id; see also Butterworth v. Kinsey, 14 Tex. 495 (1855).
69. Bender v. Armstrong, 59 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1933, no writ).
The transient must, however, be an inhabitant of Texas. See also Loos v. Swaim, 16 S.W.2d
350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1929, writ dism'd). By definition, if the inhabitant has a




before locating the defendant. 70 Moreover, the exception does not benefit
the defendant because the defendant has a choice of venue only if he can
beat the process server to the county line.71 Additionally, subdivision 2 is
unnecessary because a transient has no place of residence to which suit
could be transferred if the plaintiff were to file suit in an improper forum.
Consequently, the transient defendant would be unable to avail himself of
the plea of privilege motion, the very foundation upon which the defense-
oriented protective nature of the venue statute rests.
Article 1995(3)." Texas Nonresidents; Defendants of Unknown Residence72
Article 1995(3) permits venue to be maintained in the county of the
plaintiff's residence "[i]f one or all of several defendants reside without the
State or if their residence is unknown.173 Subdivision 3, like subdivision 2,
has jurisdictional doctrine as its root purpose. Early courts were con-
cerned that the resident plaintiff would have no jurisdiction, and therefore
no proper place for a trial on the merits as well, if service could not be
obtained by publication on a nonresident.74 The nonresident defendant
exception was drafted to preserve the symmetry of the law by providing a
proper venue for trial once service could be accomplished by publication. 75
To maintain venue, the plaintiff must prove that his own residence is
within the county of the alleged venue and that the defendant resides
outside the state.76
Some confusion has occurred regarding judicial interpretation of subdi-
vision 3. The original version of the exception as drafted in 191177 clearly
applied the exception only to cases where no resident defendants were in-
volved. The statutory revision of 192578 generated confusion when it in-
cluded the language quoted above because this language can be
interpreted as a joinder provision. That is, a resident defendant would lose
70. Langley, supra note 24, at 552.
71. The real difficulty seems to lie in the fact that the plaintiff must actually serve the
defendant in the county of alleged venue to establish the validity of this exception. Service
of process on a transient is difficult at best.
72. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(3) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD, supra
note 63, § 4.09; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 677; Keith, supra note 63, at J-16.
73. Tax. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(3) (Vernon 1964). Subdivision 3 is not an
exception as such to the general venue rule. It merely provides a venue forum for Texas
plaintiffs against nonresident defendants. As the general venue rule is designed to protect
the Texas defendant, and a defendant in this instance is not a Texas resident, subdivision 3
can be viewed as an addition rather than an exception to the general venue rule.
74. J. TowNEs, PLEADING IN THE DiSTRICT AND CoUNTY COURTS oF TEXAS 305 (2d
ed. 1913).
75. McMullen v. Guest, 6 Tex. 275, 279 (1851). "[A]nd if not to be so found [as a
transient], the object of the statute [subdivision 3] under which this suit was brought doubt-
less was to enable him [resident plaintiff] to sue and obtain service by publication." Id
76. Ladner v. Reliance Corp., 156 Tex. 158, 165-66, 293 S.W.2d 758, 764 (1956);
Dalehite v. Smith, 376 S.W.2d 934, 934 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, no writ); see
Keith, supra note 63, at J-16. Subdivision 3 is not applicable to a foreign corporation doing
business with a permit in Texas. O.M. Franklin Serum Co. v. C.A. Hoover & Sons, 410
S.W.2d 272, 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ refdnr.e., 418 S.W.2d 482 ('ex. 1967).
77. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1830(3) (1914).
78. Id art. 1995(3) (1925).
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his basic venue privilege if properly joined with a nonresident defendant. 79
Early decisions rejected the joinder argument for subdivision 3.80 The em-
ployment of a joinder provision in subdivision 29a,81 in conjunction with
subdivision 3, however, has allowed a plaintiff to maintain suit in the
plaintiff's county of residence against a nonresident defendant and a resi-
dent necessary party defendant.8 2 For this scheme to be applicable, the
resident defendant must be a necessary party.s3 This procedural loophole
frustrates the intent of subdivision 3,84 such frustration being possible
under either the statutory revision of 1925 or the current statutory organi-
zation of the venue exceptions. This loophole illustrates the problems in-
herent in piecemeal venue legislation. When the legislature drafted
subdivison 29a, the implications for subdivision 3 went unnoticed. Since
the nonresident defendant has no standing to file a plea of privilege,8 5 the
only practical effect of subdivision 3 is to permit the plaintiff to maintain a
suit against the Texas resident in the plaintiff's home county. The prefer-
ence given to the defendant by the present venue statute should not be
subverted by combining the provisions of subdivisions 3 and 29a. One
solution would be to limit subdivision 3 to cases where all defendants are
nonresidents. This would prevent unfair treatment against Texas resident
defendants and further the original intent of subdivision 3.86
Article 1995(4): Defendants in Diferent Counties8 7
Subdivision 4 provides that the plaintiff may maintain venue against all
properly joinable defendants in any county where any one of the defend-
79. Langley, supra note 24, at 533.
80. United States Gas & Oil Co. v. Duffy, 8 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1928, no writ).
81. Subdivision 29a allows the plaintiff to join all defendants who are necessary parties
in a single suit if venue can be maintained against any one of the various defendants. This
exception was added in 1927 to abrogate difficulties that had arisen from use of subdivision
4. See infra notes 366-81 and accompanying text.
82. Ladner v. Reliance Corp., 156 Tex. 158, 162, 293 S.W.2d 758, 761 (1956).
83. See Pan American Sign Co. v. J.B. Hotel Co., 403 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1966, no writ).
84. See O.F. Mossberg & Sons v. Sullivan, 591 S.W.2d 952, 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Aus-
tin 1979, no writ). The change in the wording of the statute in 1925 did not reflect a legisla-
tive intent to change the meaning of the statute. Langley, supra note 24, at 553. Prior to
1925 the statute read that proper venue lies "[w]here the defendant or all of several defend-
ants reside without the state or where the residence of the defendants is unknown, in which
case the suit may be brought in the county in which the plaintiff resides." Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. art. 1830(3) (1914). The statute as it existed prior to 1925 would not have allowed this
kind of joinder of a resident defendant. Presumably, the legislature in 1925 did not intend
that a resident defendant's venue rights could be defeated by linkage of subdivision 29a with
subdivision 3.
85. McMullen v. Burton Auto Springs Corp., 138 S.W.2d 823, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas, no writ).
86. Later treatment of subdivision 29a discusses the complexity inherent in the use of
the term "necessary party" in establishing venue. See infra notes 366-81 and accompanying
text.
87. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(4) (Vernon 1964); see I R. McDONALD, supra
note 63, § 4.10.2; B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 673; Keith, supra note 63, at J-17.
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ants resides. Texas public policy 88 has been to avoid a multiplicity of suits
by allowing the joinder of resident and nonresident defendants.8 9 The
venue facts the plaintiff must plead and prove under subdivision 4 are that:
(1) one of the defendants resides in the county of alleged venue;90 (2) the
plaintiff has a bona fide cause of action against the resident defendant; 91
and (3) the nonresident defendants are at least proper parties to the suit.92
The elements of proving a bona fide cause of action and proper party
stature of nonresident defendants were established by the Texas Supreme
Court in Stockyards National Bank v. Maples.93 While not explicitly re-
quired by subdivision 4, these two elements further the purposes of this
exception and the general venue scheme; they avoid multiple suits on simi-
lar facts and protect the nonresident defendant from being joined with a
resident who is not connected to the case. For protection of the nonresi-
dent defendant, the courts have required'the plaintiff to prove the cause of
action in the venue hearing only against the resident defendant.94 The
court in Stockyards rejected the plaintiff's need to prove a cause of action
against the nonresident defendant, emphasizing that the nonresident de-
fendant would already have knowledge of the allegations against him.95
The court also noted that the proof of other venue facts, such as the proper
party status of the nonresident defendant, would adequately protect the
nonresident defendant's right to defend himself in his own home county.96
88. See 1836 Tex. Gen. Laws, supra note 19, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS oF TEXAS 1258,
1260-61 (1898) (tenth exception).
89. Stockyards Nat'l Bank v. Maples, 127 Tex. 633, 637, 95 S.W.2d 1300, 1301 (1936).
"Resident" and "nonresident" in this subdivision mean residents and nonresidents in a par-
ticular Texas county and not residents and nonresidents of Texas. Cf. supra notes 72-82 and
accompanying text (subdivision 3).
90. The resident defendant must have resided in the county at the time the suit was
filed. Chem-Spray Aerosols, Inc. v. Edwards, 576 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1979, writ dism'd), or become a resident thereafter so long as residency is
established before disposition of the plea. Avery v. Llano Cotton Seed Oil Mill Ass'n, 196
S.W. 351, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1917, writ refd).
91. By "bona fide" claim the courts mean that each element of the claim must be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See Stockyards Nat'l Bank v. Maples, 127 Tex.
633, 95 S.W.2d 1300 (1936).
92. General Motors Corp. v. Williamson, 575 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1978, writ dism'd); Wallace v. Income Properties/Equity Trust, 538 S.W.2d 17, 18
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ dism'd); Stockyards Nat'l Bank v. Maples, 127 Tex. 633,
637, 95 S.W.2d 1300, 1302 (1936); see Keith, supra note 63, at J-17. Whether the nonresident
is a proper party is established by reference to the controverting affidavit and the petition
that reflect the nature of the suit. Ladner v. Reliance Corp., 156 Tex. 158, 164, 293 S.W.2d
758, 763 (1956). This proper party requirement is satisfied when the cause of action against
the resident grows out of the same transaction and is so intimately connected with the cause
of action against the nonresident that the two should be joined under the rules intended to
avoid a multiplicity of suits. Stockyards Nat'l Bank v. Maples, 127 Tex. 633, 637, 95 S.W.2d
1300, 1302 (1936).
93. 127 Tex. 633, 637, 95 S.W.2d 1300, 1302 (1936); see B. McELROY, supra note 36,
§ 673, at 418-20.
94. Stockyards Nat'l Bank v. Maples, 127 Tex. 633, 637, 95 S.W.2d 1300, 1302 (1936).
95. Id at 637, 95 S.W.2d at 1303.
96. Id The court's reasoning is undermined by several lower court holdings. At least
one court has held that venue is not defeated by a showing that the judgment against the
resident would be worthless. Mizell v. Longhorn Supply Co., 279 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Galveston 1955, no writ) (resident defendant in bankruptcy). Also venue is not
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The Stockyards decision can, however, be easily criticized. If
knowledge of the allegations is all that is important, a plaintiff should
never have to prove a cause of action in a venue hearing under any excep-
tion. Furthermore, the purpose of the venue hearing should not be to ap-
prise the defendant of the merits of the suit. The purpose of the venue
hearing is to decide the most convenient place for the trial. And if a cause
of action must be proven, then rationally it should have to be proven
against the nonresident defendant whose "valuable right" is in jeopardy.97
This is the situation under subdivisions 9 and 23, where to maintain venue
against a nonresident defendant the plaintiff must prove a cause of action
against the nonresident. 98 This disparity as to whether the plaintiff must
twice prove a cause of action against a nonresident defendant exemplifies
the inconsistency that pervades the present venue statute. Moreover, be-
cause subdivision 4 mandates that the plaintiff prove a cause of action
against the resident defendant but not against the nonresident defendant,
the rule places the plaintiff in a paradoxical position. For example, the
plaintiff may allege alternative causes of action against resident and non-
resident defendants. In seeking to prove that the nonresident defendant is
liable on an alternative theory based on the same facts, the plaintiff may be
forced to argue against the liability of the resident defendant. On the other
hand, proof of a cause of action against the resident defendant may tend to
negate the liability of the nonresident.99
Subdivision 4 is also unfair to all defendants. The nonresident defend-
ant has the burden of defending the merits of the claim against the resident
defendant at the venue hearing. This burden is unfair to the nonresident
defendant because he may eventually wish to take a position at trial ad-
verse to the resident defendant. Unfairness may also be present with re-
spect to the resident defendant because he has no standing to defend
defeated by a showing that the resident defendant is not contesting the plaintiff's claim.
Collins v. Maylor, 192 S.W.2d 332, 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1946, no writ); see
Parchman v. Parchman, 239 S.W.2d 902, 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1951, no writ)
(where resident defendant paid money into court to be paid over to one shown to be entitled
thereto); see also Slaton v. Anthony, 143 S.W. 201, 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1912, no
writ) (settlement by resident defendant during the pendency of the suit).
97. A number of lower court cases have held that the plaintiff should be required to
prove the cause of action against the nonresident defendant. Taylor v. Whitehead, 88
S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1935, no writ); Gordon v. Hemphill, 80
S.W.2d 394, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1935, no writ); McElwee & Co. v. Soutter, 79
S.W.2d 878, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1935, no writ). The trial court will not even con-
sider whether the allegations against the nonresident are fraudulent. Kirk v. Reynolds, 244
S.W.2d 712, 713 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ dism'd). The court will also refuse
to consider the evidence at the venue hearing indicating that the plaintiff has no valid claim
against the nonresident. Von Scheele v. Kugler-Morris Gen. Contractors, Inc., 532 S.W.2d
375, 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ dism'd). This means that the nonresident de-
fendant is "compelled to incur the expense of litigation in a distant county on a claim which
the court can see in advance is groundless." 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.10.2, at 444-
45.
98. B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 673, at 422 (citing Overseas Orders, Inc. v. Anaya,
470 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971, no writ)).
99. Von Scheele v. Kugler-Morris Gen. Contractors, Inc., 532 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, writ dism'd).
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himself at the venue hearing. 1°°
Article 1995(5)(a): Contract in Writing'0'
Subdivision 5(a) applies to venue in cases dealing with contracts in gen-
eral, while subdivision 5(b), added by the legislature in 1973,102 deals spe-
cifically with consumer contracts. Subdivision 5(a) provides that by
naming the county where performance is to take place in writing in the
contract the parties may predetermine that the venue of any subsequent
dispute concerning the contract will lie in the projected county of the con-
tract's performance. The original version of the contract exception to
venue is found in the statutes of 1836 and is of Spanish origin. 10 3 The
purpose of the original exception was to enforce the venue choice of a
party who had obligated himself to perform at a certain location. 1°4 The
venue facts that the plaintiff must prove to maintain venue under the cur-
rent provision of subdivision 5(a) include:
(1) that the defendant is a party reached by the statute; (2) that the
claim is based upon a written contract; (3) that the contract was en-
tered into by the defendant or one authorized to bind him; and
(4) that the contract by its terms provides for performance of obliga-
tion sued upon in the county of suit. 105
Proof of a cause of action against the defendant is not required.1° 6
Although Texas courts have held that parties may not stipulate venue by
contract, 10 7 subdivision 5(a) allows the parties to name the county where
the contract will actually be performed and thereby indirectly establish the
county where a suit on the contract will be heard.108 The place of per-
100. See Guittard & Tyler, supra note 48, at 569-70.
101. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982); see 1 R.
McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.11.1; B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 674; Keith, supra note
63, at 3-17.
102. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 213, § 1, at 489.
103. 1846 Tex. Gen. Laws, supra note 19, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAs 1260 (1898).
The contract exception was amended in 1935 to clarify the confusion that had been caused
by a variety of complex factual situations presented before the courts. Thane v. Dallas Joint
Stock Land Bank, 129 S.W.2d 795, 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1939, no writ); see 1935
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 213, § 3, at 503. The draftsman noted that the state of the law as to the
contract clause of the venue statute was unsettled at best.
104. See Russell v. Green, 214 S.W. 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1919, no writ); Birge v.
Lovelady, 145 S.W. 1194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1912, writ dism'd); Seley v. Williams,
50 S.W. 399 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ).
105. Brazos Valley Harvestore Sys., Inc. v. Beavers, 535 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1975, writ dism'd) (citing General Motors Corp. v. Brady, 477 S.W.2d 385, 388-
89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, no writ)). The contractual exception did not originally
require that the obligation be written. In an effort to minimize uncertainties, however, the
written requirement was later added. I R. MCDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.11.3.
106. Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Allen, 160 Tex. 258, 259, 328 S.W.2d 866, 867 (1959); Ang-
ler's Lodge, Inc. v. Scruggs, 532 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no
writ).
107. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 477 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Tex. 1972); Interna-
tional Travelers' Ass'n v. Branum, 109 Tex. 543, 547-48, 212 S.W. 630, 631 (1919).
108. The contractual provision providing for performance in a particular county must be
at least one of the obligations suedupon. The plaintiff may not sue on one obligation and
use the place of performance designated for a separate and distinct obligation. Rorschach v.
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formance must also be named specifically to avoid loss of venue under
subdivision 5(a).109 For example, a promise to perform a contract in
Amarillo has been held not to be sufficiently specific to satisfy subdivision
5(a) because Amarillo is located in both Potter and Randall counties. 10 A
contractual provision requiring payment to the Second National Bank of
Houston is not specific enough to maintain venue in Harris County,'1 '
while payment at the First National Bank of San Antonio, Texas, is suffi-
cien to maintain venue in Bexar County.' 12 This confusion regarding the
place of performance is compounded by the fact that many instruments
that would not meet the technical legal requirements of a written contract
for most purposes will nevertheless satisfy the requirements of subdivision
5(a). For example, invoices, delivery tickets, or bills of lading, even when
unsigned, have been held to be written contracts sufficient to satisfy subdi-
vision 5(a). 13 These distinctions in the interpretation of legal terms are
indicative of the frustrations of finding a way through the Texas venue
maze." 1
4
Article 1995(5) (b).. Consumer Contracts' 1 5
Subdivision 5(b) provides that suit filed by the creditor of a consumer
for an obligation to pay money for consumer goods may be brought in the
county where the contract was signed by the defendant consumer or in the
county of the defendant's residence. The venue facts to be established by
the plaintiff are that the suit must be based on a consumer transaction"16
and the contract must have been signed in the county of suit.' 7 The
courts have broadly defined the term "consumer transaction," holding that
a corporation may be a consumer for the purposes of subdivision 5(b). 118
Pitts, 151 Tex. 215, 219, 248 S.W.2d 120, 123 (1952). If both obligations are joined in a
single suit, however, only one of the obligations must be performable in the county of suit.
Middlebrook v. David Bradley Mfg. Co., 86 Tex. 706, 706, 26 S.W. 935, 935 (1894).
109. The requirement that the contract expressly name the county or a particular place
therein was added in 1935. The purpose was to make the language so plain that it would
"admit of no construction that would fix venue by implication." Saigh v. Monteith, 147 Tex.
341, 344, 215 S.W.2d 610, 611 (1948).
110. Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Shipley, 400 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1966).
111. Saigh v. Monteith, 147 Tex. 341, 215 S.W.2d 610 (1948).
112. Yanta v. Davenport, 323 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1959, writ
dism'd).
113. Lufkin Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Mixon, 445 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1969, no writ); Hurlbut v. Lyons, 405 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. Civ.App.-El Paso
1966, writ dism'd); see B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 674, at 424-25.
114. B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 674, at 424-25.
115. Tnx. REv. C1V. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982); see 1 R.
McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.11.6; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 674; Keith, supra note
63, at J-18.
116. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. AN. art. 1995(5)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982); see Amaya v.
Texas Sec. Corp., 527 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Most of the litigation thus far has revolved around the meaning of the term "consumer
transaction."
117. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982); see Castleberry v.
Acco Feeds, 525 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
118. Beef Cattle Co. v. N.K. Parrish, Inc., 553 S.W.2d 220, 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1977, no writ).
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Subdivision 5(b) is not actually a separate exception to the basic venue
provision since by its very terms it must be read in conjunction with subdi-
vision 5(a). In other words, subdivision 5(a) will apply only in cases where
subdivision 5(b) is not applicable; moreover, the plaintiff who seeks to rely
on the former must show that the latter is not applicable.
Subdivision 5(b) was adopted in response to distant forum abuse
wherein credit companies would require in the credit contract that pay-
ment by the consumer-debtor be made in a place more than 100 miles
from the place of contract. If in default, the consumer had then consented
to venue in a distant forum. This forced the consumer to the expense and
inconvenience of distant travel in any debtor-creditor litigation. 19 Subdi-
vision 5(b) has not succeeded, however, in abrogating consumer difficul-
ties. Texas venue practice requires the consumer-defendant to contest the
venue in the county where the plaintiff has filed suit. Thus the venue issue
must be determined in the distant forum.' 20 As traveling to the distant
forum to contest venue may be too costly for the defendant in an ordinary,
low-dollar consumer suit, consumers are left in the predicament of litigat-
ing in a foreign venue in order to avoid that very task. The Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act provides that distant forum abuse is a deceptive
trade act and thus subjects violators to treble damages.' 2' From the per-
spective of the creditors, however, the risk of an occasional claim for treble
damages 122 might be justified by the large number of consumers who
would simply fail to contest the suit at all. Additionally, in the ordinary,
low-dollar consumer transaction even treble damages and attorneys' fees
present no real monetary threat to a corporate plaintiff.
Article 1995(6): Executors, Administrators, Guardians123
Venue in suits for money demands against executors, administrators, or
guardians of estates may be maintained under subdivision 6 in the county
where the estate is administered. This exception is of Spanish origin,' 24
the original statute including all suits against the subject fiduciaries, not
just money demands. 25 The legislature revised the statute to narrow the
application of the exception to money demands only, thus preserving the
defendant's privilege in all other cases. 126 The motive behind the excep-
tion was one of administrative convenience, as well as the public policy
119. See Sampson, Distant Forum Abuse in Consumer Transactions: A Proposed Solution,
51 TEXAS L. REv. 269 (1973).
120. Dorsano, Creditors' Rights, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 245, 263 n.159
(1978).
121. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(22) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
122. Id § 17.50.
123. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. Am. art. 1995(6) (Vernon Supp. 1982); see 1 R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.12; B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 675; Keith, supra note 63, at J- 18.
124. 1836 Tex. Gen. Laws, supra note 19, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TExAs 1258 (1898).
125. Id
126. Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1198(6) (1879); see Crosson v. Dwyer, 30 S.W. 929, 930 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1895, writ ref d). "In 1977 the legislature added a provision that if the suit grows
out of a negligent act or omission of the person whose estate the [fiduciary] represents, the
suit may be brought in the county where the act or omission occurred." 1 R. McDONALD,
1982]
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against multiple suits and expensive scattered litigation. 127 To qualify for
the exception the plaintiff must prove that the suit is against an executor to
establish a money demand against an estate, and the suit was brought in
the county where the estate is administered.128 Subdivision 6 has limited
application; it does not apply to actions to construe a will' 29 or to resolve
adverse claims of beneficiaries.' 30
Article 1995(7)." Fraud and Defalcation 131
Subdivision 7 provides that suits based on fraud, or suits based on defal-
cation by public officers may be brought in the county where the cause of
action arose. Alternatively, suit may be brought where the defendant has
his domicile. The original version of this exception dealt with venue in
cases of fraud or delinquencies on the part of public officers.' 32 This ex-
ception was justified by the deceit that injured the plaintiff.133 Conse-
quently, allowing suit to be brought in the county where the defendant
committed the fraudulent act was reasonable.' 3 4
To maintain venue on a fraud claim under the current subdivision 7, the
plaintiff faces a difficult burden of proof. The plaintiff must prove that:
(1) the fraud occurred; (2) it was committed by the defendant or one for
whose acts the defendant is legally responsible; and (3) the fraud occurred
in the county where suit is filed.' 35 Further, the plaintiff must prove that
fraud is the gist of his suit rather than merely incidental to the main
claim.' 36 Finally, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
supra note 63, § 4.12, at 463; see also TEx. REv. Cry. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(6) (Vernon Supp.
1982).
127. See Neill v. Owen, 3 Tex. 145, 147 (1848). Part of the rationale for the exception
may have been that by requiring the suit to be brought where the succession was opened, it
would be attended with less expense. ld; see also Richardson v. Wells, 3 Tex. 223, 233-34
(1848). These purposes were probably lost when this subdivision was made permissive in
1925. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1995(6) (1925).
128. Anderson v. Huie, 266 S.W.2d 410, 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1954; no writ).
129. 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.12; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 675, at 431;
see Crosson v. Dwyer, 30 S.W. 929, 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, writ ref'd).
130. See Nunn v. Titche-Goettinger Co., 196 S.W. 890, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1917), aI'd, 245 S.W. 421, 422 (Tex. 1922); Joy v. Citizens' Life Ins. Co., 178 S.W. 590, 592
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1915, no writ). Subdivision 6 also does not apply to an action
against an individual for failure to perform his duties faithfully while serving as an executor,
administrator, or guardian, or against the sureties on his bond. See Morton v. Morris, 56
S.W. 559, 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, no writ); Stewart v. Morrison, 81 Tex. 396, 399, 17 S.W.
15, 17 (1891).
131. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(7) (Vernon 1964); see I R. McDONALD, supra
note 63, § 4.13; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 676; Keith, supra note 63, at J-19.
132. 1836 Tex. Gen. Laws, supra note 19, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TExAs 1258 (1898).
133. Wintz v. Morrison, 17 Tex. 372, 384 (1856).
134. Freeman v. Kuechler, 45 Tex. 592, 597 (1876).
135. Instant Credit Serv., Inc. v. McClanahan, 497 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1973, writ dism'd). The fraud may be actual or constructive. Boothe v. Fiest, 80 Tex.
141, 144, 15 S.W. 799, 800 (1891). This assumes, of course, that the plaintiff does not wish to
pursue venue in the county of the defendant's domicile.
136. See Banks v. Merritt, 537 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ),
and cases cited therein.
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dence "every constituent element of ... fraud,"' 37 including: (1) a false
representation made by the defendant; (2) reliance by the plaintiff upon
the false representation; (3) action in reliance by the plaintiff; (4) damage
resulting from such false representation;138 and (5) proof that some actual
damage was suffered.' 39
By providing the option of venue at the defendant's domicile, subdivi-
sion 7 repeats the basic venue rule of article 1995; the defendant should
have the benefit of being sued at his domicile. This drafting defect of
repetition is minor, however, when compared with the extreme burden of
proof placed upon the plaintiff to prove every element of fraud simply to
establish venue. This high degree of proof is not only burdensome, but
inappropriate to a determination of the most convenient place for trial.
A final criticism can be made regarding the exception's inclusion of de-
falcation by a public official. This provision is superfluous and should be
eliminated. If the public official has access to public funds, it will ordina-
rily be in the course of his employment by the state. Thus, the defalcation
would occur in the county where the public employee is serving, and the
suit will normally be maintainable there.140
Article 1995(8).- Attachment and Sequestration 141
Subdivision 8 allows the plaintiff to maintain a suit for damages for
abuse of process on writs of attachment or sequestration in the county
where the writ was issued. Prior to the enactment of the exception in
1889,142 venue of actions based on levies and attachments was governed by
local rule and varied from court to court.' 43 The legislative purpose in
unifying the procedure was to promote consistency in treatment and en-
courage administrative efficiency.44 Under this exception the venue facts
the plaintiff must prove include that the writ was wrongfully sued out'
45
and that the writ was levied in whole or in part upon property located in
the county of suit.146 Subdivision 8 has been held not to apply to writs of
137. Id
138. See Brooks v. Parr, 507 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ);
Madison v. Harper, 395 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1965, no writ).
139. See Coalson v. Holmes, 111 Tex. 502, 240 S.W. 896 (1922); Wise v. Thompson, 540
S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Amburn,
380 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1964, writ dism'd).
140. B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 676.
141. TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(8) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD, supra
note 63, § 4.14; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 677; Keith, supra note 63, at J-19.
142. 1889 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 52, § 1, at 48, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1076 (1898).
143. J. TowNEs, supra note 74, at 316.
144. Focke v. Blum, 82 Tex. 436, 436, 17 S.W. 770, 771 (1891); Thomason v. Crawford,
103 S.W. 191, 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no writ).
145. See Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Lancaster, 91 S.W.2d 890, 891 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1936, no writ); Headington Auto Co. v. Hood, 219 S.W. 511, 511 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1920, no writ).
146. Darr Equip. Co. v. Holland Page, Inc., 355 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Aus-
tin 1962, writ dism'd).
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garnishment 47 and is limited to writs of attachment and sequestration.
While permitting the plaintiff to maintain venue in the county where the
abuse of process occurred is a just rule, history has shown that carving out
a special exception for this limited purpose is hardly necessary. Only one
case relying on subdivision 8 has reached the appellate level in the past
thirty years.148 Consequently, the exception could be deleted with mini-
mal effect upon injured plaintiffs.
Article 1995(9): Crime or Trespass 149
Subdivision 9 allows the plaintiff to bring a civil suit based on a crime,
offense, or trespass in the county where such act occurred or in the county
of the defendant's domicile. This exception is of Spanish origin and was
one of the first seven exceptions to the general rule found in the original
Republic of Texas venue statute.' 50 The purpose of the exception is to
promote the interests of the injured party as opposed to the interests of the
wrongdoer.' 51 The term "trespass" has been interpreted to include negli-
gence actions, as well as intentional torts:
[There is] no good reason why a distinction should be made between
an injury resulting from intentional violence and one resulting from
negligence. It occurs to us the consideration which induced the excep-
tion was that one who had been injured in his person or his property
by the Frongful or negligent conduct of another, should not be driven
to a distant forum to get a redress of his wrongs.' 52
Two sets of venue facts are required by subdivision 9, one for a crime or
offense, the other for trespass.' 53 If the plaintiff bases his claim on a crime
or offense of the defendant, then the plaintiff must plead and prove by a
preponderance of evidence that: (1) a crime or offense has been commit-
ted; (2) the crime or offense was committed in the county of suit where
venue is alleged; and (3) the defendant participated as a principal, accom-
plice, or accessory,' 54 or that the offense was committed by the defendant's
147. Allied Fin. Co. v. Crawford, 340 S.W.2d 824, 825-26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1960, no writ).
148. B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 677, at 436 (citing Darr Equip. Co. v. Holland Page,
Inc., 355 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962, writ dism'd)).
149. Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANm,. art. 1995(9) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD, supra
note 63, §§ 4.15-17.1; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 678; Keith, supra note 63, at J-20.
150. 1836 Tex. Gen. Laws, supra note 19, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1258 (1898).
The original statute did not include the word "trespass"; this addition was adopted in 1953.
See 1953 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 107, § 1, at 390.
151. Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 217, 13 S.W. 59, 60 (1890).
152. Id
153. Whether the suit is based upon a crime, offense, or trespass depends upon the nature
of the action, to be determined by reference to the pleading. Hurley v. Reynolds, 157
S.W.2d 1018, 1022 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1941, no writ).
154. See Pearson v. Stevens, 446 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1969, no writ); Allied Fin. Co. v. Meyer, 371 S.W.2d 579, 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1963, no writ); Gorbett Bros. Welding Co. v. Malone, 254 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1952, no writ). A causal connection between the crime and the injury need not be
proved by extrinsic evidence, because this may be determined from the pleadings. Gann v.
Murray, 151 Tex. 130, 134-35, 246 S.W.2d 616, 619 (1952). On the other hand, the plaintiff
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agent or representative in the course of his employment. The courts have
given the same meaning to the terms "crime" and "offense,"' 155 a crime
being defined as an act that would be punishable under the Penal Code. 156
In actions for trespass under subdivision 9, the venue facts the plaintiff
must establish include: (1) a prima facie case of liability in trespass; (2) oc-
curring in the county of suit; (3) committed by the defendant or one for
whom defendant is legally responsible. 157 Suits for conversion of personal
property are currently the most common actions pursued by plaintiffs us-
ing the trespass exception of subdivision 9.1-8
Subdivision 9 was one of the most frequently litigated exceptions prior
to 1953; at that time subdivision 9a was added to deal with actions based
on negligence.' 59 Only three cases have arisen under the "crime or of-
fense" section of subdivision 9 in the past decade.160 The balance of venue
actions in this area have shifted to subdivision 9a.
Article 1995(9a): Negligence16 1
Subdivision 9a permits a plaintiff to maintain a negligence suit in the
county where the negligent act or negligent omission occurred, or in the
county of the defendant's domicile.' 62 This exception was enactedin 1953
to answer criticism concerning the Texas courts' attempts to handle negli-
gence cases under the trespass language of subdivision 9.163 The legisla-
ture sought to resolve this confusion by mandating that only subdivision
9a could apply to actions based on "negligence.""" In addition, the lan-
guage of the revision used the terms "active and passive" to describe negli-
gence, because the courts in prior decisions had failed to include passive
negligence as an exception to the general venue rule.165 The "trespass"
language in subdivision 9 had been construed by the Texas Supreme Court
must prove he has sustained some damages, although not necessarily the extent thereof.
Wiederkehr v. Coker, 304 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
155. Thomas v. Meyer, 168 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1943, no
writ); Chiles v. Goswick, 148 Tex. 306, 309, 225 S.W.2d 411, 412 (1949).
156. Gann v. Murray, 151 Tex. 130, 133, 246 S.W.2d 616, 618 (1952).
157. Langford v. Kraft, 498 S.W.2d 42, 50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
158. B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 678 n.61, at 441; see Peters v. Parker, 591 S.W.2d 327,
329 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ dism'd).
159. 1953 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 107, § 1, at 390.
160. B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 678, at 440 (citing Pearson v. Stevens, 446 S.W.2d
381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1969, no writ); Adami v. Dobie, 440 S.W.2d 330
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, writ dism'd); Light v. Transport Ins. Co., 419 S.W.2d
223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, no writ)).
161. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(9a) (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982); see 1 R.
McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.17.2; B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 679; Keith, supra note
63, at J-20 to -21.
162. Negligence per se is included in the statutory language, as is common law negli-
gence. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(9a) (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982).
163. 1953 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 107, § 1, at 390; see 1 R. MCDONALD, supra note 63,
§ 4.17.2; see also Comment, Venue: The "Trespass"Exception in AutomobileAccident Cases,
29 TExAS L. REv. 513 (1951).
164. 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.17.2.
165. For a complete discussion of this problem, see Comment, supra note 163.
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in Hill v. Hill to include negligently inflicted injuries as well as interna-
tional trespasses. 166 The Texas Supreme Court, however, drew a distinc-
tion that added further perplexity to this area when it construed the statute
to be applicable only to cases where a willfully or negligently committed
act could be shown. 167 Thus, the trespass language of the original subdivi-
sion 9 did not include failure to perform a duty (negligence by omis-
sion). 168 Later, courts dwelled on the distinction between an act and an
omission. Attempts to characterize the negligent act itself as active negli-
gence or passive negligence took precedence over the central question of
venue. 1
69
For an example of the problems this confusion caused, consider the sub-
tle difference in interpreting the trespass language as an affirmative act of
negligence versus an omission of a duty in McCrary v. Coates,170 as op-
posed to interpreting the trespass language to include any wrongful act
committed that causes damage, as in Campbell v. Wylie. 171 This subtle
difference in the phrasing of the trespass language in subdivision 9 led the
McCrary court to find thatfailure to use care in operating an automobile
was not an affirmative act within the ambit of the exception, 172 while the
Campbell court found that negligent driving was an act committed by the
defendant and therefore was covered by subdivision 9. 173 The legislature's
subsequent enactment of subdivision 9a was clearly directed to remedy
this area of legal hairsplitting, which had become especially burdensome
because of the large number of negligence cases dealing with automobile
accidents that invoked the benefits of this exception.'
74
The venue facts the plaintiff must establish to come within this exception
are specified in the subdivision itself:
1. That an act or omission of negligence occurred in the county
where suit was filed. 2. That such act or omission was that of the tort-
feasor, in person, or that of his servant, agent or representative acting
within the scope of his employment .... 3. That such negligence
was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 17
The requirement that the plaintiff must establish proximate cause of injury
in the venue hearing has been held to require proof of some actual in-
jury,176 but the extent of the injury or damage is not a part of the required
venue facts. 177 Additionally, the county where the damage occurred is not
a material venue fact;178 the county where the negligent act occurred is the
166. 76 Tex. 210, 216, 13 S.W. 59, 60 (1890).
167. Ricker, Lee & Co. v. Shoemaker, 81 Tex. 22, 25-26, 16 S.W. 645, 645 (1891).
168. Id at 26, 16 S.W. at 645.
169. See Comment, supra note 163, at 517-22.
170. 38 S.W.2d 393, 394-95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1931, no writ).
171. 212 S.W. 980, 980 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1919, writ ref'd).
172. 38 S.W.2d at 395.
173. 212 S.W. at 980.
174. See Comment, supra note 163, at 530.
175. TEx. REv. Ciw. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(9a) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
176. Leal v. Ramirez, 553 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1977, no writ).
177. Spoon v. Penix, 422 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Tex. 1967).
178. Main Bank v. Davy Crockett Inn of New Braunfels, Inc., 531 S.W.2d 388, 391 (Tex.
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critical fact. 179 The act or omission must also be that of the defendant or
his agent.180 This requirement engenders problems of interpretation of
agency' 8 and the scope of the employment duties of an employee. 8 2
Subdivision 9a currently is one of the most litigated of the exceptions to
the general venue rule. The plaintiff is put to the undue burden of proving
the cause of action at a preliminary hearing if he wishes to retain venue in
the county where the negligent act occurred. Consequently, to avail him-
self of the protection that the legislature intended to bestow upon him, the
plaintiff must litigate the merits of his case at what should be a procedural
hearing. The county where the negligent act occurred is usually the one
where the witnesses and evidence will be most conveniently found. If the
plaintiff fails to prove his cause of action at the venue hearing, the place of
venue will be transferred to the defendant's domicile, and the most logical
and convenient venue will be lost.
Article 1995(10)." Personal Property183
A plaintiff may maintain a suit to recover personal property from the
defendant in the county where the property is located, or in the county
where the defendant resides.' 8 4 The ancestor of subdivision 10 is found in
the 1836 Laws of the Republic of Texas and is of Spanish origin.'8 5 This
exception focuses on the convenience of the plaintiff. '8 6
To maintain venue under this exception, the plaintiff must prove that
the suit is for recovery of personal property and the property is located in
the county of suit.'8 7 The plaintiff is not required to prove a cause of ac-
tion against the defendant, 88 but the petition must state a cause of action
that, if proven at trial, would show plaintiff's right to the property. 8 9 Con-
Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ); Wright v. Climatic Air Sales, Inc., 527 S.W.2d 518, 520
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).
179. Leonard v. Abbott, 366 S.W.2d 925, 927-28 (Tex. 1963). The plaintiff is not re-
quired to negate affirmative defenses. 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.17.2.
180. See International Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 455 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tex. 1970).
181. See id
182. Barber v. Intercoast Jobbers & Brokers, 417 S.W.2d 154, 158-59 (Tex. 1967). A
rebuttable presumption of agency and of the scope of employment can arise by ownership of
a vehicle in the name of someone other than the tortfeasor. Strickland Transp. Co. v. In-
gram, 403 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1966, writ dism'd).
183. TEX. REV. Cry. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(10) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.18; B. McELROY, upra note 36, § 680; Keith, supra note 63, at J-21.
184. A number of the venue exceptions also permit the plaintiff to choose the county of
the defendant's domicile. These provisions are of course superfluous, for if the plaintiff
wished to file suit at the county of defendant's domicile, he need merely use the general rule
instead of the exception.
185. 1836 Tex. Gen. Laws, supra note 19, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1258 (1898).
186. Richardson v. Wells, 3 Tex. 223, 232 (1848).
187. Allen v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 459 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970,
no writ).
188. Walshak v. Walshak, 417 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967,
no writ); Allen v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 459 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970,
no writ).
189. See Frost v. Wells, 388 S.W.2d 235, 238-39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1965, writ
dism'd).
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sequently, the burden upon the plaintiff under this subdivision is not as
onerous as those under other article 1995 exceptions.
Few recent reported cases have relied upon subdivision 10.190 The rea-
son for the limited use of subdivision 10 may be the popularity of venue
exceptions based on written contracts and on corporations. 191 Rarely
would personal property be in the hands of another (other than a thief)
unless that other person is acting under a written contract, for example as
in the sale of goods. As repossessors are usually corporations, an exception
dealing with corporations or with written contracts could be used in lieu of
an exception based on personal property. Another possible reason for the
scarcity of opinions dealing with subdivision 10 is that actions involving
conversion of property can also be brought under subdivision 9. Conse-
quently, the benefits of subdivision 10 are limited when viewed in the con-
text of the entire venue statute.
Article 1995(11)." Inheritances1 92
Subdivision 11 authorizes the plaintiff to maintain an inheritance suit
against a defendant who has inherited the estate in the county where the
estate principally lies. This exception was adopted by the Republic of
Texas and is derived from Spanish law. 193 Early lawmakers may have felt
a need to unify suits dealing with estates in a limited number of forums; 194
thus they perpetuated subdivision 11. The lawmakers may have also felt
that the plaintiff should be provided with a permissive forum at the place
where the subject of the suit, the inheritance, was located. The fear may
have been that a prodigal son, beyond the reach of hometown creditors,
would siphon off his inheritance from afar, leaving the creditors of the
estate with no convenient venue. On the other hand, the intent of the leg-
islature may have also been to require suits between heirs to be brought
where the estate is located because of practical concerns, primarily the
availability of the evidence.' 95
For the plaintiff to avail himself of this exception, he must prove that the
defendant inherited an estate upon which the suit is based and that the
estate lies principally in the county where the plaintiff has filed suit. 196
190. B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 680. McElroy has suggested that no need exists for
this exception. Id
191. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5), (23) (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982).
192. Id art. 1995(11) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.19; B.
MCELROY, supra note 36, § 681; Keith, supra note 63, at J-21.
193. 1836 Tex. Gen. Laws, supra note 19, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1258 (1898).
194. Richardson v. Wells, 3 Tex. 223, 233-34 (1848).
195. The purpose for this exception is difficult to discern, in part because its ambit is
undefined. As might be expected, no legislative history is available to determine if this ex-
ception is limited to suits between heirs or if it can include creditors of the estate. The only
case dealing with this exception involves a dispute between heirs. See Deason v. Rogers,
499 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ dism'd). The issue of whether the
estate's creditors can use this exception remains unresolved.
196. See id at 16-17. The nature of the suit is to be determined from the petition, but the
location of the estate must be established by extrinsic evidence. 1 R. McDONALD, supra
note 63, § 4.19.
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Only one case has reached the appellate level relying on subdivision 11.197
This is because in most situations other venue exceptions will fix the venue
in the county of the estate's location.198 These other exceptions include
subdivision 6, which deals with suits against administrators of estates, 99
and subdivision 18, which deals with suits for revision of probate.2 0° The
situation addressed in subdivision 11 thus seems so specialized and unu-
sual that it is questionable whether the subject should be specifically ad-
dressed in the general venue statute.20'
Article 1995(12): Lien202
Subdivision 12 allows the plaintiff to bring suit to foreclose a mortgage
or other lien on real or personal property in the county where the property
or any part of it is located.20 3 As originally enacted in 1846204 subdivision
12 concerned mortgages only and was held not to apply to liens on prop-
erty.205 The subdivision was amended in 1863 to include the words "or
other lien" after the word "mortgages," thus extending the application of
the subdivision to liens.2°6 The basic rule of the exception grants the plain-
tiff a choice of venue as the subdivision was enacted to favor the plain-
tiff.20 7 To qualify for this exception the plaintiff must prove that the action
is for foreclosure of a lien and that the property is located in the county of
suit.20 8 Proof of a valid lien under subdivision 12 is not necessary; the
plaintiff need only plead the existence of a lien.2°9 The location of the
197. Deason v. Rogers, 499 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1973, writ
dism'd).
198. 1 R. McDoNALD, supra note 63, § 4.19, at 481.
199. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. AN. art. 1995(6) (Vernon Supp. 1982); see supra notes 123-30
and accompanying text.
200. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANr. art. 1995(18) (Vernon 1964); see infra notes 264-70 and
accompanying text.
201. B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 681.
202. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANNm. art. 1995(12) (Vernon 1964); see I R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.20; B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 682; Keith, supra note 63, at J-21 to -22.
203. Cf. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(11) (Vernon 1964), dealing with the inheri-
tance exception, where the question concerns the county where the estate "principally lies."
Id
204. 1846 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act To Regulate Proceedings in the District Courts § 119,
at 394, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TExAs 1669 (1898).
205. Coffee v. Haynes, 24 Tex. 190, 191 (1859).
206. 1863 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 17, § 1, at 10, 5 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TExAs 664 (1898);
see Hays v. Stone, 36 Tex. 181, 186 (1871).
207. Kinney v. McCleod, 9 Tex. 78, 79 (1852).
208. Hagan v. Anderson, 506 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973), writ
refdn~r.e per curiam, 513 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1974). Strangely enough, the suit need not be
for an actual foreclosure of a lien. A suit seeking a declaratory judgment for the establish-
ment of an enforceable lien is sufficient. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Cattleman's Prod. Credit
Ass'n, 617 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
209. Morgan Farms v. Brown, 231 S.W.2d 791,791 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio), leave
to file petition for mandamus overruledper curiam sub nomL Morgan Farms v. Murray, 149
Tex. 319, 233 S.W.2d 123 (1950). The lien may be an express contractual obligation or an
equitable or imaplied lien. See First Trust Co. v. Good Land Lumber Co., 297 S.W.2d 312,
3 5-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1956, no writ); Brooks v. Herren, 30 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1930, writ dism'd).
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property involved must be proven by extrinsic evidence. 210
In Morgan Farms v. Murray21' the Texas Supreme Court held that the
nature of the plaintiffs suit is proven by the pleadings in the case, not by
the evidence. Thus the plaintiff is relieved of the burden of actually prov-
ing a cause of action, here a valid lien, against the defendant. This is a
significant lessening of the plaintiff's usual burden in qualifying for an ex-
ception under the general venue rule, although Texas precedent for this
point is in conflict.2 2 The fact that so much contrary precedent exists in
the Texas venue practice is one of the major criticisms of the Texas system.
The uncertainty regarding the degree of proof required at the venue hear-
ing has caused expensive and time-consuming litigation concerning sub-
jects that should not be considered for the purposes of deciding the place
of trial. Additionally, subdivision 12 is an example of the difficulty in-
volved in interpreting specific statutory venue language. From its incep-
tion as part of the venue statute, the term "mortgage" has required
appellate court definition.213 The legislature has thus been forced to tinker
with the statute in an attempt to cure this problem.214
Article 1995(13): Partition215
Subdivision 13 permits the plaintiff to maintain suit for the division of
real or personal property in the county where the property is located or in
the county where the defendant resides. This exception seems to have
grown out of early state laws dealing with partition of real2 6 and personal
property. 217 Subdivision 13 first appeared in the original codification of
the Revised Civil Statutes of 1879.218 Prior to 1879 Texas legislators ap-
parently assumed that suits for partition of property would either be
brought under the provisions dealing with suits for land or the provisions
concerning personal property. No act of the legislature has been found
that specifically adds subdivision 13 to the venue statute. It simply appears
210. Ross v. Gulf Ref. Co., 530 S.W.2d 859, 859-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no
writ); Hagan v. Anderson, 506 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973), writ
refrdn.r.e. per curiam, 413 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1974).
211. 149 Tex. 319, 233 S.W.2d 123 (1950).
212. See Knape v. Davidson, 465 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ
dism'd) (adopting the Morgan Farms decision on subdivision 12, but citing contrary
precedent).
213. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
215. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(13) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.21; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 683; Keith, supra note 63, at J-22 to -23.
216. 1840 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act To enable part owners of Land to obtain Partition
thereof, and for other purposes, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 245 (1898). Venue is not,
however, addressed specifically in this act.
217. 1851 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 26, §§ 1-7, at 20, 3 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 898
(1898). Venue is not addressed specifically in this act, but the act does mandate that a writ
of execution is to be issued to officers of the county where the personal property may be
located.
218. See 1876 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 60, §§ 1-4, at 58-59, 8 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS
894 (1898) (act authorizing the creation of the Revised Civil Statutes).
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in the Revised Civil Statutes of 1879.219 Consequently, no discernable
purpose for the addition of the subdivision has been discovered.
To qualify for the real property exception, the plaintiff must allege that
the suit is for partition and that the land in controversy is located within
the county of alleged venue. With regard to the personal property excep-
tion, the plaintiff must establish that the property is personal property and
that it is located in the county of suit. In the alternative, the plaintiff must
establish that one or more defendants reside in the county of suit.220 The
venue facts differ with regard to real property because subdivision 13 must
be interpreted in light of subdivision 14. The latter exception concerns
venue in suits to recover title to lands, whereas the last sentence of subdivi-
sion 13 states that "[n]othing herein shall be construed to fix venue of a suit
to recover the title to land."'22 1  Consequently, subdivision 14 is
mandatory, requiring that suits for land title must be maintained in the
county where the land is located, while subdivision 13 is permissive. Sub-
division 14 thus takes precedence over subdivision 13 in real property title
disputes, with the result that subdivision 13 can only apply to real property
if title is not disputed. To maintain venue under subdivision 13 in suits
concerning real property, therefore, the plaintiff must prove that no title
dispute exists.222 Consequently, in any case where the defendant asserts
an adverse conflicting title claim to real property, and the plaintiff is un-
able to prove the contrary at the venue hearing, subdivision 14, not subdi-
vision 13, must apply. 22 3
Furthermore, if the legislature determines that suits for title to land
should be heard where the land is located, then most suits involving land
219. Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1198(12) (1879).
220. Gilbert v. Gilbert, 145 Tex. 114, 118-19, 195 S.W.2d 936, 938 (1946). One who is
not entitled to possession of any part of the property may not rely upon this subdivision. 1
R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.21.
221. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(13) (Vernon 1964). The difficulties are com-
pounded under these two seemingly conflicting provisions when the plaintiff sues a defend-
ant in the county of the defendant's residence and no part of the property is located in that
county, and when personal property is involved. In either of these situations the plaintiff
must additionally demonstrate by extrinsic evidence that the defendant who asserts an inter-
est in or adverse claim to the personal property resides in the county of alleged venue.
Thompson v. Pure Oil Co., 113 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1937, no writ).
If real property is involved, the plaintiff need only demonstrate by extrinsic evidence that a
defendant resides in the county of suit, and that the action does not involve a controversy as
to the title. 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.21, at 485.
222. Gilbert v. Gilbert, 145 Tex. 114, 119-20, 195 S.W.2d 936, 939 (1946); see Herrington
v. McDonald, 141 Tex. 441, 445, 174 S.W.2d 307, 309 (1943); Pena v. Sling, 135 Tex. 200,
213, 140 S.W.2d 441, 447 (1940).
223. 1 R. MCDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.21. The result of this judicial interpretation is
that a plaintiff
no longer can know in advance of suit whether he can maintain his partition
action, involving land located in county A, in a court of county B where a
defendant resides. Since he must, if the defendant questions the venue, prove
that there is no controversy as to title, it is insufficient for him to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the interest he asserts, or
that the defendant has no valid claim to a greater share than plaintiff has
conceded in his petition.
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should be heard where the land is located. Subdivision 13, therefore, is not
justified; it is redundant in light of subdivision 10 (suits dealing with per-
sonal property) and subdivision 14 (suits for land). Furthermore, subdivi-
sion 13 requires the plaintiff to prove a negative fact regarding partition of
real property to come within the venue exception; that is, the plaintiff must
prove that no title dispute exists. Requiring a party to establish facts in the
negative, prior to a trial on the merits, is too complex an issue at this early
stage of the proceedings. The question is simply where should the trial be
held. This unexplained shifting of the normative burden of proof is
unjustified.
Article 1995(14): Lands224
Subdivision 14 requires that suits involving disputes over land title,
damages to land, or suits to prevent or stay waste be heard in the county
where the land is located. This exception has its origin in the early venue
statute of the Republic of Texas, although it was initially framed in a sim-
pler form mentioning only controversies where "land is the object of the
suit. ' 225 The legislative addition of the word "damages" to land refers to
an injury as to the possession of the land or to the freehold or estate.226
Prior to the revised statutes, only suits that could be maintained as actions
for trespass to try title could be brought under this subdivision.227 By
broadening the application of subdivision 14 to other types of disputes, the
legislature intended to provide for venue exceptions in all cases where the
title to land is in controversy. 228
To qualify for this exception, the plaintiff must establish that the suit is
for the recovery of lands or damages thereto and that a part of the land lies
in the county of suit.229 While the location of the land in controversy
requirement has not produced a large number of subdivision 14 cases, the
requirements regarding the nature of the suit have caused much perplex-
ity.230 In framing subdivision 14, the legislature chose to include five spe-
cific types of actions regarding land disputes. These include suits for
recovery of land for damage to lands, to remove incumbrances upon land
titles, to quiet title to land, and to prevent or stay waste to land. Each one
224. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(14) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, §§ 4.22.1-.7; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 684; Keith, supra note 63, at J-23.
225. 1836 Tex. Gen. Laws, supra note 19, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1258 (1898).
226. Miller v. Rusk, 17 Tex. 170, 171 (1856).
227. 1 J. SAYLES, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 235 (1896); see Hearst's Heirs v. Kuyken-
dall's Heirs, 16 Tex. 327 (1856); Miller v. Rusk, 17 Tex. 170 (1856); Morris v. Runnels, 12
Tex. 175 (1854).
228. 1 J. SAYLES, supra note 227, § 235; see Thomson v. Locke, 66 Tex. 383, 388, 1 S.W.
112, 115 (1886).
229. Piazza v. Phillips, 153 Tex. 115, 117, 264 S.W.2d 428, 429 (1954); Cowden v. Cow-
den, 143 Tex. 446, 451, 186 S.W.2d 69, 71 (1945). The nature of the suit is determined by
reference to the petition. Renwar Oil Corp. v. Lancaster, 154 Tex. 311, 312, 276 S.W.2d 774,
775 (1955). Plaintiff need not establish by extrinsic evidence his interest or title. Cowden v.
Cowden, 143 Tex. 446, 449, 186 S.W.2d 69, 72 (1945); cf. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
1995(13) (Vernon 1964); supra notes 215-23 and accompanying text.
230. B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 684, at 462.
[Vol. 36
TEXA S VENUE
of these specific terms has spawned numerous cases as Texas appellate
courts are forced to decide whether the nature of a particular suit is in-
cluded within this statutory language. 231 Conflicting case law can be
found for each cause of action listed in subdivision 14.232 The statute need
not be so specific in detailing the types of actions to which it will apply.
Such specificity serves only to give ammunition to the resourceful plain-
tiff's attorney as he shapes his pleadings to match the terms of subdivision
14 in an attempt to sue a defendant in a county other than the defendant's
domicile.
Additionally, under the damage to lands language, the courts have held
that subdivision 14 is applicable to suits for damages to improvements
placed on the land.233 One Texas appellate court has ruled that this lan-
guage includes damages allegedly done to the roof of a house by a repair
company.234 This case illustrates how the venue decisions have over-
lapped in application so that the prudent plaintiff's litigator will allege
venue based on as many exceptions as possible to preserve potential argu-
ments should appeal be necessary.235 The plaintiff in this lawsuit could
have relied on subdivision 9a (negligence) or subdivision 23 (county where
cause of action or part thereof arose). The plaintiff obviously chose subdi-
vision 14 because it was easier to prove. The case law under heavily liti-
gated subdivisions such as subdivision 14 invariably offers some precedent
to support an appeal.
Another area of conflict involving subdivision 14 is exemplified by
Brown v. Gui/Television Co. ,236 where the plaintiff sought an injunction to
remove a television antenna from his neighbor's land. The plaintiff
claimed that his own land, which he used as an airport, was damaged by
the presence of the defendant's tall antenna. According to the court, the
venue issue was to determine the primary purpose of the suit. If the suit
was to recover for damages to the plaintiff's land, then subdivision 14
would be relied upon to determine venue. If, however, the primary pur-
pose of the suit was to obtain an injunction to force the removal of the
antenna, then the Texas jurisdiction for trial injunction statute, article
4656, would fix the place of venue.237 The court was forced to examine the
plaintiff's claim to decide whether a legal remedy of damages or an equita-
231. See 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, §§ 4.22.2-.6; B. McELROY, supra note 36,
§ 684, at 462-65.
232. See, e.g., the annotated cases cited at TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(14)
(Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982).
233. Calvert v. Welch, 369 S.W.2d 840, 842 ('rex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1963, no writ).
234. Perma Seal of Texas, Inc. v. Lovelace, 518 S.W.2d 447, 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1975, no writ).
235. The writer once represented an architect sued in a negligence action for negligent
design of a school building. The school building had been damaged by fire, allegedly as a
result of the negligence of the architect. Plaintiff maintained venue in this negligence action
in the county of suit because the school building was located in the county of suit.
236. 306 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1957).
237. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4656 (Vernon 1964). Note that subdivison 30 of the
venue statute gives precedence to statutes outside the venue statute in which venue is ex-
pressly provided. Id. art. 1995(30).
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ble remedy of injunction was sought by the plaintiff. In Brown the Texas
Supreme Court expressed its support for this type of venue hair-splitting:
"[I]t may seem that no venue distinction between remedies should logically
be drawn if convenience of trial for litigants and witnesses be the true basis
of the venue exception, but the Legislature has expressly provided a special
venue for injunction suits ....
The Brown problem will persist as long as mandatory venue subdivi-
sions exist in article 1995 and the legislature enacts confficting mandatory
venue provisions in other statutes. The problem is to determine which
mandatory provision should prevail when conflict between the two occurs.
The Texas Supreme Court in Brown was correct in observing that no ra-
tional venue distinction could be drawn between remedies. Since any dis-
tinction drawn between remedies should have little to do with the
principles underlying venue fairness, the court could have left the problem
of resolving direct venue conflicts as a discretionary matter for trial judges
based upon the venue considerations discussed infra.
Article 1995(15): Breach of Title Warranty239
Subdivision 15 authorizes the plaintiff to sue any seller of land for
breach of title warranty in the seller's county of residence, and to join all
other sellers who would be liable in the same suit. This is true regardless
of the respective counties of residence of the other sellers. The legislature
added this exception in 1887,2m and it can only be considered as an exam-
ple of needless tinkering with the venue statute. Subdivision 15 is in es-
sence merely a joinder provision serving the same purpose as subdivision
4.241 Moreover, the original legislative purpose for it is unknown. Subdi-
vision 15 is therefore unnecessary.
Article 1995(16)." Divorce2 4 2
Subdivision 16 sets out the residency requirements of the plaintiff in
suits for divorce and establishes venue based upon those residency require-
ments. The ancestor of this exception was the Republic of Texas law spec-
ifying residency requirements in divorce suits. 243 This law was amended
in 1873 and was placed in the venue statute by the codifiers of the first
Revised Civil Statutes in 1879.244 Subdivision 16 has been superseded,
however, by the 1973 Family Code, which contains differing residency re-
238. Brown v. Gulf Television Co., 306 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. 1957).
239. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(15) (Vernon 1964); see I R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.23; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 685; Keith, supra note 63, at J-23.
240. 1887 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 88, § 1, at 69, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 876 (1898).
241. Id; see also Langley, supra note 24, at 559-60. Only six cases are annotated under
this exception, with only four of those appeals occurring in this century.
242. TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(16) (Vernon Supp. 1982); see I R.
McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.24; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 686; Keith, supra note 63,
at J-24.
243. 1841 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony, § 11, at 21, 2 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 485 (1898).
244. 1873 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 74, § 1, at 117, 7 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 569 (1898).
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quirements from those in the venue statute. 245 As subdivision 30 of the
venue statute provides that specific acts of the legislature that expressly
specify venue will supersede the subdivisions of article 1995,246 subdivision
16 is superfluous and should be deleted.
Article 1995(17): Injunctions247
Subdivision 17 mandates that the plaintiff maintain a suit to enjoin the
execution of a judgment or to stay proceedings in another suit in the
county where the judgment was rendered or the other suit is pending. This
exception to the general venue rule was added in the 1879 codification. 248
Its ancestor is the Act Regulating Proceedings in the District Court of May
13, 1846.249 The issuance of injunctions, orders of mandamus, and other
extraordinary writs were apparently areas much abused by early judges.250
Evidenced by the promulgation of special rules regarding extraordinary
writs in 1841 and 1846, the legislature was concerned with the indepen-
dence of frontier judges and their potential abuse of equitable powers.25'
The purpose of this subdivision is to unify in one court the proceedings
regarding the subject matter of a suit. This purpose serves administrative
convenience rather than the convenience of the parties.
The venue facts to be established by the plaintiff are that the nature of
the suit (as determined by the plaintiff's pleadings) is covered by the excep-
tion and that the judgment or action attacked occurred or is pending in the
county of suit.252 The latter of these facts is usually within the court's
knowledge. Thus, judicial notice may be taken of the fact. 253
Subdivision 17 is identical in effect to article 4656 of the Texas stat-
utes,254 which requires that writs of injunction to stay an execution of a
judgment be returned to and tried in the court where the suit is pending or
the judgment was rendered. Subdivision 30 of the general venue statute
gives preference to article 4656 over subdivision 17 of article 1995.255 The
venue subdivision is superfluous, as evidenced by the fact that the few
245. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.21 (Vernon 1975).
246. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(30) (Vernon 1964).
247. Id art. 1995(17); see 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.25.1; B. MCELROY, supra
note 36, § 687; Keith, supra note 63, at J-25.
248. Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1198(15) (1879).
249. 1846 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act to Regulate Proceedings in the District Courts § 151,
at 405, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1711-12 (1898).
250. In the Act Regulating Proceedings in the District Courts, January 25, 1841, the leg-
islature, in the midst of prescribing rules for injunction and mandamus actions, took the
time to criticize the prior decisions of the supreme court that had allowed the district courts
to issue peremptory mandamus orders after an ex parte hearing. 1841 Tex. Gen. Laws, An
Act to Regulate the Granting on Trial of Injunctions, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 548
(1898).
251. For a discussion of subdivision 20 mandamus against heads of departments, see
mfra notes 279-89 and accompanying text.
252. 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.25.1, at 508.
253. Id
254. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4656 (Vernon 1964).
255. Id art. 1995(30) (Vernon 1964). This provision gives preference to any statute spe-
cifically designating venue over the venue statute itself.
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cases annotated under subdivision 17 of the venue statute invariably refer
to article 4656 as a basis for venue.256 Subdivision 17 should thus be
eliminated.
Article 1995(17a): Labor Disputes257
Subdivision 17a requires that a plaintiff file suit to enjoin unlawful labor
activities in the county where the alleged unlawful action occurred. This
exception is based upon the condition, however, that service can be had on
the defendant. Otherwise, venue is to be found in the county of residence
of the defendant or any one of the defendants, or in Travis County (when
suit would be filed by the State of Texas as a party). The venue facts are
based on the nature of the suit as shown by the pleadings of the plaintiff.
Subdivision 17a was originally added to article 1995 in 1955258 and was
amended in 1969.259 The most significant change of the 1969 amendment
made subdivision 17a mandatory rather than permissive. This change was
in direct response to Exparte Edgery,26° where an injunction against pick-
eting in Jefferson County (the Beaumont area) was filed in Midland
County. The picketers were cited for contempt by the Midland judge, ar-
rested by the Midland County Sheriff, and held in the Midland County jail
in west Texas. On writ of habeas corpus,26' the Supreme Court of Texas
ordered the strikers released. Subdivision 17a was not mentioned in the
opinion; this abuse was legislatively cured, however, by making subdivi-
sion 17a mandatory. Subdivision 17a is aimed at a very specific type of
action and is clearly a remedial measure better suited for inclusion in stat-
utes dealing with labor relations rather than in the venue statute. An indi-
cation of the limited application of subdivision 17a is shown by noting that
only one case is annotated under subdivision 17a in the statutes. In that
case the plaintiff sought to use the subdivision to "strike" the trial judge
from a case.262 Subdivision 17a was there held to be clearly inapplica-
ble.263 Consequently, the exception as to labor disputes has never been
favorably asserted by plaintiffs on appeal. If such a policy-based venue
provision is even wise, it certainly does not belong in the procedure-based
provision of article 1995.
256. B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 687, at 475.
257. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(17a) (Vernon Supp. 1982); see 1 R.
MCDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.25.2; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 688; Keith, supra note
63, at J-25 to -26.
258. 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 388, § 1, at 1031.
259. 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 864, § 1, at 2606.
260. 441 S.W.2d 514 (rex. 1969); see Keith, supra note 63, at J-26, n.142.
261. 441 S.W.2d at 514.
262. San Antonio Gen. Drivers, Local 657 v. Thornton, 156 Tex. 641, 299 S.W.2d 911
(1957).
263. Id at 915.
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Article 1995(18): Probate Revision264
Subdivision 18 provides that suits to revise probate proceedings of the
county court must be brought in the state district court of the same county.
The act that first contained a similar provision was passed in 1876.265 It
was then reworded and codified in the general venue statute in 1879.266
The allegations in the plaintiffs petition are sufficient to determine the na-
ture of the suit for purposes of subdivision 18.267
Subdivision 18 is a jurisdiction granting measure rather than a venue
exception.268 It is a misplaced provision that should be removed from the
venue statute269 and placed in the Probate Code, if indeed it is a necessary
provision. Only three recent cases are annotated under this subdivision.270
Article 1995(19): Suits Against Counties271
Subdivision 19 mandates that suits brought against a county must be
brought in that county. In the 1846 act incorporating the counties of the
then new State of Texas, the legislature included a provision requiring that
suits against a county be brought within that specific county.272 This pro-
vision was incorporated into the general venue statute in 1879.273 The
purpose is clearly to further the administrative convenience of county offi-
cials 274 because this mandatory provision extends beyond the venue privi-
lege generally granted to defendants.
The sole venue fact needed to activate this exception, as shown from the
plaintiff's petition, is that the suit is against a county or a county official
acting in his official capacity.275 Subdivision 19 has been held to take pre-
cedence over other mandatory and permissive subdivisions of the general
venue statute276 so that a county as defendant may not, for example, be
264. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(18) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.26; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 689; Keith, supra note 63, at J-26.
265. 1876 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 84, §§ 128, 130, at 128, 8 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAs
929, 964 (1898).
266. Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1198(16) (1879).
267. Dowden v. Cannon, 480 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1972, writ dism'd).
268. 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.26, at 510; B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 689;
Keith, supra note 63, at J-26.
269. B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 689.
270. McCarty v. Loftice, 587 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ); Deason
v. Rogers, 499 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ dism'd); Dowden v.
Cannon, 480 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ dism'd).
271. TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(19) (Vernon 1964); see I R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.27; B. MCELROY, supra note 48, § 690; Keith, supra note 63, at J-26 to -27.
272. 1846 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act to Incorporate the Several Counties of this State
Which Now Exist, or which May be Hereafter Established § 4, at 321, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS
OF TEXAS 1626 (1898).
273. Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1198(17) (1879).
274. See Hodges v. Coke County, 196 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1946,
no writ); Montague County v. Meadows, 31 S.W. 694, 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, writ refd).
275. Fielder v. Parker, 119 S.W.2d 1089, 1092 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1938, no writ);
Cobb v. H.C. Burt & Co., 241 S.W. 185, 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1922, no writ).
276. Randall County v. Todd, 542 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no
writ). This rule can be logically inferred from State Board of Ins. v. Adams, 316 S.W.2d 773
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joined in a suit maintainable outside the county under the joinder excep-
tion of subdivision 4. Although "[a] county is not of course an inhabitant
and probably does not need the same protection that an individual might
require," 277 counties are necessarily composed of the officials that bring
them to life. County officials, like other individuals, deserve protection
when acting in their official capacities. 278
Article 1995(20): Heads of Departments279
Subdivision 20 commands that all suits for mandamus against heads of
state government departments be brought in Travis County. Early Texas
courts issued writs of mandamus against department heads of the Republic
of Texas to compel them to act in favor of local petitioners.280 This was a
favorite tactic against the Commissioner of the General Land Office, for
example, to enforce the granting of lands.28' District judges were appar-
ently issuing these writs without notice or summons to the department
heads; consequently, the legislature in 1841 felt compelled to prohibit the
issuing of preemptory writs of mandamus after ex parte hearings.282 In
1846 these provisions were carried over into the first act of the State of
Texas organizing the district courts and defining their jurisdiction.283 This
act provided that writs of mandamus were returnable before the district
court of the county where the seat of government was located. 284 This pro-
vision was codified in the general venue statute in 1879.285
The fact that the suit is against a government department head for man-
damus is determined from the plaintiff's petition.286 Subdivision 20 is a
mandatory provision 287 and is applicable to mandamus actions only, not
to suits for damages and injunction.288 The exception has little utility,
because most department heads reside in Travis County. Consequently,
under the general venue provision, suit would have to be filed there re-
gardless of the status of the defendant as a governmental department head.
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, no writ), and the fact that the entire venue scheme uses this
rule whenever the nature of the suit at issue involves a government official acting in an
official capacity.
277. B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 690, at 48 1.
278. Id
279. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(20) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.28; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 691; Keith, supra note 63, at J-27.
280. Houston Tap & Brazoria Ry. v. Randolph, 24 Tex. 317, 342-43 (1859).
281. Commissioner of the Gen. Land Office v. Smith, 5 Tex. 471 (1849). For an example
of this early practice, see Board of Land Comm'rs v. Bell, Dallam 366 (1840).
282. 1841 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act To regulate the Granting and Trial of Injunctions,
and to empower the Judges of District Courts to submit issues of fact to a Jury in Chancery
cases § 9, at 84, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 548 (1898).
283. 1846 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act to Organize the District Courts and to Define their
Powers and Jurisdiction § 4, at 201, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1507 (1898).
284. Id
285. Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1198(17) (1879).
286. State Bd. of Ins. v. Adams, 316 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, no
writ)..
287. Lewis v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry., 229 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1950,
writ dism'd) (dictum).
288. Sterrett v. Gibson, 168 S.W. 16, 17-18 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1914, no writ).
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The effect of this exception is further diminished by the fact that manda-
mus against state government department heads is not a common type of
action.289 Thus, like so many of the other overly specific venue exceptions,
subdivision 20 is largely ineffective and should be repealed.
Article 1995(21): Corporation Charters290
Subdivision 21 allows the State of Texas to maintain venue in Travis
County in four types of suits: (1) suits against a domestic corporation for
forfeiture of its charter; (2) suits against foreign corporations for cancella-
tion of a permit to do business in Texas; (3) suits against any corporation
for exercising powers not conferred by the state; and (4) suits against any-
one engaging in business in the state contrary to law. Subdivision 21 is a
combination of two earlier venue exceptions. The first dealt only with
forfeiture of charters granted to corporations by the legislature, 291 and its
origin was an 1876 act.292 The second dealt with suits to forfeit the char-
ters of corporations organized under the general incorporation laws of the
state, 293 an act originally passed in 1903.294 These two exceptions, num-
bered as subdivisions 21 and 22 in 1911,295 were combined in the revision
of the Civil Statutes of 1925 to formulate what now reads in the venue
statute as subdivision 21.296 State administrative convenience was the pur-
pose for these measures specifying venue in Travis County. Subdivision
21 has been superseded by current provisions of the Texas Business Corpo-
rations Act, however, thus rendering the exception of doubtful relevance
with regard to suits against foreign and domestic corporations.297 Thus,
the subdivision could be deleted.
Article 1995(22): Railway Lands298
Subdivision 22 provides that for the state to recover when land was orig-
inally granted to a railroad by the State of Texas and those lands were
fraudulently alienated by the railroad, venue must be maintained in Travis
County. Subdivision 22 has never been used at the appellate level to de-
289. B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 691.
290. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(21) (Vernon 1964); see I R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.29; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 692; Keith, supra note 63, at J-28.
291. Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1198(19) (1879).
292. 1876 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 167, § 1, at 312, 8 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1148
(1898).
293. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1830(22) (1911).
294. 1903 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 92, § 1, at 118 (purporting to confer jurisdiction of these
types of suits on the District Court of Travis County).
295. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1830(21), (22) (1911).
296. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1995(21) (1925).
297. Keith, supra note 63, at J-28 (citing TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 7.03 (Vernon
1956) (regarding domestic corporations) & art. 8.16 (Vernon Supp. 1977) (regarding foreign
corporations)). The cited articles of the Texas Business Corporation Act permit suits to be
filed "either in the district court of the county in which the registered office of the corpora-
tion is situated, or in any district court of Travis county."
298. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(22) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.29; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 693; Keith, supra note 63, at J-28.
1982]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
termine venue, and future use of the exception is unlikely.299 The state has
granted no lands to railroads since 1882,30o and the Texas Constitution
requires that all land granted to a railroad must be alienated within twelve
years.30' Thus, the last of such lands should have been alienated by
1894.302 In addition, as of August 5, 1969, Texas voters repealed the provi-
sions of the state constitution dealing with railroad lands.30 3 This subdivi-
sion is consequently an anachronism and should be deleted.
Article 1995(23): Corporations and Associations3°4
Subdivision 23 allows suits against corporations 305 and associations30 6 to
be maintained in a number of alternative venues at the plaintiff's discre-
tion, including: (1) the county in which the corporation's principal office is
found; (2) the county where the cause of action or a part of the cause of
action arose; (3) the county where the plaintiff resided at the time the cause
of action arose if the corporation has an agent or representative in that
county; or (4) the county nearest to the plaintifi's county of residence when
the corporation did have an agent or representative at the time the cause of
action arose, assuming that the corporation has no agent or representative
in the plaintiff's resident county at the time the cause of action arose. Stat-
utes dealing with corporations are of relatively recent origin since early
corporation charters were granted directly by the sovereign. Venue in suits
against private corporations was first established by the legislature in 1874
in substantially the same form as today.307 The limited liability of the
299. Langley, supra note 24, at 552.
300. 1882 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 6, § 1, at 3, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 263 (1898)
(repealing the last railroad land grant law).
301. TEX. CONST. art. XIV, § 3 (1876, repealed 1969).
302. See Langley, supra note 24, at 551-52.
303. TEX. CONST. art. XIV, § 3 (1876, repealed 1969) (grants to railroad companies);
TEX. CONST. art. XIV, § 5 (1876, repealed 1969) (forfeiture of lands granted to railroad
companies).
304. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(23) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, §§ 4.29-.30; B. McELROY, upra note 36, § 694; Keith, supra note 63, at J-29.
The discussion of subdivisions 23, 24, 25, and 26 will follow the organization of Justice
Keith's discussion in that the provisions in subdivision 23 dealing specifically with railroad
corporations will be discussed in the ensuing portion of the text. The remainder of the text
will discuss certain types of suits against railroads (subdivisions 25 and 26) and suits against
common carriers in general (subdivision 24). Subdivision 23 was rewritten in 1943. Prior to
that time, the statute made no distinction between domestic and foreign corporations. The
1943 amendment, however, was made applicable to foreign corporations and associations.
Thus, foreign corporations and associations having a principal office or an agent in Texas
are subject to two venue exceptions. 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.30.1.
305. This subdivision does not include domestic public or quasi-public corporations even
though they have the elements of a private corporation. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v.
Finch, 512 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ).
306. Partnerships are considered to be "associations" under subdivision 23, although this
was not true prior to the adoption of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act. TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1982). See, e.g., Hudgens v. Bain Equip. &
Tube Sales, Inc., 459 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1970, no writ).
307. 1876 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 34, § 1, at 32-33, 8 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 34
(1898). Note that this act contains the words "cause of action." In Texas procedure this
phrase has come to mean that to maintain venue the plaintiff must prove he has a cause of
action. Conversely, the venue practice in 1874 put the burden on the defendant to negate
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corporate form, plus the general public suspicion of corporate activities,
led the legislature to benefit plaintiffs who seek to sue corporations. This
exception was placed in the general venue statute in the codification of
1879.308
Each of the above alternatives requires a different combination of venue
facts, but some common elements are required for any exception to be
applicable. The plaintiff is required "both to plead specifically and to
prove facts showing that a cause of action arose in [his] favor against the
defendant. ' 30 9 The plaintiff must of course allege that the defendant is a
corporation, but actual proof is required only if the defendant denies the
allegation in the plea of privilege. 310 The corporation's principal office is
defined as the place or places designated in its charter as a principal office,
or where the principal office is in fact located.31' If the plaintiff relies on
the language in subdivision 23 regarding the county where the cause of
action arose, the plaintiff must show that "either some part of the transac-
tion creating the primary right, or some part of the transaction relating to
the breach of that right, must have occurred in the county where the suit is
brought., 312 If, however, the plaintiff relies on the language in subdivision
23 regarding the county of the plaintiffs residence at the time the cause of
action arose, then the plaintiff must establish his own residence in the
county of suit, prove that the corporation has an agent or representative in
that county,313 and show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
the allegations of the petition in order to establish venue according to the general rule of
venue in the defendant's domicile. Clearly, the 1874 legislature did not intend that proof of
a cause of action by the plaintiff should be required to qualify for one of the enumerated
venue exceptions. See id
308. Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1198(21) (1879).
309. Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Monteith, 138 Tex. 216, 223, 158 S.W.2d 63, 67 (1941).
This statement is true except for the provision allowing suit to be brought in the county
where the defendant's principal office is situated.
310. Tri-Service Drilling Co. v. Adams, 287 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1956, no writ).
311. Mobile County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern Agent Corp., 519 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Broussard, 340
S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1960, writ dism'd).
312. Stone Fort Nat'l Bank v. Forbess, 126 Tex. 568, 572, 91 S.W.2d 674, 676 (1936).
This means that a plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence all ele-
ments of a cause of action. Santleben v. Taylor-Evans Seed Co., 585 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ). Damages, however, are not part of the cause of
action for purposes of venue. Ben Griffin Tractor Co. v. Garza, 497 S.W.2d 69, 71-72 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, no writ). Thus, the sustaining of damages in the county of suit
is not sufficient to establish venue where the genesis and breach of the right occurred else-
where. Haden Co. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 553 S.W.2d 759, 759 (rex. 1977) (per
curiam). This rule, however, does not appear to apply in a strict liability tort case. No cause
of action for venue purposes in such a case exists until actual physical harm has occurred to
person or property. Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. Sames, 598 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Tex. 1980).
313. Milligan v. Southern Express, Inc., 151 Tex. 315, 316-17, 250 S.W.2d 194, 194
(1952); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Preston, 487 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1972, writ dism'd). In this portion of subdivision 23 and in the following portion, the local-
ity in which the cause of action arose is irrelevant. Texas-Louisiana Power Co. v. Wells, 121
Tex. 397, 399, 48 S.W.2d 978, 979 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, judgmt adopted).
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plaintiff possesses a cause of action.314 Finally, if the plaintiff relies on the
language in subdivision 23 providing that suit may be maintained in the
county nearest the plaintiffs county of residence at the time the cause of
action arose, the plaintiff must prove the existence of an agent or represen-
tative in the county nearest the plaintiffs county of residence at the time
the cause of action arose, and the plaintiffs possession of a cause of
action.315
A look at the maze of venue facts under subdivision 23 indicates that
this exception is an unwieldy law.3 16 Additional diverse elements that the
plaintiff must prove under the subdivision include the date when the cause
of action arose, the county where the plaintiff resided when the cause of
action arose, the elements of the cause of action, and issues concerning
when a person is an agent or representative as opposed to a mere servant
or employee of the corporate entity.317 This complicated optional venue
structure has engendered frequent litigation.3 18 In addition, the terms
used in subdivision 23 are given different meanings for venue purposes
than the meanings given to the same terms in a trial on the merits.319 For
example, in Milligan v. Southern Express, Inc. 320 The Supreme Court of
Texas acknowledged this denotative distinction:
[T]he presence in the county of a mere servant, for example, a salaried
employee to clean out dirty trailers, does not create there an agency
for venue purposes, even though respondent [sic] superior would ob-
viously apply. Conversely, the more or less permanent possession by
a resident of the county of a broad power of attorney of the defendant
might well make such a person an "agency or representative" even
though his high position necessarily involved powers of discretion far
beyond those of a servant and therefore similar to those of an in-
dependent contractor.32'
These inconsistencies in the law have been the genesis of many appellate
cases as attorneys seek to define and apply otherwise familiar terms for
venue purposes.
The requirement that the plaintiff prove a cause of action not only gen-
erates venue appeals, but more importantly it generates innumerable
venue hearings on matters that have little, if any, relation to proper venue
considerations. Proof of the entire cause of action, not merely that part of
314. La Jet, Inc. v. United Petroleum Distribs., Inc., 570 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
315. Morris Plan Life Ins. Co. v. Wells, 367 S.W.2d 410, 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1963, no writ); Duncan Coffee Co. v. Clement, 246 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1952, no writ).
316. See Langley, supra note 24, at 561.
317. Id
318. See, e.g., the cases annotated in TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(23) (Vernon
1964 & Supp. 1982).
319. B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 694, at 493. See the discussion of subdivision 5,
supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
320. 151 Tex. 315, 250 S.W.2d 194 (1952).
321. Id at 322, 250 S.W.2d at 197.
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the cause of action that arose in the county of suit, is required.322 Each
case with its distinct fact pattern presents different questions of proof for
the trial court and different avenues of appeal for the disappointed
litigator.
Finally, the requirement that an "agency or representative" exist in the
county of suit has little bearing upon the question of the proper trial fo-
rum. If there is not a connection between the occurrence made the basis of
the suit and the existence of the agency or representative, then the venue
where an agency or representative exists is irrelevant. This is especially
true when considered in light of the basic venue principles of convenience
of the witnesses, the location of the evidence, and the convenience of the
parties and the court.323
Article 1995(23), (24), (25), and (26): Railroads and Common Carriers324
Actions against railroads or other common carriers are considered in
four subdivisions of article 1995, including the last portion of subdivision
23 and subdivisions 24, 25, and 26. Subdivision 23 allows suits against
railroads to be maintained in any county where the railroad extends or is
operated. Subdivision 24 is applicable to common carriers in general,
specifying that suits against two or more carriers may be maintained in
any county where one of the carriers does business. Subdivision 25 per-
mits suits for personal injuries against railroads to be maintained in either
the county where the injury occurred or in the county where the plaintiff
resided at the time of injury. Subdivision 26 concerns suits for railroad
wages and allows the employee to bring suit where the labor was per-
formed, where the cause of action accrued, or at the location of the princi-
pal office of the railroad.
Most of these provisions are of late nineteeth century origin and indicate
the suspicion with which the legislature viewed the railroads at that time.
These specific enactments concerning railroads may have been a response
to the perception that physical property damage might be done or wages
left unpaid, leaving the injured citizen with no one to sue. This fear is
exemplified by a 1905 law that allowed plaintiffs to serve process on the
railroad by serving the conductor. 325 No cogent reason can currently be
given as to why carriers should be subject to different rules of venue than
other corporations doing business in Texas. The venue provisions regard-
ing corporations, negligence, written contracts, or breach of warranty
would serve the same purposes as the provisions contained within these
322. Employers Casualty Co. v. Clark, 491 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Tex. 1973).
323. Guittard & Tyler, supra note 48, at 574. The same argument is of course applicable
to the appropriate clause under subdivision 27. See i,.fra notes 327-39 and accompanying
text.
324. TEx. Rav. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(23), (24), (25), (26) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R.
McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.31; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 694, n. 11, at 484 & §§ 695-
697; Keith, supra note 63, at J-30 to -31.
325. 1905 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 25, § 2, at 29; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1962 (1911).
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four subdivisions. 326
Article 1995(27).. Foreign Corporations327
The development of the venue provision dealing with foreign corpora-
tions is similar to the development of provisions pertaining to corporations
and railroads. The first law specifying venue regarding foreign corpora-
tions was passed in 1887.328 This law was codified in the general venue
statute in 1895.329
Subdivision 27 is similar to the first portion of subdivision 23 pertaining
to corporations in that subdivision 27 provides that foreign corporations
may be sued where their principal office is located or in the county where
the cause of action arose. 330 Under subdivision 27 foreign corporations
are subject to suit in any county where the corporation has an agency or
representative, 33' or in the plaintiffs county of residence if the foreign cor-
poration has no agency or representative in the state. Moreover, if the
plaintiff relies on these latter two requirements to maintain venue, no
cause of action against the foreign corporation need be proven. 332 A cause
of action need be proven against a foreign corporation only if the plaintiff
relies on the language in subdivision 27 regarding the county where the
cause of action accrued.333
The difference in treatment between resident corporations in subdivision
23 and nonresident corporations in subdivision 27 regarding proof of a
cause of action subjects foreign corporation defendants to broader venue
possibilities than domestic corporations. 334 This unequal treatment has
nevertheless been held to be constitutional by the Texas Supreme Court3 3 5
and by the United States Supreme Court. 336 In response to this discrimi-
326. See B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 695, at 494; Keith, supra note 63, at J-3 1; Lang-
ley, supra note 24, at 554-55 (commenting on subsection 25).
327. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.. art. 1995(27) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.30.4; B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 698; Keith, supra note 63, at J-32.
328. 1887 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 137, at 131, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAs 929 (1898).
329. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1194(25) (1895).
330. All elements of the cause of action must be established by a preponderance of the
evidence. General Motors Corp. v. Brady, 477 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1972, no writ).
331. Under this clause, the defendant must have had an agent or representative in the
county of suit at the time of the filing of the suit or at the time of the date of the hearing. 1
R. McDoNALD, supra note 63, § 4.30.4. Thus the locality of the claim is irrelevant, as is the
locality of the plaintiffs residence at the time the claim arose. Texas-Louisiana Power Co. v.
Wells, 121 Tex. 397, 399, 48 S.W.2d 978, 979 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, judgmt adopted).
332. Maintenance & Equip. Contractors v. John Deere Co., 554 S.W.2d 28, 30-31 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ dism'd); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 457
S.W.2d 115, 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970, no writ).
333. Maintenance & Equip. Contractors v. John Deere Co., 554 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ dism'd).
334. See 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.30.1, at 514; B. McELROY, supra note 36,
§ 698, at 497.
335. Commercial Ins. Co. v. Adams, 369 S.W.2d 927, 927 (Tex. 1963) (per curiam).
336. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Starnes, 425 U.S. 637 (1976).
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natory distinction, 337 commentators have argued that no differentiation
should be made between domestic and foreign corporations and have
urged that the residence of any corporation should be the county where it
maintains its principal place of business in the state. 338 This writer agrees
with this argument insofar as it extends. But questions still remain con-
cerning what is to be done about foreign corporations with no place of
business within this state. No rational basis can be found for a corporation
without a place of business within the state to have any standing to contest
venue unless that corporation can show that another county would better
serve judicial economy and fairness. A foreign corporation simply has no
standing to argue venue based upon its personal convenience. Conse-
quently, foreign corporations without a place of business within the state
should generally be subject to venue in any county within the state.339
Article 1995(28)." Insurance3W°
The original version of subdivision 28 is found in an act passed by the
legislature in 1874.34 1 This act duplicates in part an earlier provision of
the same legislature regarding venue in suits against specified private cor-
porations. 342 This duplication indicates that some legislators wanted to be
sure that suits involving claims against insurance companies were covered
by the statutes. No other rationale can explain this complicated measure,
which distinguishes as to venue between certain types of corporations.
These overlapping laws were codified in the general venue statute in the
1879 revision.343
Subdivision 28 is composed of two separate sentences that deal with two
types of insurance companies. The first sentence deals with fire, marine, or
inland insurance companies. It allows suit to be maintained in the county
where the insured property was situated. The second sentence of subdivi-
sion 28 refers to life insurance companies, accident insurance companies,
life and accident insurance companies, health and accident insurance com-
panies, and life, health, and accident insurance companies. It provides
that venue may be maintained: (1) where the company's home office is
located; (2) where the loss occurred; or (3) where the policyholder or bene-
ficiary resides.
337. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 457 S.W.2d 115, 119 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1970, no writ) (Keith, J., concurring).
338. Guittard & Tyler, supra note 48, at 581-83.
339. Foreign corporations are subject to the provisions of subdivision 23 as well as those
of subdivision 27, although the plaintiffs burden to establish venue is significantly dimin-
ished under subdivision 27. 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.30.1, at 514; B. MCELROY,
supra note 36, § 698, at 497. Consequently, any criticisms applicable to subdivision 27 are
likewise applicable to subdivision 23.
340. Tax. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(28) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.33; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 699; Keith, upra note 6, at J-32.
341. 1874 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 87, § 1, at 107-08, 8 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAs 109-10
(1898).
342. Id ch. 34, § 1, at 31-32, 8 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 33-34 (1898).
343. Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1198(22) (1879).
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The venue facts differ under the two parts of subdivision 28. Plaintiffs
who rely on the first sentence of subdivision 28 must only show that the
company is a fire, marine, or inland insurance company and that the in-
sured property was situated in the county of suit.344 If the plaintiff seeks to
maintain venue under the second sentence of subdivision 28, the plaintiff's
burden is increased. The venue facts required under the latter provision
are that: (1) the plaintiff is a policyholder or beneficiary; (2) he resides in
the county of suit; or, as an alternative to (1) and (2), (3) that the loss
occurred in the county of suit; (4) the defendant is an insurance company
of the type named in the exception; and (5) the plaintiff is suing on an
insurance policy. 345 The Texas Supreme Court has judged that the second
sentence of subsection 28 applies to "suits on policies," that is, actions for
enforcement of policies for what is due and payable under a policy. The
latter portion of subdivision 28 thus has no applicability to suits "arising
out of the policy," such as actions for the value of a policy or for the return
of premiums paid.34" In addition, the Texas Supreme Court has decided
that subdivision 28 is inapposite to automobile insurers. 347
No adequate justification exists for a statutory distinction in venue re-
quirements between types of insurance companies.348 Moreover, the dis-
tinction has caused anomalous results. For example, the requirement in
the second sentence of subdivision 28 that the plaintiff be a policyholder or
beneficiary is not a requirement for maintaining venue under the first sen-
tence of subdivision 28. This has caused some plaintiffs to lose the benefit
of the latter subdivision based upon their failing to prove that they were
indeed policyholders.349 Such a result cannot be justified on any basis.
The legislature's insistence upon differentiating between insurance compa-
nies remains a mystery with no rational basis upon which to rest this dis-
tinction. Consequently, the distinction must fall.
344. Houston Gen. Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Stricklin, 538 S.W.2d 178, 179 (rex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1976, writ dism'd). In an action on a fire insurance policy, one court has held that
providing the property was covered by the policy is not necessary in a venue hearing. Mc-
Kinney v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 257 S.W.2d 452,454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1953, mand.
overr.).
345. National Life Co. v. Rice, 140 Tex. 315, 320, 167 S.W.2d 1021, 1024 (1943); Em-
ployers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Harkness, 497 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso), writ re'd
n.r.e. per curiam, 502 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1973); Great Southwest Life Ins. Co. v. Camp, 464
S.W.2d 702, 703-04 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, no writ). The nature of the suit is
determined from the plaintiff's pleadings. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Caylor, 333
S.W.2d 161, 163 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960, no writ). The plaintiff is not required under
this exception, however, to prove a cause of action. Mercury Life & Health Co. v. Edgar-
Renegar-Campbell Clinic & Hosp., 287 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1956,
writ dism'd); American Casualty & Life Co. v. Robinson, 220 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1949, writ refd n.r.e.).
346. National Life Co. v. Stegall, 140 Tex. 554, 559, 169 S.W.2d 155, 157 (1943).
347. Pioneer Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 450 S.W.2d 64, 65 n.2 (Tex. 1970); see also Dairy-
land County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morales, 534 S.W.2d 383, 386 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1976, no writ); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Cantu, 482 S.W.2d 349, 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1972, no writ).
348. B. McELRoY, supra note 36, § 699, at 502.
349. Houston Gen. Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Stricklin, 538 S.W.2d 178, 179 (rex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1976, writ dism'd).
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Article 1995(28a). Fraternal Benefit Societies and Statewide Mutual
Assessment Companies350
Subdivision 28a allows suits against specified insurance groups to be
maintained in the county of the plaintifi's residence, in the county where
the defendant's principal office is located, or in the county where the cause
of action arose. The venue facts the plaintiff must prove to rely upon this
subdivision include: (1) the nature of the suit as growing out of or based
upon a contract of insurance; (2) the type of company involved; and
(3) either the county of the plaintiff's residence, the county of the defend-
ant's principal office, or the county where the cause of action arose. 351 Ad-
ded in 1933,352 subdivision 28a seems to be a legislative afterthought
designed to address a perceived need to provide a forum for litigation
against the specified insurance groups.
Subdivision 28a is clumsily worded. On its face it appears to apply to all
types of contracts entered into by these insurance companies, but the
courts have decided that the exception applies only to insurance con-
tracts.353 In addition, as was emphasized in the discussion of subdivision
28, no reason exists for treating various types of insurance companies dif-
ferently for venue purposes. Neither is there any reason why insurance
companies in general should be treated differently from other corpora-
tions.354 Similarly, there is no reason why insurance companies covered by
subdivision 28a should be subjected to broader venue provisions than are
other insurance companies under the latter portion of subdivision 28.
355
Furthermore, subdivisions 28 and 28a have to some degree been super-
seded by the Texas Insurance Code. The Insurance Code provides an
analogous but narrower venue article relating to certain specified insur-
ance companies. The narrower insurance venue provisions permit the lo-
cation of trial as to claims for benefits to be maintained at the defendant's
principal office or where the policyholder or beneficiary resides. 356 Conse-
quently, since no rational basis exists for distinguishing between the vari-
ous types of insurance companies, and subdivision 28a may very well be
superseded by certain venue provisions articulated by the Insurance Code,
exception 28a should be deleted.
The policy behind these exceptions to the basic venue provision as to
corporate entities in general may be fair since policyholders should not be
required to bring suit where the insurance company has its principal office,
or alternatively to prove the residence or agency of the company to main-
350. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(28a) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.34; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 700; Keith, supra note 63, at J-33.
351. National Mut. Benefit Ass'n v. Maggard, 161 S.W.2d 142, 143 (rex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1942, no writ); National Aid Life v. Self, 140 S.W.2d 606, 607 (rex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1940, no writ).
352. 1931 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 150, § 1, at 251.
353. Tidelands Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 414 S.W.2d 196, 198 (rex. Civ. App.-Austin
1967, no writ).
354. B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 700, at 505.
355. Id
356. Tax. INS. CODE. AwN. art. 14.35 (Vernon 1981).
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tain venue.357 This consideration, however, does not justify the differing
treatment of insurance companies based on their form of organization.
Based on these principles of fairness, one general exception should apply
to all insurance companies, or there should be no exception at all.
Article 1995(29)." Libel or Slander358
Subdivison 29 provides that suits for libel or slander shall be maintained
in the county where the plaintiff resided at the time the cause of action
accrued, in the county where the defendant resided at the time of filing
suit, or in the county of any defendant's residence or the domicile of any
defendant corporation. This exception is based on a 1919 law359 designed
to curb the then existing practice that allowed the plaintiff in libel and
slander cases wide latitude in selecting venue. This practice was especially
onerous when the alleged libel occurred in a widely distributed publica-
tion.360 Although the 1919 statute precluded the plaintiff from arbitrarily
selecting venue to obtain an advantage over the defendant,361. enterprising
plaintiffs' attorneys nevertheless abused the law. The current subdivision
29 was enacted to abrogate that abuse.
The venue facts the plaintiff must prove when seeking to maintain venue
at his county of residence at the time the cause of action accrued include
that a cause of action for defamation has accrued, that the cause of action
accrued on a certain date, and that the plaintiff resided in the forum
county on that date.362 To maintain suit in the county of residence of one
defendant against a plea of privilege filed by another defendant who does
not reside in that county, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that a cause of action accrued against the nonresident defend-
ant (a greater burden than the joinder provision of subdivision 4) and that
a defendant who is a properly joinable party resides in the county of
suit.
3 6 3
The policy behind the libel exception to the basic venue rule is based on
the belief that the plaintiff should be allowed to clear his name of the defa-
mation in the county of the plaintiff's residence, among people who know
357. Langley, supra note 24, at 566.
358. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(29) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.35; B. MCELRoY, supra note 36, § 701; Keith, supra note 63, at J-33 to -34.
359. 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 87, § 1, at 138.
360. Plaintiff could bring suit in any county where the libel was circulated. A.H. Belo &
Co. v. Wren, 63 Tex. 686, 721 (1884); Bailey v. Chapman, 38 S.W. 544, 546 (Tex. Civ. App.
1897, no writ).
361. Light Publishing Co. v. Wurzbach, 266 S.W. 188, 190 (rex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1924, no writ).
362. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Howard, 487 S.W.2d 708, 710 (rex. 1972);
A.H. Belo Corp. v. Blanton, 133 Tex. 391, 396, 129 S.W.2d 619, 622 (1939). Plaintiff has the
burden of proving at the venue hearing that the cause of action for defamation in fact ac-
crued. Hornby v. Hunter, 385 S.W.2d 473, 474 (rex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1964, no
writ); Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 92, 188 S.W.2d 770, 771 (1945). For a landmark case
concerning a suit against a corporation because of defamation by its agent, see Texam Oil
Corp. v. Poynor, 436 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1968).
363. 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.35, at 543.
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the plaintiff best.36 If this policy is a wise one, then it is overburdensome
to require the plaintiff to prove the elements of the cause of action and the
place of his residence at the time the cause of action accrued. The require-
ment of proof of a cause of action is never appropriate in a venue hearing
because this matter should be left to a trial on the merits. The requirement
of proof of the plaintiff's residence at the time the cause of action accrued
is superfluous because few if any plaintiffs will change their residences af-
ter a cause of action accrues in order to bring the suit in another county.
The complicated joinder provision of subdivision 29 is likewise redundant
since the existing joinder provision of subdivisions 4 and 29a will serve the
same purpose.365
Article 1995(29a)." Two or More DefendantS366
Subdivision 29a is a permissive joinder provision allowing the plaintiff
to join all defendants who are necessary parties in a single suit if venue can
be maintained against any one of the defendants. This exception to the
venue rule was added to the venue statute in 1927367 to remedy a defect in
the existing venue statute. Before subdivision 29a was enacted, the plain-
tiff was forced to rely on subdivision 4 to join multiple defendants. This
reliance meant that unless the plaintiff sued the defendants in the county
of residence of one of the defendants (a situation clearly within the bounds
of subdivision 4), he had to establish some other subdivision within the
statute against each of the defendants to maintain venue against all de-
fendants. 368 Subdivision 29a was added to lighten this heavy burden and
to benefit the plaintiff.369
Subdivision 29a applies only when no defendant resides in the county of
suit. 370 Because this exception is always considered in conjunction with
another subdivision of article 1995,371 the required venue facts for applica-
tion of subdivision 29a will vary depending on the companion provision.
In all cases, however, the plaintiff must show that the defendants who are
to be joined are necessary parties to the suit.372 In other words, if the plain-
tiff can establish that one exception applies against one defendant, then all
other defendants can be kept in the county of suit if they are necessary
parties. The test of whether a defendant is a necessary party, however, has
364. Langley, supra note 24, at 556; see Houston Printing Co. v. Tennant, 120 Tex. 539,
545, 39 S.W.2d 1089, 1091 (1931).
365. Langley, supra note 24, at 557; cf. 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.35, at 543.
McDonald relies on the fact that subsection 29 is mandatory to say that the joinder will be
different and the various joinder provisions can thus be justified.
366. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANNm. art. 1995(29a) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.36; B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 702; Keith, supra note 63, at J-34.
367. 1927 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 72, § 2, at 197.
368. 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.10.1, at 433; see Pioneer Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Gray, 132 Tex. 509, 514, 125 S.W.2d 284, 287 (1939).
369. 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.10.1, at 433.
370. Houseman v. Mahin, 390 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. 1965).
371. Schulz v. Schulz, 478 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas, 1972, no writ); Kain
v. Northland Ins. Co., 472 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, no writ).
372. Ladner v. Reliance Corp., 156 Tex. 158, 162, 293 S.W.2d 758, 762 (1956).
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caused much litigation. The Texas Supreme Court has defined a necessary
party as one whose joinder in the suit "must be necessary in order to afford
plaintiff the complete relief to which it is entitled. ' 373 Moreover, the plain-
tiff must not only allege in the petition that the defendant is a necessary
party, he must prove by extrinsic evidence the facts that make the defend-
ant a necessary party before subdivision 29a is applicable.374
The requirement in subdivision 29a that the nonresident defendants be
necessary parties to the suit has generated two problems. First, the inter-
pretation of who is a necessary party produces much litigation even though
the Supreme Court of Texas has ruled frequently on the matter.375 Sec-
ond, the necessary party requirement causes fragmentation of litigation.
Because subdivision 29a can only be used when no defendant resides in
the county of suit, if the plaintiff fails to prove that the defendants are
necessary parties, then the actions against the defendants who have filed
pleas of privilege to contest venue are automatically transferred to their
counties of residence. 376 Thus, similar cases based on similar facts are sub-
ject to repetitious trials in scattered forums.377 One possible resolution to
this problem might be to dismiss the suit entirely when a plea of privilege
is sustained and allow the plaintiff a grace period, not subject to the statute
of limitations, to refile in a proper county where venue might be main-
tained against all defendants.378 This solution, however, would only have
a band-aid effect. Another possible resolution to the problem is to abolish
the necessary party requirement of subdivision 29a and to allow joinder of
parties for venue purposes to be governed by the joinder provision in the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.379 Because the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure380 provide for joinder of parties, the venue statute should be recon-
ciled with the rules. No justification exists as to why joinder for venue
purposes based on the residence of one of the defendants in the county of
373. Loop Cold Storage Co. v. South Tex. Packers, Inc., 491 S.W.2d 106, 108 (Tex. 1973).
374. Ladner v. Reliance Corp., 156 Tex. 158, 165, 293 S.W.2d 758, 764 (1956).
375. See, e.g., Loop Cold Storage Co. v. South Tex. Packers, Inc., 491 S.W.2d 106, 108
(Tex. 1973). The annotations in the Texas Digest contain 24 cases since the Loop decision
where courts of civil appeals have found it necessary to apply the definition. Apparently, the
Loop decision has not made the matter crystal clear to the lawyers of the state. See 37A
TEx. DIG. § 22(4) (Supp. 1981).
376. See Loop Cold Storage Co. v. South Tex. Packers, Inc., 491 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex.
1973); Belcher v. Ramirez, 578 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no
writ); C. Hayman Constr. Co. v. American Indem. Co., 473 S.W.2d 62, 70 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1971, no writ), on cert#Fed questions, 471 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. 1971).
377. The Loop court explicitly recognized this problem when it observed that "[t]his is
one controversy which perhaps could most fairly and expeditiously be tried as one lawsuit.
But the Texas venue law does not leave our decision to considerations of better administra-
tion of justice." 491 S.W.2d at 108.
378. One author has suggested such a revision, along with more comprehensive and nec-
essary reforms. See McElroy, Proposalsfor Reviions to Texas Civil Statutes, 44 Tax. B.J.
257, 257-58 (1981).
379. TEx. R. Cirv. P. 40. Rule 40, in contradiction to article 1995, allows joinder of joint
tortfeasors in a single suit. Joint tortfeasors are not necessary parties under subsection 29a.
See Leonard v. Abbott, 366 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1963) (plea of privilege granted as to defend-
ants who were not necessary parties).
380. Tax. R. Crv. P. 39-43.
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suit (as stated in subdivision 4) should differ from joinder for venue pur-
poses where none of the defendants reside in the county of suit (as in sub-
division 29a). 381
Article 1995(30): Special Venue 382
Subdivision 30 states that article 1995 will be displaced by any law ex-
pressly providing for venue in certain types of actions. Thus, when the
legislature enacts a statute that contains a venue clause for disputes arising
under it, that statute will preempt the general venue rule and the numerous
venue exceptions articulated in article 1995. 383 Although subdivision 30 is
stated in mandatory terms, it does not convert a permissive venue provi-
sion in any other statute into a mandatory prescription. Permissive venue
found in any other statute must always yield to a mandatory exception in
article 1995. 384 Subdivision 30 first appeared in the venue statute in 1879.
It was apparently included by the early codifiers for uniformity purposes,
since no specific act of the legislature can be found to substantiate the ra-
tionale behind its inclusion.385
Article 1995(31)." Breach of Warranty by Manufacturer386
Subdivision 31 allows suits against manufacturers of consumer goods to
be maintained in: (1) the county where the cause of action accrued; (2) any
county where the manufacturer has an agency or representative; (3) the
county where the manufacturer has its principal office; or (4) the county
where the plaintiff resides. Subdivision 31 was added to the venue statute
in 1973.387 It was designed to relieve the plaintiffs burden of proving a
cause of action in a venue hearing against the defendant in complicated
products liability suits. 388 The venue facts the plaintiff must prove to sus-
tain venue under subdivision 31 are that: (1) the suit is for breach of war-
ranty; (2) the defendant is the manufacturer; (3) the product is a consumer
good;389 and (4) the suit is brought in a county that fits the plaintiff's cho-
381. Langley, supra note 24, at 567-69.
382. TEx. Rev. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(30) (Vernon 1964); see 1 R. McDONALD,
supra note 63, § 4.37; B. MCELROY, supra note 36, § 703; Keith, supra note 63, at J-35.
383. Langdeau v. Burke Inv. Co., 163 Tex. 526, 529, 358 S.W.2d 553, 555-56 (1962).
384. Id
385. See Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1198(23) (1879).
386. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(31) (Vernon Supp. 1982); see 1 R.
McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.37.1; B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 703; Keith, supra note
63, at J-35 to -36.
387. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 213, § 2, at 490.
388. See General Motors Corp. v. Franks, 509 S,W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1974, writ dism'd).
389. Whether the action is for breach of warranty and whether the product is a "con-
sumer good" will be determined by the plaintifls petition. See General Motors Corp. v.
Washington, 559 S.W.2d 425, 427-28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ); Mainte-
nance & Equip. Contractors v. John Deere Co., 554 S.W.2d 28, 30-31 (rex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ dism'd). One court has held that subdivision 31 applies only
to breach of warranty and not to strict liability in tort. Chavez v. Murrel's Welding Works,




Other provisions of the venue statute make this exception redundant. If
the manufacturer is a corporation, then the first three venue choices pro-
vided by subdivision 31 are already addressed by subdivisions 23 and 27
regarding suits against corporations. 39' The fourth alternative, granting
venue at the plaintiff's residence, is the broadest provision of this subdivi-
sion and is by far the most popular with plaintiffs. 392 These subdivisions
stand in need of some linguistic tightening due to this duplication.
393
II. TExAs CIVIL VENUE PROCEDURE
Early Texas venue procedure employed the common law plea in abate-
ment to challenge the venue chosen by the plaintiff.394 The burden was on
the defendant to traverse or especially deny the facts of the plaintiff's alle-
gations which purported to establish venue in the county where suit was
filed. Additionally, the defendant was required to negate all exceptions
upon which the plaintiff might rely in order to achieve his alleged
venue. 395 This position was initially endorsed by the Texas Supreme
Court,396 but the court later held to the contrary:
The right to maintain a suit in a county other than that in which the
statute fixes the venue must depend upon the existence of the fact or
facts which constitute an exception to the statute, and not upon the
mere averment of such fact or facts. Where . . . he [the defendant]
pleads the privilege of being sued in the county of his domicile as
Provided by that statute, to defeat this plea and deprive him of that
right, we think the facts relied on should be not only alleged but
proved.397
Consequently, the later supreme court ruling forced the plaintiff not only
to allege and prove the specific facts needed to activate a venue exception,
but it also shed some doubt upon the practice of forcing the defendant to
negate the elements of the plaintiff's venue exceptions. The view that the
defendant's privilege to be sued in his home county was valuable provided
the justification for requiring more of the plaintiff than mere allegations of
venue. Moreover, the zeal to protect the rights of the defendant gave rise
to a Texas venue procedure that in many cases requires two trials of a suit,
one to sustain venue, the other on the merits. 398
390. Hall v. Ford Motor Co., 565 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978,
no writ).
391. 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.37.1 (Supp. 1980); B. McELRoY, supra note 36,
§ 704.
392. 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.37.1 (Supp. 1980); B. McELRoY, supra note 36,
§ 704.
393. B. McELROY, upra note 36, § 704.
394. J. TOWNES, upra note 74, at 349.
395. Stark v. Whitman, 58 Tex. 375, 376 (1882); Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R. v. Graves, 50
Tex. 181, 201 (1878).
396. Robertson v. Ephraim, 18 Tex. 118, 124 (1856). This position was held to be the law
as late as 1910 in Witherspoon v. Duncan, 131 S.W. 660, 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, no writ).
397. Hilliard v. Wilson, 76 Tex. 180, 184, 13 S.W. 25, 26 (1890).
398. See Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232, 237, 88 S.W.2d 91, 95 (1935).
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The requirement that the defendant negate all possible exceptions that
the plaintiff might establish was considered to be a harsh burden on the
defendant. 399 Also, the early plea in abatement practice contained no
transfer provision. Consequently, when a suit was abated for improper
venue, it was immediately dismissed rather than transferred to the proper
county of venue. This dismissal caused delay at best, and at worst, loss of
the cause of action due to statutory limitations. 4°° The 1907 legislature
passed the Plea of Privilege Act to combat these criticisms.4° 1 The 1907
Act provided for transfer of suits to the proper county of venue rather than
immediate dismissal upon a finding of improper venue, and the defendant
was no longer forced to negate every possible ground of venue outside his
own county of residence. ° 2 In 1917 the legislature added the provision
that the defendant's plea of privilege constituted prima facie proof of his
right to a change of venue to the county of his residence, thus requiring
that the plaintiff file a controverting affidavit to contest the defendant's
plea. °3 The 1917 Act also provided for an interlocutory appeal of the
venue decision prior to the trial on the merits of the case.Y0 These impor-
tant provisions of the 1907 and 1917 Acts were originally codified in arti-
cles 1832, 1833, and 1903 of the Texas statutes.4°5 They were subsequently
renumbered as articles 2007 and 2008 in the statutory revisions of 1925.406
This was the state of the law when the first Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
took effect in 1941.407
A. Current Procedure
Current Texas venue procedure is codified in the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, rules 86-89 and 385(e), 408 and has not changed substantially
since 1941. Before consideration of the rules in detail, a brief outline of
their procedural application is necessary.
When the plaintiff files a petition, the defendant may contest the choice
of venue by filing a plea of privilege. 4°9 The plaintiff must respond within
399. M.E. SHAFER, GAmMEL'S ANNOTATED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN TEXAS app.
xi (1948) ("Changes Made in Pleas of Privilege by New Rules," an address by Fred Porter,
May 5, 1945).
400. Id; see also J. TOWNES, supra note 74, at 350.
401. 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 133, § 1, at 248.
402. Id.
403. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 176, § 1, at 388.
404. Id
405. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. arts. 1832, 1833, 1903 (1918).
406. Id arts. 2007, 2008 (1925).
407. Adopted by authority of the Rule Making Power Act, 1936 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 25,
§ 6, at 201.
408. TEx. R. Civ. P. 86-89, 385(e).
409. A defendant may waive a plea of privilege in any number of ways. For example, if
the defendant fails to file the plea in "due order," that is, before any other plea, pleading, or
motion if filed, the plea of privilege is waived. Crosby v. Heldt Bros. Trucks, 394 S.W.2d
235, 237 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1965, no writ). The defendant also waives a plea of
privilege by taking any action that would be considered inconsistent with his claim that the
venue should be transferred. 1 R. McDONALD, supra note 63, § 4.40. Obviously, these
waiver rules are traps for the unwary. Moreover, until the plea of privilege has been dis-
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ten days410 by filing a controverting plea, otherwise the defendant's plea of
privilege will be granted, and the case will be transferred to the county of
the defendant's residence. 41' If a controverting plea is filed, the plaintiff is
responsible for obtaining a hearing. At the hearing, the plaintiff is obli-
gated to prove the specific venue facts associated with the subdivision of
article 1995 upon which he relies to maintain venue in the county of suit.
These venue facts must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.412
If the plea is denied, then the trial on the merits of the case may begin.
This is the case even if the defendant appeals the venue ruling of the trial
court.41 3 If the plea of privilege is sustained and the trial court orders that
the case be transferred to the county of the defendant's domicile, then a
timely appeal by the plaintiff will suspend the transfer and trial of the case
pending the venue appeal.414
B. Rule 86
Rule 86 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure contains the provisions
regarding the defendant's plea of privilege. The rule provides that the plea
must be sworn to and in writing. It must also state that the defendant was
not, at the institution of the suit, at the time of service of process, or at the
time of the filing of the plea of privilege, a resident of the county of suit.415
The defendant must then name his county of residence and his address,
and he must state that no exception to exclusive venue at his residence
exists.
The plea of privilege is the exclusive method of raising the issue of
venue in Texas courts.416 Since the plea of privilege constitutes prima fa-
cie proof of the defendant's right to a change of venue from that alleged in
the plaintiff's complaint,417 the plaintiff has the burden of proving the facts
posed of, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to render a judgment on the merits against the
defendant. Jones v. Kline, 451 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970,
no writ).
410. TEx. R. Civ. P. 88. A controverting plea must be filed with the clerk of the court
within 10 days of the receipt of the plea of privilege. An extension is theoretically available
"for good cause," but making the required showing is difficult. Lindsey v. Chanslor, 538
S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, no writ). This ten-day filing requirement
begins to run upon receipt of the plea and is not extended by the provisions of rule 21a,
which allow an extra three days for responsive action when service is by mail. Wilson v.
Gross Nat'l Bank, 535 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
411. TEx. R. Civ. P. 385(e).
412. Porter v. United Motels, Inc., 315 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1958, no
writ). The trial court should not, however, consider the matter of affirmative defenses at the
venue hearing. Berton Land Dev. Corp. v. Ryan Mortgage Investors, 563 S.W.2d 811, 812
(Tex. 1978).
413. TEx. R. Civ. P. 385(e). As a practical matter, few plaintiffs' lawyers will venture to
try the case on the merits since the venue order may ultimately be reversed on appeal. In
that event, the entire trial would have been futile.
414. Id
415. Id If the defendant had been a resident of the county where suit was ified at the
time suit was filed this would, of course, be dispositive of the issue.
416. Texas Highway Dep't v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. 1967).
417. Geary, Hamilton, Brice & Lewis v. Coastal Transp. Co., 399 S.W.2d 878, 879 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, no writ).
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necessary to overrule the plea and obtain the desired exception. 418 In ad-
dition, the plaintiff must plead specifically in the controverting plea the
grounds relied upon to confer venue in the county of suit.41 9
C. Rule 87
The venue hearing itself is the subject of rule 87 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure. The rule provides that the hearing cannot be held until at
least ten days have elapsed after the defendant has received a copy of the
plaintiff's controverting plea.420 If the defendant demands a jury trial on
the venue issue, the court may require the cause to be tried on the merits at
the same time.421 Consequently, few defense lawyers ever demand a jury
trial on the venue issue.
The venue hearing differs from a trial on the merits in that the inquiry at
the venue hearing is whether the defendant may be sued where the plain-
tiff has instituted suit. The trial on the merits determines whether the de-
fendant is liable to the plaintiff on the transaction in question and what
damages, if any, should be awarded because of that liability.422 Proof at
the venue hearing relates solely to the venue facts necessary to maintain
venue as specified by the exception relied upon by the plaintiff.4 23 Depend-
ing upon the exception sought, however, issues at the venue hearing will
often overlap with those litigated at the trial on the merits. The plaintiff
has the burden of pleading and proving that his case is within one of the
statutory exceptions to the general venue rule favoring the defendant's res-
idence as the proper place of trial.4
24
D. Rule 88
Rule 88 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure concerns the issuance of
process for witnesses and the taking of depositions for the purposes of the
venue hearing. The rule specifies that such actions will not constitute a
waiver of the plea of privilege. Additionally, the rule provides that deposi-
418. Citizens Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Gilley, 521 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1975, no writ); Fleetwood Constr. Co. v. Western Steel Co., 510 S.W.2d 161, 163
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).
419. Flugarth v. Brickstone Prods. Corp., 411 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1967, no writ).
420. The rule goes on to state that after the ten-day period the court "shall promptly hear
such plea of privilege." As a practical matter the plea of privilege is rarely "promptly"
heard. Usuallyso much discovery must be done on the matter that several years may elapse
before the parties are prepared for a hearing. TEx. R. Civ. P. 87. This is especially true in
light of the requirement for some of the venue exceptions that a cause of action must beproved byth laintiff in the venue hearing.
421. Alanizv. Haegelin, 384 S.W.2d 43[, 433 (Tex. Civ. App.- Eastland 1964, no writ)
(plaintiff entitled to jury on venue issue if some evidence of probative force to support al-
leged venue facts).
422. Cunningham v. Portwood, 426 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968,
no writ).
423. Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232, 237, 88 S.W.2d 91, 93 (1935).
424. Banks v. Collins, 152 Tex. 265, 267, 257 S.W.2d 97, 99 (1953); Guerra v. Texas
Employers Ins. Ass'n, 480 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1972, no writ).
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tions taken in preparation for a venue hearing may be read into evidence
in subsequent suits involving the same parties. Subsequent suits, however,
must "[concern] the same subject-matter in like manner as if taken in such
subsequent suit."' 425 Consequently, a deposition taken in preparation for a
venue hearing that touches upon the merits of the cause of action will ordi-
narily be admissible into evidence at the trial upon the merits. This rule of
procedure thus increases the importance of pre-venue hearing discovery
and the venue hearing itself.
E Rule 89
Rule 89 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides for disposition
of the trial on the merits after the trial court has ruled on the plea of privi-
lege. If the plea is sustained, the court must transfer the case to the proper
county of venue along with a transcript of the hearing and all original
papers filed with the court.426 The case is then subject to trial ten days
after the transcript and papers are received by the transferee court. The
transferring court must make a copy of the transcript and papers filed for
all defendants who have been severed from one or more other defendants
and also send these documents to the proper court. Consequently, the ad-
ministrative burden that falls upon the transferring court in sustaining a
plea of privilege is substantial, especially in a case dealing with multiple
defendants.
F Rule 385(e)
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 385(e) provides for appeal of the venue
decision. Rule 385(e) specifies that if the appeal is from an order sus-
taining the plea of privilege, then the transfer of the case and the trial on
the merits will be suspended pending the appeal.427 In addition, article
2008 regarding the right to an interlocutory appeal remains in effect.428
Article 2008 is essentially the same as rule 385(e), except that it provides
that either party may appeal the venue decision. Consequently, while rule
385(e) does not speak to the issue of who may file an appeal concerning a
trial court's venue ruling, article 2008 provides that either party has the
right to appeal their venue decision because it is an interlocutory appeal.
Nevertheless, both rule 385(e) and article 2008 provide that only the ap-
peal of the order sustaining the plea of privilege will suspend transfer and
trial.
G Criticism of the Venue Procedure
The most important criticism leveled against the Texas venue procedure
is the excessive delay engendered before a suit is ready for a trial on the
425. TEx. R. Civ. P. 88.
426. Id 89. The rule provides that "the cause shall not be dismissed." Id Conse-
quently, the decision to transfer is not optional; it is mandatory.
427. TEx. R. Clv. P. 385(e).
428. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2008 (Vernon 1964).
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merits of the claim.429 This consistent delay in the trial on the merits is
evidenced by the number of reported venue cases that consume the time of
attorneys, courts, and litigants on matters of mere procedure.430 In many
cases, the plea of privilege process is employed to delay the trial on the
merits and to obtain a preview of the plaintiffs case.431
Texas venue practice not only delays the trial on the merits, but it also
confers upon the defendant a strategic edge in negotiating settlements
since the plaintiff is forced to incur additional expense before any, possible
recovery can be obtained. 432 This expense and delay is compounded if the
plaintiff is required to appeal an adverse ruling prior to proceeding on the
merits. Thus, in cases where the plaintiff has limited resources, the venue
hearing may determine whether the plaintiff will be able to maintain his
action as to the trial on the merits at all. In small damage cases the plain-
tiff may not find it profitable to travel to a distant county to prosecute his
claim if the defendant's plea of privilege is sustained. In other cases, the
mere assertion of a plea of privilege may dissuade the plaintiff from pursu-
ing the action at all, thus granting the defendant an unfair bargaining lever
as to disposition of the litigation.
Although the inquiry at the venue hearing differs from that of the trial,
the venue hearing frequently becomes "a short form duplication of much
of a subsequent trial on the merits. '433 In most cases nothing is gained by
requiring proof of the facts alleged in the controverting plea, because all
the facts required in the controverting plea must be set out in the plea
under oath.434 Thus the requirement of proof of the venue facts by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence accomplishes nothing save increased delay in
reaching the trial on the merits of the controversy and a proportionate
increase in expenses.
Finally, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure cause confusion regarding
the interlocutory appeal of a venue order. While provisions regarding the
venue hearing, the plea of privilege, and the controverting plea are found
in rules 86-89, the process of appeal for the venue decision is hidden in
rule 385(e). 435 In addition, article 2008436 with its overlapping clauses is
still in effect with respect to the venue appeal, even though the Rules of
Civil Procedure adopted in 1941 repealed most of the then existing statu-
429. See B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 679 n.70, at 445, where the author comments that
most of the Texas venue problems are created by the venue hearing with its onerous proof
requirements and the right of the plaintiff to appeal the venue decision.
430. Id § 779, at 39.
431. Harvill, supra note 24, at 530 (citing Knapp, "Pleadings from Defendant's View-
point," § 3.33, Subchapter B, Chapter 3, Personal Injury Litigation in Texas). Use of the
venue hearing as a discovery tool is unjustifiable. The rules provide liberal discovery proce-
dures for the defendant to obtain a preview of the plaintiffs case, but not to delay the trial
on the merits unduly.
432. Langley, supra note 24, at 550-51.
433. B. McELROY, supra note 36, § 772, at 31.
434. Id
435. Venue rules 86-89 fall under the categorical heading of "pleading," while venue
appellate rule 385(e) falls under the categorical heading of "proceedings."
436. Thx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2008 (Vernon 1964).
1982]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
tory rules of practice and procedure. 437
III. THE VENUE SYSTEM IN OTHER STATES
The Texas venue process is the product of its Spanish civil law heritage
and the large size of the state. States with similar characteristics, however,
have not encumbered themselves with the same statutory venue complexi-
ties and the corresponding amount of conflicting case law as has Texas. A
comparison of the venue practice in three other similar states reveals clues
regarding the pathology of Texas venue practice. Alaska, California, and
Arizona have been chosen for comparison. Alaska and California are sim-
ilar in geographic size to Texas, while the venue practice in California and
Arizona, like Texas, has developed from the Spanish civil law.
A. Alaska
The Alaska venue statute is admirably simple,438 thus differing mark-
edly from the lengthy Texas statute. The Alaska venue statute provides
that a civil action may be brought in the judicial district where the defend-
ant may be served with process, or in the district where the claim arose.439
Real property suits provide the only exception to this basic rule; these suits
must be commenced in the judicial district where the real property, or any
part of the affected real property, is situated.440 The Alaska statute addi-
tionally contains a catch-all measure, which provides that actions in cases
not covered by the provisions noted above may be brought in any judicial
district of the state.441 Furthermore, the Alaska Legislature has conferred
upon state trial court judges great discretion to transfer cases if the conven-
ience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted, 442 or alter-
natively if the court finds that the defendant will be put to unnecessary
expense and inconvenience by the disposition of suit in the venue of
filing.443
By granting the plaintiffs an optional venue provision for most civil ac-
tions, Alaska has chosen to focus its attention on the place where the cause
of action arose as the primary consideration in determining venue. Con-
ceivably, a plaintiff could pursue a defendant to an inconvenient forum
and have process served there as a harrassment technique, but judicial dis-
cretion serves as the safety valve in such situations. The Alaska provision
permitting suit to be maintained in any county where the defendant can be
served is also compatible with the Alaska incorporation statutes, which
define the residence of the corporation and the persons who may be served
as representative of the corporation.4 " Various provisions of the Alaska
437. B. McELRoY, supra note 36, § 777, at 35.
438. ALAsLA STAT. § 22.10.030 (1962).
439. Id § 22.10.030(b).
440. Id § 22.10.030(a).
441. Id § 22.10.030(e).
442. Id § 22.10.040(2).
443. Id § 22.10.040(4).
444. Id § 10.05.057.
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statutes thus work in harmony to provide internally consistent results.
Once again, abuse by the plaintiff can be cured by the trial court's discre-
tionary change of venue procedure, and as a further deterrent against
abuse the Alaska statutes provide that costs for venue procedures may be
assessed against the plaintiff in appropriate circumstances. 445 Suits against
nonresident defendants are covered by the safety-net provision, allowing
suit to be maintained in any judicial district. The Alaska statute contains
no specific rule concerning joinder of parties or actions. It purposefully
leaves these issues to the Rules of Civil Procedure. 44 6
The procedure for calling the court's attention to improper venue is by
way of pretrial motion.447 Failure to make timely objection to improper
venue waives the objection." 8 The decision to grant or deny a change of
venue is solely within the discretion of the trial judge.449 As such, venue is
not left unchecked in the hands of the plaintiff, nor is it so skewed towards
protection of the defendant as to overburden the plaintiff. The judge will
base this discretionary decision on affidavits that must state the statutory
grounds relied upon for a requested change of venue. 450 The procedure
for appeal of the venue order is by appeal of the final judgment of the trial
on the merits, and the appellant must demonstrate that the venue ruling
constituted an abuse of discretion that resulted in prejudicial error.451
Consequently, as the venue ruling cannot be brought up on interlocutory
appeal, abuse by delay through a purely procedural mechanism is avoided.
B. California
The California venue statute452 will appear more familiar to Texas law-
yers than the Alaska statute since California shares with Texas the civil
law preference for the defendant. The California venue law states:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided by law ...the county in which the
defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is
the proper county for the trial of the action. '453 While the California ex-
ceptions to the basic venue rule are not numbered or physically separated
from the body of the general venue statute, the exceptions indicate Califor-
nia's concern over many areas similar to those manifested in the Texas
exceptions. For example, California has exceptions to the general venue
rule covering tort claims, 454 contracts in general, 455 consumer contracts, 456
445. Id § 22.10.040(4). Subdivision 4 provides that if the court finds that the expense
and inconvenience were intentionally caused, then costs can be assessed against the plaintiff.
See McClellan v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 565 P.2d 175, 179 (Alaska 1977).
446. Compare the Texas practice where joinder for venue purposes is different from join-
der of parties and issues. See supra notes 72-86 (subdivision 3), 87-100 (subdivision 4), 366-
81 (subdivision 29a) and accompanying text.
447. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 12.
448. ALASKA STAT. § 22.10.030(0 (1962).
449. Maier v. City of Ketchikan, 403 P.2d 34, 39 (Alaska 1965).
450. Coughlan v. Coughlan, 423 P.2d 1010, 1015 (Alaska 1967).
451. Id at 1014.
452. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 395 (West Supp. 1982).
453. Id § 395(a).
454. Id
455. Id
456. Id § 395(b).
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determination of rights to real property,457 liens or foreclosure actions on
real property,458 and actions where the defendant is a nonresident,459 a
corporation,460 or the executor of an estate.461 Thus California, like Texas,
has addressed many specific kinds of actions and types of defendants in its
venue statute. While these categories have spawned considerable litiga-
tion,462 California has not experienced the burdensome flood of venue liti-
gation that Texas has. Although the California and Texas venue statutes
are similar, California's good fortune is the result of the simplified proce-
dural approach taken by the California courts in the venue decision.463
In California the venue issue is raised when the defendant files an affi-
davit to the plaintiff's allegation of venue and a notice of motion for an
order transferring the action.464 The trial judge adjudicates the venue
question based only on these affidavits and the plaintiffs opposing affida-
vits. 465 Disputed issues of facts relevant to the venue determination are
decided by the trial judge, and these decisions cannot be disturbed on ap-
peal.466 In addition, the trial judge has the discretion to consider the con-
venience of witnesses and the ends of justice when arriving at a venue
decision. The trial judge is vested with the authority to change venue467 or
retain the case468 when these goals would be promoted.
In 1974 the California Legislature amended its statute to grant to the
trial court the power to order payment of costs to the prevailing party re-
garding transfer of actions brought in an improper venue.469 Relevant fac-
tors for the court to consider in assessing costs include whether an offer to
stipulate venue was reasonably made and rejected by either party and
whether the plaintiffs selection of venue or the defendant's motion for
transfer was made in good faith.470 Additionally, any costs assessed by the
court are specifically made the personal liability of the attorney represent-
ing his client and are not chargeable to the party involved in the litiga-
457. Id § 392(l)(a).
458. Id § 392(I)(b).
459. Id § 395(a).
460. Id § 395.5.
461. Id § 395.1.
462. For example, the annotations to CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 395 (West Supp. 1982),
the basic California venue provision, take up 33 pages.
463. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 396b (West Supp. 1982); see also id § 397 (permitting
discretion in venue transfers as well). In addition to this simplified procedural approach,
another reason for California's lack of venue litigation is that the courts have not construed
the statute to require the plaintiff to prove a cause of action in order to establish an excep-
tion to the basic venue rule favoring the defendant. Harvill, supra note 24, at 530.
464. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 396b (West Supp. 1982).
465. Id; see also Diepenbrock v. Auslen, 185 Cal. App. 2d 747, 8 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1960).
466. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 397(3) (West 1973).
467. Id § 396b.
468. Hamilton v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 418, 423, 112 Cal. Rptr. 450, 453-54
(1974).




tion.471 The 1974 amendments also provided that the cause of action on
the merits could not be prosecuted in any state court until the costs and
fees assessed from any venue procedure were paid.472 These sanctions
were clearly designed to eliminate abuse of the venue procedure by attor-
neys seeking to delay a trial on the merits or seeking to harass the opposing
party.
Actions regarding venue matters are not directly appealable in Califor-
nia. Mandamus is the proper remedy.473 The appellate court may stay all
proceedings in the trial court, however, pending final judgment on the pe-
tition for writ of mandate. 474 While this structure may subject the trial on
the merits to some delay, the mechanism for delay lies in the hands of the
objective appellate court and not the zealous advocate. Thus the potential
for delay abuse is substantially diminished.
C Arizona
The Arizona venue statute475 was originally adopted from the Texas
statute476 and therefore bears a striking resemblance to the Texas venue
structure. Based upon the general rule that venue is to lie in the defend-
ant's domicile, the Arizona venue statute has nineteen exceptions shifting
venue to the choice of the plaintiff.
Arizona like California, has developed a different venue procedure from
Texas. The venue decision in Arizona is based solely upon the pleadings
and affidavits filed by the parties.477 Arizona has reflected the Texas proce-
dure, however, of requiring an evidentiary hearing in venue matters.478 In
addition, Arizona judges possess the discretionary authority to order a
change of venue when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice
would be promoted.479 The appeal of a venue decision in Arizona is by
special action,480 and the test on appeal is abuse of discretion. A special
action will not automatically stay the trial court proceeding unless a stay is
specifically ordered by the appellate court.48' These interlocutory stays are
subject to the same limitations as temporary restraining orders.482 Arizona
courts will not ordinarily reverse venue decisions for an abuse of discretion
471. Id
472. Id § 399.
473. Id § 400 (West 1973); see also Hennigan v. Boren, 243 Cal. App. 2d 810, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 748 (1966) (contesting denial of the motion to change venue); Laurel Crest, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 235 Cal. App. 2d 69, 44 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1965) (contesting the granting of the
motion to change venue).
474. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 400 (West 1973).
475. ARiz. REV. STAT. AN. art. 12-501 (West 1982).
476. See historical note ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. art. 12-401 (West 1982).
477. Id art. 12-406.
478. Pride v. Superior Court, 87 Ariz. 157, 348 P.2d 924, 927 (1960); Turner v. Superior
Court, 3 Ariz. App. 414, 415 P.2d 129, 134 (1966).
479. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. art. 12-406 (West 1982).
480. Landry v. Superior Court, 125 Ariz. 337, 609 P.2d 607, 608 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
481. ARIz. SuP. CT. R. 5.
482. Id
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unless the complaining party demonstrates clear prejudicial error.483
The simplified procedure for determining venue in Arizona avoids the
delay found in the Texas practice while protecting the defendant's privi-
lege to be sued in the county of his residence.484 The discretionary power
of the trial judge acts as a check on the factors of fairness in defining the
proper location of trial. The motive to delay the trial is also removed by
limiting the availability of an interlocutory stay and by allowing the trial
judge wide latitude in the venue decision. Likewise, the deferential appel-
late standard of abuse of discretion encourages trial judges to act as they
think best without the impending threat of an appellate review standard
that is fatal in fact.
D. Federal District Court Venue
Federal venue procedure for district courts varies considerably from the
Texas venue practice.485 In federal venue procedure, when diversity of
citizenship is not the basis of subject matter jurisdiction, the federal venue
statute allows the plaintiff to choose the district of the defendant's resi-
dence or the district where the claim arose as the place of trial.48 6 The
statute also provides for venue when the defendant is a corporation, 487 an
alien,48 8 or when the defendant is a United States government employee
being sued for actions in his official capacity. 489 These specifically named
parties are the only ones included in the general venue statute, although
other detailed situations are addressed in specific sections.490 No article of
the federal district court venue statute deals with "local" actions, although
such actions are expressly excluded from the sections concerning litigation
with multiple defendants or property in more than one district.491 Thus
the multidistrict litigation section provides that transitory actions may be
brought in any district where one defendant resides or where some part of
the property in controversy is located.492
The federal district judge has the discretionary authority to transfer an
action from one venue to another for the convenience of the parties or in
the interests of justice;493 likewise, an action may be dismissed or trans-
ferred if it is brought in the wrong district.494 This varies from the Texas
venue procedure in that a Texas court has no option but to transfer the
483. Williams v. Garrett, 4 Ariz. App. 7, 417 P.2d 378 (1966).
484. Harvill, supra note 24, at 530.
485. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976).
486. Id § 1391(b). The venue issue in diversity cases is unique because the federal stat-
ute specifies that either the defendant's or the plaintiffs residence may be a proper venue for
the suit; this is in addition to the district where the claim arose. Id § 1391(a).
487. Id § 1391(c).
488. Id § 1391(d).
489. Id § 1391(e).
490. See id §§ 1394-1403.
491. Id § 1392.
492. Id.; see Wood, Federal Venue: Locating the Place Where the Claim Arose, 54 TEXAs
L. REv. 392 (1976).
493. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
494. Id § 1406(a).
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cause of action to the proper venue. Dismissal for improper venue is pro-
hibited. The venue decision in the federal trial court is based on the plead-
ings and affidavits of the parties after the defendant files a motion raising
the issue of improper venue.495 Unless special circumstances show a clear
abuse of discretion by the trial judge, the appellate remedy for venue error
in the federal system is an appeal from the final judgment on the merits.496
A venue decision made after the conscientious exercise of a federal trial
judge's judgment has been ruled not to be a proper matter of mandamus
proceedings in the federal courts.497
A comparison of the federal provisions with the laws of Alaska, Califor-
nia, and Arizona reveals similar venue concerns and procedures. Both
Alaska and Arizona have based their rules of civil procedure on the fed-
eral model 498 and their handling of venue appeals is similar to the federal
procedure.499 By allowing suit to be maintained where the defendant may
be served with process, Alaska has avoided problems of defining the place
where a defendant resides. This decision by the Alaska Legislature relies
heavily on the individual judgment of the trial judge to properly set the
place of trial and to remedy abuses through discretionary transfers. Un-
like Texas, Alaska has had a dearth of civil cases dealing with venue is-
sues.5°° Arizona and California, with venue statutes more complex than
Alaska and with venue procedures allowing appeals by way of extraordi-
nary writs, have experienced more venue litigation than Alaska. 50 1 Never-
theless, the volume of Texas cases dealing with venue far exceeds the
volume of Arizona or California cases for similar time periods.50 2
Two conclusions can be drawn from a comparison of these venue provi-
sions with the Texas provisions. First, simplifying the procedure for mak-
ing the initial venue decision in the trial court and thus altering the nature
of the venue appellate procedure will reduce the number of venue cases
reaching the Texas appellate courts. All four jurisdictions considered
above limit the proof of venue issues to affidavits of the parties and require
no proof of the elements of the cause of action. The federal and Alaska
venue systems allow no interlocutory appeals of venue matters, while Cali-
495. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
496. Banker's Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953).
497. Comfort Equip. Co. v. Steckler, 212 F.2d 371, 376-77 (7th Cir. 1954).
498. Compare the following rules of civil procedure: ALASKA R. CIv. PROC. 12(b); ARIZ.
R. CIV. PROC. 12(b); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
499. Alaska, like the federal courts, allows appeals of the venue decision only after a
final order has been entered. ALASKA STAT. § 22.10.040 (1981); see Maier v. City of Ketch-
ikan, 403 P.2d 34 (Alaska 1965). The Arizona courts, conversely, may stay an action in the
trial court upon venue appeal, but only on a showing of cause similar to that required for a
temporary restraining order. ARIz. SuP. CT. R. 5. Thus, the availability of a stay of the trial
court is limited.
500. Using 1979 as a sample year, according to this writer's count, Alaska courts heard
only two civil appellate cases that mentioned venue, and neither of these cases considered
the venue statute.
501. In 1979, according to this writer's count, California appellate courts considered
eight cases mentioning venue matters, while Arizona heard six cases mentioning venue.
502. In 1979, according to this writer's count, Texas appellate courts considered eighty-
four cases dealing with venue, all of which mentioned the Texas venue statute, article 1995.
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fornia and Arizona limit the scope of appeals to abuse of discretion; addi-
tionally, the availability of a stay of the trial court proceeding is restricted.
These changes in the Texas system would undoubtedly have the salutary
effect of reducing the number of venue contests at the trial court level.
The second conclusion that can be drawn from a comparison of venue
statutes and procedures is that procedural reform plus simplification of the
venue statute best achieves the goal of relegating the venue decision to its
rightful place of secondary importance to the trial on the merits. The pri-
mary aim of venue hearings is, of course, to achieve the most economic
expenditure of the litigants' and trial courts' time, energy, and expense.
The relative paucity of appellate cases in these comparison states indicates
that these states have been more successful than Texas in reducing the
importance of venue in relation to the trial on the merits. All four of the
comparison jurisdictions have conferred broad discretion upon judges to
transfer or retain cases based upon venue considerations of justice and
fairness. This discretionary power serves as a means of remedying venue
abuses while limiting the delay caused by venue trials and appeals. If a
similar system were incorporated into the Texas venue structure, the volu-
minous venue litigation imposed upon our courts and clients would likely
cease, with the resulting effect of a more focused effort by all parties on the
most important aspect of litigation, the trial on the merits.
IV. EVALUATION OF HOUSE BILL 771 (1975)503
House Bill 771, a revision of article 1995, was proposed in 1975 by the
Committee on Administration of Justice of the State Bar of Texas.5°4 The
legislature did not pass H.B. 771 in 1975, but the bill was reintroduced in
the house in 1981 in the same form.505 Although the proposed statute
failed to pass the legislature again in 1981, it represents an attempt to im-
prove the present Texas venue statute. Unfortunately, the bill is little more
than a recodification of present venue exceptions to article 1995. Although
a broad reading of one provision in the proposed statute dealing with
"Conduct of Defendant" 5°6 should serve to simplify many venue proceed-
ings, the proposed statute perpetuates much of the superfluous language
and many of the inoperative subdivisions of article 1995 that have proven
troublesome to Texas courts. The premise of the proposed statute is that a
mitigation of the plaintiffs burden of proof at the venue hearings will re-
move the defendant's incentive to contest venue in order to delay the trial
on the merits and increase his bargaining position.507 This mitigation in
the burden of proof is the major revision found in the proposed statute,
which repeatedly states that the plaintiff is not required to prove any of the
503. H.B. 771 (1975); see infra Appendix.
504. COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
REPORT ON VENUE (1975).
505. H.B. 909 (1981).
506. H.B. 771, § 3(a) (1975).
507. This writer agrees with this general premise, but suggests that a more thorough revi-
sion of the statute and the venue procedure is needed.
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issues concerning the merits of the case in order to maintain venue.508
The proposed statute is divided into four sections: section 1, definitions;
section 2, mandatory venue; section 3, permissive venue; and section 4,
general provisions. The definitions explicated in section 1 are a welcome
addition because the present venue statute has generated volumes of litiga-
tion attempting to define the words used in the statute. Under the present
statute, definitional problems have been exacerbated by the fact that some
terms are held to have one meaning for venue purposes, and another
meaning in a trial on the merits of the case.509 Although a definitions
section should ameliorate these problems and make judicial application of
the venue statute more predictable, the primary conundrum in the present
statute is not the search for adequate definitions but the application of
present definitions to ever varying factual situations.
The proposed statute's definitions section is not free of criticism. Section
l(a) of H.B. 771 provides a definition of the term "venue" to make clear
the distinction between venue and jurisdiction. As stated in the proposed
statute, venue is the authority to maintain a civil action in a particular
county510 while jurisdiction is the power of a court to sit in judgment in a
particular matter.5 1 Jurisdictional provisions confer on a particular court
"a power to hear and determine cases of a kind which the court could not
otherwise hear."512 The importance of the distinction is that parties may
waive objections to improper venue by not asserting them, while a court
that lacks jurisdiction over a certain subject may not issue an enforceable
judgment. Likewise, while the issue of venue can only be raised on appeal
if properly preserved at the trial court hearing below, jurisdiction can be
addressed at any time during appellate disposition of a controversy, in-
cluding sua sponte by the judiciary. This definition of venue and distinc-
tion as to jurisdiction in the proposed statute is designed to immunize the
venue statute from the specious jurisdictional arguments that have so
plagued venue statutes in the past. While the proposed statute does not
contain a provision for waiver of the right to make an objection to im-
proper venue, the case law provides for waiver in the present Texas venue
system.513 If venue is to be statutorily defined, the possibility and mechan-
ics of waiver should be included in the statute.
The definitions section of the proposed venue statute also establishes a
distinction between mandatory and permissive venue. 514 This distinction
is drawn because certain types of cases should be heard in only one venue,
thus venue is mandatory; certain other types of cases could be heard in
more than one proper venue, thus venue is permissive. Permissive venue
508. See H.B. 771, §§ 3(a)-(f) (1975).
509. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
510. H.B. 771, § 1(a) (1975).
511. Stevens, supra note 31, at 317.
512. Id at 319.
513. Livingston v. Gage, 581 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ retd
n.r.e.).
514. H.B. 771, §§ 1(b), (c) (1975).
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allows the plaintiff a choice of proper forums. The mandatory and permis-
sive categorization sets up a priority system for use when two or more
venue provisions apply to the facts in a particular case and avoids conflict
as to which provision should be applicable. 515 When a case must be trans-
ferred because of improper venue, the case will go to a mandatory venue
county, if any, before being transferred to a county that is proper because
of a permissive provision. If more than one permissive provision applies,
the court will have discretion to decide the most convenient county for the
parties and witnesses. 516
In many suits, more than one venue provision will apply.517 Assuming
that the majority of the overlapping venue provisions will be permissive,
most suits requiring transfer under the proposed statute would be subject
to judicial discretion in the choice of venue among qualifying counties. If
judicial discretion, however, becomes the touchstone in such cases, why
must the proposed statute go into such detail in listing so many permissive
venue provisions? Time and interpretive effort would be saved by increas-
ing the areas of judicial discretion and by paring down these provisions
into a very few sections with broad scope. Courts could then exercise dis-
cretion in transferring cases for the convenience of the witnesses and to
serve the ends of justice.
Section 1 of the proposed statute contains a needed subsection defining
"residence" as it applies to various entities in the venue context. 518 This
clarification of residence is juxtaposed with section 3(m) of the proposed
statute. Section 3(m) provides that venue can be maintained in the county
of the defendant's residence. The place of residence of the defendant
therefore is an alternative venue in all the permissive venue provisions.519
Subsection I (d)(4) also defines in part the residence of an executor or
guardian acting in his official capacity as the location of the court from
which the executor or guardian derives his authority. 520 What is gained by
including this definition? The intent must have been to allow an executor
to be sued in the county where the estate in controversy is administered,
but this goal can be achieved through the use of other provisions, depend-
ing upon the nature of the claim. The executor definition appears to be a
holdover from subdivision 6 of article 1995, which was drafted to protect
the executor from having to defend against multiple suits filed in counties
remote from the site of the estate's administration. 521 The proposed defini-
tion, however, effaces the favoritism presently shown to defendants and
515. See, e.g., id § 4(b).
516. Id § 4(f).
517. This statement is especially true given the breadth of the exception dealing with
"Conduct of Defendant," which arguably could apply in all civil suits. See discussion infra
note 543 and accompanying text.
518. H.B. 771, § 1 (1975).
519. Id § 3(m).
520. Id § 1(d)(4).
521. See discussion of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(6) (Vernon 1964), supra
notes 123-30 and accompanying text. A problem exists only when the executor or guardian
resides in a county other than the county of administration.
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complicates the proposed general definition of residence. Thus, the site of
the administration of the estate evolves into but one more permissive
venue choice. If providing that the executor be sued in the county of the
estate's administration is so important, then a more straightforward ap-
proach of drafting a mandatory or permissive provision should be taken
rather than fashioning an artificial definition of the residence of the execu-
tor.5 22 Furthermore, little need exists for any special article dealing with
suits against executors or guardians in their representative capacity. Suits
against these fiduciaries should be subject to the same venue rules as suits
against ordinary citizens.
Section 2 of the proposed statute contains the mandatory venue provi-
sions.523 In the case law that has covered the current mandatory provi-
sions, venue is proper in a single specified county; no option to the plaintiff
is allowed. Section 2(a) of the proposed venue statute codifies a
mandatory venue provision concerned with suits involving land.524 This
subsection treats only suits to determine interests in land and eliminates
the language of the existing statute that includes suits for damages to
land.525 This is a beneficial revision and will limit the application of the
subsection to suits where land title is the principal right asserted.
The remainder of section 2, however, deserves few compliments. In the
provisions dealing with injunctions against suits526 and injunctions against
executions527 the draftsmen of the proposed statute have ignored the con-
fusion between these venue provisions and the language of article 4656 of
the Texas Revised Civil Statutes.528 These provisions create a distinction
between certain causes of action that has no rational basis in venue policy.
Convenience of the litigants and witnesses and the location of evidence
demand no such arbitrary distinction.
Sections 2(d) and 2(e) cover suits for mandamus against heads of state
departments529 and suits against counties, 530 respectively. These sections
clearly favor the government-as-defendant over the plaintiff-as-citizen.
The question to be asked is whether the government requires this kind of
venue protection. Although the issue is a close one, this writer believes
that the demands of administrative convenience justify the protection
granted to counties in mandamus actions, but do not justify protection of
mandamus actions against heads of state departments. Protection for the
latter could be reinstated should abuses develop. It would seem more bur-
522. The artificiality of this definition is enhanced by the fact that the residence of the
executor, administrator, guardian, or receiver is also defined as the county in which the
conduct or activity of the ward or decedent occurred.
523. H.B. 771, § 2 (1975).
524. Id § 2(a).
525. TEx. REV, CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(14) (Vernon 1964).
526. H.B. 771, § 2(b) (1975).
527. Id § 2(c).
528. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4656 (Vernon 1952). The author suggests that arti-
cle 4656 also needs revision to reflect proper venue considerations.
529. H.B. 771, § 2(d) (1975).
530. Id § 2(e).
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densome both in time and expense for a county or county official to litigate
in the far comers of the state than for a state official to defend a rare man-
damus action in a county other than Travis County.
Finally, the mandatory section of the proposed statute restricts the
venue of a libel, slander, or invasion of privacy suit to the county where
either the plaintiff or the defendant resides.531 This measure mirrors the
present exception to the general venue rule, which was enacted to prevent
the plaintiff from choosing a remote venue for libel suits against a widely
distributed publication.5 32 Whether such a tactic would be used today is
questionable. Moreover, protection for defendants from publication venue
abuse may not be necessary. Clearly, a chosen venue that is remote from
the parties and pertinent evidence would have little connection to any issue
in a libel or slander case except as to the location of the defamatory publi-
cation. If the courts were empowered to consider the convenience of wit-
nesses and the location of evidence in making a discretionary venue
change, section 2(f) would be rendered superfluous. The trial court could
simply move the venue to a county with a greater nexus to the witnesses
and evidence. This of course assumes that the discretion of the trial judge
would take precedence over a mandatory venue exception. But provisions
like section 2(f), aimed at specific causes of action, parties, or situations,
merely invite courts and lawyers to invent special circumstances to main-
tain venue in a forum foreign to the defendant's county of residence. For
example, novel claims of invasion of privacy, which would be covered by
proposed section 2(f), might be alleged in connection with other causes of
action simply for the purposes of maintaining venue at the plaintiff's resi-
dence. Venue statutes should thus be drafted to the extent possible to
avoid such subterfuges.
Section 3 of the proposed statute lists circumstances and causes of action
in which permissive venue applies.533 The plaintiff may choose the venue
provided in section 3(a) through (j)534 or 3(/),535 whichever fits the specific
facts of the case, or the plaintiff may maintain suit in the county of the
defendant's residence under section 3(m). 536 The draftsmen of the pro-
posed statute have performed an admirable job of condensing the existing
statute into section 3. In doing so they have, however, preserved the venue
law as it has developed under the existing statute and failed to remedy
certain venue difficulties. A more thorough revision is needed to discour-
age unnecessary venue litigation. This revision could be accomplished by
deleting all the specific types of actions listed in section 3, which provide
for venue at a place where some element of a cause of action has arisen,
and subsuming these specific types of actions into a single, broadly worded
provision. Section 3(a) could serve this function of discouraging unneces-
531. Id § 2(0.
532. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(29) (Vernon 1964).
533. H.B. 771, § 3 (1975).
534. Id §§ 3(a)-(j).
535. Id § 3(/).
536. Id § 3(m).
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sary venue litigation if it were rewritten to include the county where a duty
arose, a loss occurred, or where personal property is located. For example,
in the proposed statute subsections 3(b) through 30) could be deleted since
they provide that in certain situations venue may be maintained in the
county where some element of the cause of action has accrued or some
property is located. The only exception to this statement would cover a
contract specifying performance in a particular county.537 In 1973 the
Texas Legislature expressed the need to protect consumers from "distant
forum abuse," 538 and subdivision 5(b) was added to article 1995. The pro-
posed statute recreates subdivision 5(b) in proposed sections 3(b) and (e).
Other provisions in the permissive venue section of H.B. 771 concern
suits in which the state is the plaintiff539 and suits in which the plaintiff's
residence is considered to be the proper county for bringing suit.54° Ad-
ministrative convenience may be a sufficient reason to justify special venue
treatment for the state-as-plaintiff cases in the business-related situations
specifically described in section 3(k). The suits described in section
3(k)(1), (2), and (3), however, could instead be included in a broad provi-
sion allowing suit where the legal duty arose or where the wrongful act or
part of the act occurred. Since the business entities named throughout
section 3 are required to register in Travis County for incorporation or
authorization to transact business under Texas corporation laws, violation
of some aspect of these procedures could be construed to occur in Travis
County. Of course any witnesses or evidence will normally be located at
the place where the corporation is doing business, usually the most reason-
able place for holding the trial. Likewise, subsection 3(k)(4) of the pro-
posed statute allows the state to force the defendant to shoulder a
considerable burden of defending himself in Travis County from a charge
of unlawfully doing business in the state when in most cases the evidence
and witnesses will be located elsewhere.
Proposed subsection 3(1) subjects insurance companies to suit at the
plaintiff's residence when the suit is based upon a contract of insurance. 541
In today's mobile society, favoring plaintiffs in this way may be desirable,
but again such actions should be included under a provision that would
establish venue in the county where a duty arose, a loss occurred, or where
personal property is located. This subsection also perpetuates discrimina-
tion against insurance companies by refusing to treat other corporate enti-
ties in a like manner. No distinction between different types of
corporations should be drawn.
Section 4 of the proposed statute contains general provisions dealing
with joinder of claims and parties and transfer of cases. This writer views
section 4 favorably.542
537. Id § 3(b).
538. See generally Sampson, supra note 119.
539. H.B. 771, § 3(k) (1975).
540. Id § 3(1).
541. Id
542. Id § 4.
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Thus far, criticism of the proposed statute has focused on the individual
provisions. The proposed statute can also be criticized for the complica-
tions it creates and its failure to achieve the true goal of a venue statute:
providing a convenient place for trial. For example, an individual's action
for a contested loss covered by a standard insurance contract might be
subject to six different permissive provisions under section 3 of the pro-
posed statute.5 43 Such a system is not only confusing for inexperienced
plaintiff's counsel, but some of these provisions could easily be overlooked.
The goal of this prolix system is to give plaintiffs wide latitude in main-
taining venue against an insurance company, but this goal can best be sat-
isfied by drafting a broad venue provision based on the place where the
cause of action or part thereof arose, or where the loss occurred. Con-
versely, if the legislature decided that plaintiffs needed to be granted a
choice of venue in their own county of residence, then subsection 3(l)
would be an appropriate provision to achieve this goal. Of course, the
defendant's residence should always be an appropriate permissive venue
as is provided in the proposed statute at section 3(m). The other four
venue provisions applicable to insurance contracts are nothing more than
excess baggage.
Another complication in the proposed statute is that some subsections
are already covered by other, broader subsections. For instance, most of
subsections 3(g) as to the location of property, 3(h) as to writs of attach-
ment, garnishment, sequestration, or execution, and 3(i) as to injunctions
are already covered under subsections 3(a) through (c). No need exists for
these superfluous subsections.
An even broader criticism of the proposed venue statute concerns the
fact that not only can many of the specific subsections be subsumed into
the general subsections, but the earmarking of specific types of actions for
specific venue considerations can only produce more lawyers' wrangling
over whether a petition sufficiently pleads a specific provision. The more
lawyers dispute, the more expensive it becomes for their clients, and the
more inefficient the judicial system becomes. Also, a court might even de-
cide that the broader subsections are inapplicable because of the inclusion
of specific actions, thus circumventing legislative intent in an attempt to
unscramble the venue puzzle. The potential for venue disputes still
abounds in the proposed statute.
As a result, any permissive venue provision designed to deal with a spe-
cific type of action can and should be covered by a broad provision placing
venue where the wrongful act, omission, or loss occurred. In extraordinary
situations, social policy may call for favoring plaintiffs, 5 " protecting de-
fendants from distant forum abuse,5 45 or providing governmental entities
543. The six provisions are §§ 3(a) (conduct of defendant), 3(e) (performance by plain-
tiff), 3(0 (loss covered by insurance or indemnity), 3(g)(4) (location of property), 3(l) (plain-
tifi's residence), and 3(m) (defendant's residence).
544. For example, the proposed venue statute provides that the plaintifi's residence is
made a permissive place of venue in suits against insurance companies. Id § 3(1).
545. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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with special venue choices. 546 Such exceptions should be restricted to
avoid unnecessary confusion and expense in deciding the proper place for
trial. The issue is not complexity; it is simplicity and fairness.
V. A SUGGESTION FOR A NEW TExAS VENUE STATUTE
One overriding principle should be considered in evaluating or drafting
a venue statute. As venue is only a question of determining the fairest
location to hold the trial on the merits, venue decisions should be based
solely on the competing conveniences of the litigants, the witnesses, and
the court.547 A number of general principles can be drawn from this basic
premise. For example, convenience of the parties is the motive for venue
provisions favoring the residence of one of the parties, while measures
specifying that actions dealing with real property be commenced where the
property is located favor the witnesses and courts. Provisions establishing
venue where the activity the subject of the suit occurred favor the conven-
ience of witnesses and the location of evidence. Thus, in considering the
goal of convenience, four basic venue choices can be isolated:
(1) where the subject of the action is situated;
(2) where the wrongful act occurred, or duty arose, or loss occurred;
(3) where the defendant resides;
(4) where the plaintiff resides.5 48
A proper venue statute should consist of a general article founded on
each of these choices. Ideally, these articles could be written broadly to
contain few if any specific types of action,549 with legislative discretion to
limit or expand the application of each provision in very special circum-
stances. For example, the plaintiffs residence could be expressly desig-
nated as a venue choice only when all defendants are nonresidents of the
state. 550 By limiting the use of specific legal terms and instead using broad
language to effect venue rules, the legislature will reduce venue litigation
by eliminating overlapping areas of potential conflict. For example, a
plaintiff may allege negligence, but the defendant may contend that the
cause is in fact an intentional tort or a contract action. Specific terms and
causes of action encourage a plaintiff to allege as many causes of action as
546. Provisions granting the state or county the privilege of suing or being sued at the
location of the seat of government are examples of social policy decisions that favor these
governmental entities.
547. Stevens, supra note 31, at 331.
548. Stevens recognizes five basic venue factors: (1) where the subject of the action or
part thereof is situated; (2) where the cause of action, or part thereof, arose; (3) where the
defendant resides; (4) where the plaintiff resides; and (5) where the seat of government is
located. Stevens, supra note 31, at 331-32. Stevens assimilates other factors into provisions
dealing with the defendant's residence. For example, he combines the place where the de-
fendant is doing business, or where the defendant has an office, agent, or representative, as
an important subsection under the heading of the defendant's residence. Id at 332. See also
Guittard & Tyler, supra note 48, at 584, for an alternate listing of venue factors, including
"(1) a connection between the suit and the county, and (2) a connection between the defend-
ant and the suit."
549. Stevens, supra note 31, at 331.
550. See id at 335 (illustrating a provision in this form).
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possible, even though some may be specious or at best untenable, in order
to establish venue at a more advantageous location. Thus, specific terms
such as fraud, negligence, and trespass should be replaced by broader
phrases describing the cause of action for venue purposes as a "wrongful
act."
The new Texas venue statute proposed in this Article contains an initial
section of definitions followed by five major parts. Since this proposed
statute is based on the location of some act or omission in controversy, or
the location of the alleged loss, or the residence of one of the parties, the
definitions are limited to outlining the place of residence of the types of
possible parties. The definitions section should take the following form:
(a) The residence of a domiciliary is a permanent dwelling place
within this State.
(b) The residence of all corporations, domestic and foreign, shall be
considered to be in any county in which the corporation:
(1) has a registered agent;
(2) has an office;
(3) has a place of doing business; or,
(4) is actually doing business.
(c) The residence of partnerships, unincorporated associations, or
nonresident persons doing business in the State shall be deemed
to be the county in which they are actually doing business.
By broadly defining the residence of a corporation, the corporation will be
subject to suit at the location where any business activity of the corpora-
tion occurs. Under part (c), partnerships, unincorporated associations, and
nonresident persons may be sued in any county where they are actually
doing business.
Part One would take the following form:
1. Mandatory venue. The trial of suits in the following actions shall
be brought in the county specified:
(a) Suits for the recovery of real property, or of an estate or
interest in real property, or for partition of real property,
or the enforcement of mortgages or liens on real property,
or to remove encumbrances from the title to real property,
or to quiet title to real property must be maintained m the
county where the real property or any part thereof is
located.
(b) Actions against any county within the State must be
brought in that county.
(c) Actions against any other political subdivison in the State
must be brought in the county where the political subdivi-
sion or any part thereof is located.
Part One of the new venue statute sets venue where the subject of the ac-
tion in controversy is located. This part includes suits for rights of owner-
ship in land as well as measures that favor the seat of government as the
best location for trial when the government becomes a defendant in litiga-
tion. These provisions are mandatory; no choice of alternative venue
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would be possible if the subject of the suit were included in Part One.
Social policy is the reason that these provisions are mandatory. Anglo-
American jurisprudence has long held that the trial of interests in real
property should be conducted in the county where the property is located.
The obvious reason for this decision is that the greatest quantity and quali-
ty of the evidence relevant to land-based suits will be found in the county
where the land is located. The convenience of the local governmental unit
has been considered of sufficient importance to justify the requirement that
venue in suits against the governmental unit itself, for example the county
or city, be maintainable only in the county where that particular seat of
government is located.
Although this Article is critical of subdivision 14 of article 1995 for its
specificity,55' maintaining specificity in part l(a) of this proposed statute is
desirable. In the context of a multiplicity of specific exceptions, as is the
case with the current Texas venue statute, additional exceptions as set out
in subdivision 14 generate unneeded confusion concerning the applicabil-
ity of subdivision 14 versus other subdivisions. Also, this specificity pro-
duces additional procedural wrangling as lawyers try to shape their
pleadings to fit within the terms of subdivision 14 and shop for the most
advantageous venue. In the proposed statute, specificity is desirable be-
cause venue provision overlap would not be a major problem. The only
potential overlap in this proposed statute would occur between the
mandatory provision of Part One and the general permissive provisions.
This overlap would not prove a catalyst for litigation, because the pro-
posed venue statute specifically requires that mandatory provisions control
over permissive provisions. Moreover, specificity is required in order to
distinguish coverage of the mandatory provisions of this proposed statute
from the permissive measures contained in Part Two.
Other specific types of actions, which for public policy reasons are re-
quired to be maintained in a particular county and no other could be in-
cluded under Part One. These actions would be those deemed by the
legislature to be of such importance that venue could not be maintained
except in a specific location. Any actions included in Part One, however,
should be specifically described to avoid confusion as to the applicability
of Part One in conjunction with Parts Two through Five.
Part Two should take the following form:
2. Permissive venue.
The county in which the alleged wrongful act or omission, or part
thereof, occurred, or in which the alleged duty arose, or in which
any alleged loss, or part thereof, occurred as the result of an al-
leged wrongful act or omission, or where personal property is lo-
cated, is a proper county for trial, except for actions included in
Part 1.
The second part of the new venue statute contains a provision based on the
place where the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred. This provision
551. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(14) (Vernon 1964).
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would allow for a nexus between the issues and evidence in the suit, and
the place of trial.
The use of the term "wrongful act or omission" or "any loss, or a part
thereof' in the proposed statute will cause fewer problems of interpreta-
tion than the phrase "cause of action" used in the current venue statute.
Use of the former term will clarify the intent of Part Two: to provide for
venue where the evidence and witnesses needed for proof of an issue will
be located. At the same time, the problems of defining what is involved in
a particular cause of action will be obviated. 552 The court need not con-
sider, for example, whether a cause of action has been fully pleaded, or
whether a particular allegation was actually part of a cause of action for
purposes of establishing venue. Obviously, as only an allegation is re-
quired, the plaintiff need not prove that a wrongful act or omission or a
loss has in fact occurred. The term "wrongful act or omission" therefore
simplifies the venue decision for the trial judge and discourages plaintiffs
counsel from framing his complaint around the venue structure.
This broad provision would also allow the plaintiff to bring the action in
alternate locations. Some of these locations might not be, in a particular
case, the most desirable venue choice given that convenience should be the
foremost factor in any venue statute. As a balance to this provision, there-
fore, the defendant should have the right to move for a change of venue to
a more convenient forum based on the availability of witnesses and evi-
dence. The convenience of one of the parties, without more, should not
ordinarily be the basis of a venue decision, since the court should not be
asked to favor one party over another in contravention of the proposed
statute. The court's primary consideration should be the convenience of
witnesses and the location of evidence. An exception may occur when
harassment by the plaintiff is apparent or when the burden on the defend-
ant is excessive.. The trial court's discretionary power to act on a motion
of this type should be given deference, subject only to the strictest stan-
dards of appellate review in determining the existence of an abuse of judi-
cial discretion. This discretionary change of venue based upon
convenience of witnesses and availability of the evidence to be proven at
the trial constitutes the primary operative portion of the new venue statute.
It is located in Part Five.
Part Three should take the following form:
3. Permissive venue: Defendant's residence. The county of the de-
fendant's residence is a proper county for trial, except for actions
included in Part 1.
This provision would permit a defendant's home county to be an alterna-
tive venue in all suits not covered by the mandatory provisions of Part
552. For example, see the difficulty the federal courts have had in enunciating and apply-
ing a test for the district "in which the claim arose." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1976). One court
has used the "weight of the contracts" test. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp. 252, 260-61 (E.D. Pa. 1968). Another court has




One. The definition of "residence" given in the definitions section would
provide for a broad venue choice when a corporation is the defendant. By
allowing the defendant's residence to be an alternative venue site, the cur-
rent venue statute's goal of protecting the defendant is partially served.
Part Four should take the following form:
4. Permissive venue: Plaintiff's residence. The county of the plain-
tiff's residence, or the residence of any one of several plaintiffs, is
a proper county for trial if all of the defendants are nonresidents
of this State, except for actions included in Part 1.
The fourth part of the new statute favors the plaintiff's residence as the
venue choice when no defendant resides in the state. Although this situa-
tion may be rare, resident plaintiffs should be granted a forum for actions
against nonresidents, provided that jurisdictional requirements can be sat-
isfied. This provision is based on the convenience of the resident plaintiff,
favoring state residents over nonresidents. Again, the defendant has a
right to request a discretionary change of venue based upon the trial
court's authority in Part Five.
The clauses suggested in section 4 of H.B. 771, 553 which provide for
joinder of parties or claims and transfer of cases, are satisfactory solutions
to specific procedural problems and should be incorporated into the new
statute's fifth part. Part Five should also address such procedural matters
as the manner in which the issue of improper venue is raised, the manner
in which venue evidence is presented, the trial court's discretion to change
venue to a more convenient forum, and venue as established by
contract.55
4
Part Five deals with general provisions applicable to the venue statute as
a whole; it should take the following form:
5. General Provisions.
(a) Venue improperly laid: The burden is on the defendant to
place the issue of improper venue before the trial court by
moving for a change of venue to a proper county. If such
motion is made in a timely manner as may be prescribed
in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and the trial court
determines that the case should be transferred, the trial
court may then transfer the case. The trial court may also
charge the plaintiff with reasonable costs incurred because
of the venue hearing, including but not limited to reason-
able compensation for defendant's expenses and reason-
able attorney's fees. The defendant's failure to make a
timely motion of improper venue shall be deemed to be a
waiver of any objection to the venue.
(b) The venue decimon: In determining the proper venue for
the trial of a civil action, the trial court shall consider only
553. H.B. 771, § 4 (1975).
554. The provisions of H.B. 771 dealing with the following subjects would be included in
art 5 of the proposed statute: § 4a, assignment of note, etc.; § 4b, joinder of defendants;
4c, joinder of claims; § 4d, counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party claims; § 4e, entire case
transferred; § 4f, county to which transferred.
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the factual sworn affidavits of the parties submitted in a
timely manner as may be prescribed in the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure and the pleadings on file in the case. The
trial court may, however, in its discretion, order an evi-
dentiary hearing if the defendant contends that false facts
have been alleged by the plaintiff for the purpose of main-
taining venue in the forum county.
(c) Discretionary change of venue: The trial court shall have
discretion in all cases, except for actions included in Part 1,
to order a change of venue upon motion timely filed by the
defendant as may be prescribed in the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. In exercising this discretion, the trial judge
shall consider the convenience of the parties and the wit-
nesses and whether the ends of justice would be promoted
by the change.
(d) Change of venue by contract: All contracts whereby venue
as provided in this statute is altered, are invalid.
(e) Consumer transactions: A suit by a creditor upon or by
reason of an obligation arising out of a consumer transac-
tion for goods, services, or loans, or extensions of credit
intended primarily for personal, family, household, or ag-
ricultural use, is not a ground of venue in any county other
than that in which defendant in fact signed the contract, or
in the county where the defendant resides at the time of
the commencement of the action.
(f) Other mandatory and permissive venue: An action gov-
erned by any other Texas statute perscribing mandatory
venue shall be brought in the county required by such stat-
ute. An action governed by any other Texas statute but
providing for permissive venue may be brought in the
county designated in such statute or in any county in
which the action may be brought under the provisions of
this statute.
Part Five of this proposed venue statute would be supplemented by
amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure implementing the poli-
cies provided in the statute. For example, the legislature should not be
concerned with the exact number of days allowed for the filing of the mo-
tion for change of venue, since this is an area of court procedure properly
covered by the Rules of Civil Procedure. The legislature should instead
address the broad policy issues and problem areas already discussed in this
Article, such as the proof required to maintain venue, the trial court's dis-
cretion in ordering a change of venue, and the availability of an appeal of
the venue decision. The following explication of the general provisions of
the proposed statute suggests some appropriate amendments to the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Part 5(a) of the proposed statute alters the existing plea of privilege
structure, replacing it with the motion for change of venue. The Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure should specify the proper time for filing the mo-
tion as well as the form and content of the motion. The goal of accelerat-
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ing the disposition of the venue question would best be served by requiring
that the defendant raise the venue issue within thirty days after filing an
answer in the case. The parties should then be required to file affidavits of
fact to assist the trial court in forming its decision. These affidavits should
be filed within a set time period, for example twenty days from the defend-
ant's motion for change of venue, subject to any continuance granted by
the court. The trial judge could then dispose of the venue issue early in the
proceedings, avoiding any substantial delay in preparing the case for trial.
Part 5(b) is designed to limit the evidence used by the court in forming
the venue decision, particularly eliminating the need for an evidentiary
hearing in all venue decisions. This provision will abolish the "two-trial"
procedure that has historically plagued Texas venue practice. The affida-
vits to be submitted to the trial judge would be of the same factual nature
as is required in summary judgment practice and would be sworn to by the
party preparing them. This procedure would accelerate the venue decision
while still protecting the rights of the parties.
Part 5(c) grants the trial court the discretion to consider the convenience
of witnesses and the ends of justice in forming the venue decision, but only
when the defendant raises these issues in the motion for change of venue.
This provision would enable the trial court to transfer a case to a more
appropriate county even though venue might be technically proper in the
forum county. The trial court's discretion, however, cannot circumvent the
mandatory provisions of Part One. Part 5(c) indicates the importance
placed on the relationship between the availability of witnesses or the loca-
tion of evidence and the proper place for the trial of a civil suit.
Part 5(d) prohibits the parties from contracting for the venue of any suit
that arises out of the contract. Subdivision 5(a) of the present statute per-
mits the parties to agree to venue when the suit is based on the contract.
This subdivision was adopted to give the plaintiff a wider range of venue
choices in light of the restrictive general rule of venue favoring the defend-
ant. Under the proposed statute, plaintiff has no need of such relief since
the plaintiff is given a wide range of venue choices and is not shackled by
the general rule favoring the defendant. The primary reason for not per-
mitting the parties to contract the venue is the plethora of adhesion con-
tracts in modem life. If the parties were permitted to contract for venue,
undoubtedly the party with the stronger bargaining position would require
the venue of any suit to be in a county that would work to the disadvan-
tage of the weaker party. For instance, one can imagine insurance compa-
nies requiring any suit brought against them to be brought at their home
office in Dallas County. This would not only burden the plaintiff, in say
Cameron County (Brownsville), but would in many cases not be the
county with the closest nexus to the case in terms of the location of the
evidence and convenience of the witnesses. Another instance of abuse
could occur if sellers of products required any suits brought against them
to be brought in a particular county. The sellers of products would un-
doubtedly choose a county the location of which would discourage a plain-
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tiff from bringing a suit based upon economic loss, property damage, or
personal injury. Statutory permission to contract for venue would result in
further venue abuse. The best policy is not to allow a party with with a
strong bargaining position to force the weaker party into an inconvenient
forum 5
55
Part 5(e) continues the present protection for consumers in suits by cred-
itors concerning consumer transactions. The provision is designed to
avoid distant forum abuse. Part 5(f) basically continues the present prac-
tice under subdivision 30 of article 1995. The primary purpose is to defer
to venue provisions in other statutes.
With respect to appeals of the venue decision, this writer recommends
the repeal of article 2008556 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes and rule
385(e)557 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which allow an interlocu-
tory appeal of trial court venue decisions. Interlocutory appeals have de-
monstrably increased the delay of trials on the merits and increased
expenses of the litigants. Interlocutory appeals have also enhanced the
defendent's incentive to contest venue in the first place. For these reasons
the interlocutory appeal should be abolished. Any venue points of error
should instead be presented in an appeal of the cause of action on the
merits. The danger is, of course, that an appellate court will reverse solely
because of some error in the venue, rendering the full-scale trial an exer-
cise in futility. The benefits to be gained from the abolition of interlocu-
tory venue appeal, however, would seem to far outweigh any such danger.
In advancing this proposed statute, this writer recognizes that the propo-
sal may be criticized for relying too heavily on the discretion of local
judges to adjust inequities and to restrain any abuse resulting from the
increased freedom granted to plaintiffs in choosing venue. One might con-
tend that judges would favor hometown plaintiffs over out-of-town de-
fendants. This criticism is parried by the fact that if a judge is inclined to
favoritism, he is going to exercise that favoritism no matter what the stat-
ute or rules may provide. Also, the alternative to increasing the discretion
of the trial judges must be considered. Our present system vastly curtails
the discretion of the trial judges by imposing rigid and detailed rules. We
have already seen the vice inherent in such rules. Texas must either join
with its sister states in reducing venue questions to a secondary role, or it
can continue with the present restrictions upon discretion and keep the
litigation pot boiling. Furthermore, the majority of the jurisdictions sur-
veyed in this Article vest a similar amount of discretion in their trial
judges. None of those jurisdictions has had the venue problems that Texas
has had. If a plaintiff were to attempt to employ the broad power granted
555. An alternative might be to allow the parties to contract for any venue site that bears
a reasonable nexus to the suit. This provision would have to be supplemented by a further
provision that the trial judge has the discretion to transfer the case to a more convenient
forum, specifically taking into account the unequal bargaining strength of the parties.
556. TEX. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2008 (Vernon 1964); see supra notes 427-37 and
accompanying text.
557. TEx. R. Civ. P. 385(e); see supra notes 408-14, 427-37 and accompanying text.
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under Part Two to lodge the venue in an improper forum, the defendant
could contest the improper venue on the ground that Part Two requires
that some part of the subject matter of the suit be related to the forum
county. If plaintiff's counsel alleges false facts in order to establish venue
in an improper forum, then the defendant would have the right, and the
burden of proof, to demonstrate the spurious nature of the plaintiffs alle-
gations through the affidavit practice. The trial court should probably be
given the authority to conduct an evidentiary hearing as it deems neces-
sary. If, however, experience with the suggested system proves to be unsat-
isfactory in not sufficiently restraining overreaching by plaintiffs'
attorneys, then sanctions against attorneys for abuse of the system could be
instituted as a control measure.558
When the ease of modern travel and communication is considered, the
plaintiff's choice of venue should be given preference over that of the de-
fendant. This writer contends that such a system will remove the present
inequities from the Texas venue practice and put the issue of venue in its
proper place as a secondary, pretrial matter. More particularly, this pro-
posed statute satisfies the factors with which a venue statute should be con-
cerned. This proposed statute focuses upon the convenience of the parties,
the witnesses, and the court, as well as the location of the evidence. "[T]he
goal of the statutory venue system should be to consume as little judicial
time as is consistent with overall fairness to all the parties to the law-
suit." 559 The proposed statute satisfies this goal.
558. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 396b (West Supp. 1982).
559. Comment, Federal Venue: Locating the Place Where the Claim Arose, 54 TEXAs L.
REv. 392, 392 (1976).
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APPENDIX
By. Powers, Geiger, Maloney H.B. No. 771
A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
AN ACT
relating to venue in civil actions; amending Article 1995, Revised Civil
Statutes of Texas, 1925, as amended; and declaring an emergency.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
TEXAS:
Section 1. Article 1995, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, as
amended, is amended to read as follows:
"Article 1995. VENUE, GENERAL RULE
"Section L Denitions. (a) 'Venue' is the authority conterred by this ar-
ticle or by any other provision of law to maintain a civil action in a partic-
ular county.
"(b) Where provision is made that an action 'shall' be brought or
maintained in a particular county, venue in the county specified is
mandatory in the sense that transfer of the action to that county is required
if a party makes proper objection to trial in any other county.
"(c) Where provision is made that an action 'may' be brought or main-
tained in a particular county, venue in that county is permissive in the
sense that an action pending in that county is not subject to transfer to any
other county unless a mandatory provision applies.
"(d) In this article, 'Residence' means:
"(1) a place where a natural person has a dwelling which he
occupies other than occasionally or temporarily and is not limited to one
residence;
"(2) a place where a natural person regularly works or maintains
his principal place of business;
"(3) the principal place of business in this state of a public or
private corporation, association, joint stock company, or partnership, do-
mestic or foreign, or the registered office in this state designated by the
corporation, association, joint stock company, or partnership in its articles
of incorporation or other papers filed with the secretary of state; or
"(4) in an action involving an executor, administrator, guardian,
or receiver in his official or representative capacity, the location of the
court from which he derives his authority or the county in which the con-
duct or activity of the ward or decedent of the executor, administrator,
guardian, or receiver occurred pursuant to Section 3 of this Act.1
"Section 2 Mandatory venue. (a) Lands. Actions for recovery of real
property or an estate or interest in real property, or for partition of real
property, or to remove encumbrances from the title to real property, or to
1. The last part of this subsection after "or" was added by amendment in the House.
The apparent intent was to permit a personal representative to be sued in other counties
under § 3, but that result would follow without this amendment since the only function of
this subsection is to define "residence." The amendment is inappropriate to the definition.
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quiet title to real property shall be brought in the county in which the
property or a part of the property is located.
"(b) Injunctions against suits. Actions to stay proceedings in a suit
shall be brought in the county in which the suit is pending.
"(c) Injunctions against executions. Actions to restrain execution of a
judgment based on invalidity of the judgment or the writ shall be brought
in the county in which the judgment was rendered.
"(d) Against state or 2 head of state department. An action for manda-
mus against the head of a department of the state government shall be
brought in Travis County.
"(e) Against county. An action against a county shall be brought in
that county.
"(/) Libel, slander, and invasion ofprivacy. An action for libel, slander,
or invasion of privacy shall be brought in the county of plaintiff's residence
or in the county of defendant's residence.
"(g) Other mandatory venue. An action governed by any other statute
prescribing mandatory venue shall be brought in the county required by
such statute.
"Section 3. Permissive venue. (a) Conduct of defendant. An action may
be maintained in the county in which there occurred any conduct or activ-
ity, including any act or omission in connection therewith, of defendant,
his agent or employee, alleged in the petition as a basis of the action to be
wrongful, negligent, or a breach of duty imposed by contract, statute, or
common law.3 Plaintiff is not required to prove that the conduct or activ-
ity was wrongful or actionable or that the agent or employee alleged in the
petition to have acted within the scope of his authority or employment by
defendant did, in fact, act within the scope of his authority or employment,
but only that the conduct or activity occurred in the county of suit and was
the conduct or activity of defendant or of his agent or employee.
'(b) Breach ofduty. Subject to the limitations specified in this subsec-
tion, an action may be maintained in the county in which defendant was
required to perform a duty by contract, statute, or common law, if plaintiff
alleges a breach of the duty by defendant as a basis of the action. Plaintiff
is not required to prove the breach, but only the facts establishing a duty of
defendant performable in the county of suit rather than elsewhere.
"Failure of defendant to pay money or to deliver personal property in a
particular county is not a ground of venue unless the duty to do so is evi-
denced by a contract in writing expressly naming the county or a definite
place in the county.
"Also, failure of defendant to pay money due on an obligation arising
out of a consumer transaction for goods, services, loans, or extensions of
2. The "state or" should be eliminated. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 20
(Vernon 1964).
3. To bring product liability cases expressly within this subsection, the following words
may be added at this point: "including manufacture, sale or delivery of a product alleged, as
a basis of the action to have been defective." This would complement §3(c).
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credit intended primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural
use is not a ground of venue in any county other than that in which de-
fendant in fact signed the contract, notwithstanding any provision requir-
ing payment at some other place.
"(c) Injury or damage in county. An action for injury or damages al-
leged by plaintiff as a basis for the action to have been caused by consump-
tion, use, or operation of or contact with a product, object, or physical
condition made, built, created, operated, sold, or supplied by defendant,
either as principal or as agent for another, may be maintained in the
county in which the consumption, use, operation, or contact occurred.
Plaintiff is not required to prove injury, damage, causation, or liability, but
only that the consumption, use, operation, or contact occurred in the
county and that defendant, either as principal or as agent for another,
made, built, created, operated, sold, or supplied the product, object, or
condition alleged to have caused the injury or damage.
"(d) Statement or representation. An action, other than for libel or
slander, may be maintained in the county in which defendant or his agent
or employee, whether or not acting within the scope of his authority or
employment, made a statement or representation alleged by plaintiff as a
basis of the action to be false, fraudulent, or otherwise damaging to plain-
tiff. If the statement or representation was initially heard or received in a
county other than that in which it was uttered or written, it is deemed to
have been made in both counties. Plaintiff is not required to prove that the
statement or representation was false, fraudulent, or material, or that
plaintiff was injured in reliance on it, or that defendant's agent or em-
ployee made it in the scope of his authority or employment, but only that
defendant or his agent or employee made such a statement or representa-
tion in the county.
"(e) Performance byplaintif. An action on a written4 contract may be
maintained in the county5 in which plaintiff or his assignor performed the
acts which he alleges entitle him to demand performance by defendant or
to damages for defendant's failure to perform. However, in any action
arising out of a consumer transaction for goods, services, loans, or exten-
sions of credit intended primarily for defendant's personal, family, house-
hold, or agricultural use, performance by plaintiff is not a ground of venue
in any county other than that in which defendant in fact signed a contract
evidencing the transaction. Plaintiff is not required to prove breach of a
contractual duty by defendant, but only that plaintiff or his assignor ren-
dered the performance under a contract between defendant and plaintiff or
his assignor and has performed in that county acts which plaintiff alleges
entitled him to performance by defendant.
4. The Committee on Administration of Justice recommended that this subsection ap-
ply to plaintifi's performance under "a contract express or implied," but the House limited it
to performance under "a written contract."
5. This subsection might be considered too broad as applied to a case in which the
plaintiff's performance under the contract extended to a large number of counties. To avoid
this result, the word "principal" may be inserted before "county."
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"(/ Loss covered by insurance or indemnity. An action on a contract of
insurance or indemnity may be brought in the county in which there oc-
curred the loss, casualty, or event which plaintiff alleges to be covered by
the contract. Plaintiff is not required to establish defendant's liability or
that the loss, casualty, or event was in fact covered by the contract, but
only that the loss, casualty, or event occurred in the county and that de-
fendant issued or signed the contract which plaintiff alleges to cover the
loss, casualty or event. A judgment against the insured or indemnitee or a
payment by the insured or indemnitee for which reimbursement is claimed
is considered a loss occurring in the county where the judgment was recov-
ered or the payment was made.
"(g) Location of property. The following actions may be maintained in
the county in which the property or a part of the property was located at
the time of commencement of the suit or at the time of the damage or loss
for which recovery is sought:
"(1) an action for damages to real property or to restrain
interference with the use and enjoyment of real property;
"(2) an action to enforce a contract, security interest, or lien
concerning real or personal property;
"(3) an action for recovery of specific personal property; or
"(4) an action on an insurance contract for loss of or damage to
real or personal property.
"(h) Writs. An action for damages alleged to have resulted from issu-
ance or levy of a writ of attachment, garnishment, sequestration, or execu-
tion may be maintained in the county in which the writ was issued.
"(i) Injunctions. An action for injunction restraining acts alleged to be
occurring or threatened in a particular county may be maintained in the
county in which the acts are occurring or are threatened.
") Mandamus and mandatory injunctions. An action for mandamus or
mandatory injunction to require an act to be done in a particular county
may be maintained in the county where the act is specifically required to
be done by contract, statute, or common law.
"(k) Suits by state. The state may maintain actions in Travis County
to:
"(1) forfeit the charter of a private corporation;
"(2) cancel the permit authorizing a foreign corporation to
transact business in this state;
"(3) restrain a corporation from exercising powers not conferred
on it by the laws of this state; or
"(4) prevent a person from engaging in business in this state
contrary to the laws of this state.
"(1) Plainqf's residence. The following actions may be maintained in
the county of plaintiff's residence at commencement of the action:
"(1) an action by an insured or beneficiary on a contract of life,
health, accident, or liability insurance; or
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"(2) an action on a contract of insurance for loss of personal
property.
"(m) Defendant's residence. An action not governed by Section 2 of
this article may be maintained in the county of defendant's residence, but
one defendant's residence shall not establish venue of an action against
any other defendant who seeks transfer of the action on grounds other
than his residence in a different county.
-(n) Other permissive venue. An action governed by another statute
providing the county in which the action may be brought, but not prescrib-
ing mandatory venue, may be brought in the county designated in such
statute or in any county in which the action may be brought under the
provisions of this article.
"Section 4. Generalprovisions (a) Assignment of note, etc. The transfer
or assignment of a note, account, or chose in action shall not entitle the
holder or assignee to venue in a county which would not have been proper
venue if no transfer or assignment has been made.
"(b) Joinder of defendants. When two or more parties are joined as
defendants in the same action, and the court has venue of the action
against any defendant, the court also has venue of the action against all
defendants who are properly joined under the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, except that residence of one or more defendants in the county of suit
shall not establish venue of a defendant who seeks transfer of the action on
a ground other than residence in a different county.
"(c) Joinder of claims. When two or more claims or causes of action
are properly joined in one action under the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, a court having venue of one claim or cause of action has venue of all
claims or causes of action so joined unless one or more of the claims or
causes of action is governed by a mandatory venue provision requiring
transfer to another county under Section 2 of this article.
"(d) Counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims. Venue of the
main action shall establish venue of a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim properly joined under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, un-
less a severance is granted on other grounds.
"(e) Entire cause transferred When venue is successfully challenged,
the entire suit with respect to all parties shall be transferred to the county
of proper venue unless a severance is granted on other grounds.
"(0 County to which transferred. If the cause must be transferred and a
claim or cause of action involved in the action is governed by a mandatory
venue provision under Section 2 of this article or under any other provi-
sion of law, the court shall transfer the entire action to the county in which
venue is mandatory. If more than one county has mandatory venue, or if
no mandatory provision is applicable and venue is permissive in more
than one county, the court shall select a county of proper venue to which
the cause shall be transferred, considering the convenience of the parties
and the witnesses.
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"Section 5. Effective date. This Act is effective as of January 1, 1976,
and shall apply to all suits filed after that date."
Section 2. Emergency. The importance of this legislation and the
crowded condition of the calendars in both houses create an emergency
and an imperative public necessity that the constitutional rule requiring
bills to be read on three several days in each house be suspended, and this
rule is hereby suspended, and that this Act take effect and be in force from
and after its passage, and it is so enacted.

